Security audit

iDRAC

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed iDRAC administration helper with real operational and credential risks, but its behavior matches its stated purpose and does not show hidden or malicious actions.

Install only if you intend to manage Dell iDRAC devices from this machine. Use a dedicated least-privilege iDRAC account where possible, keep ~/.idrac-credentials protected or delete it when not needed, review ~/.config/idrac-skill/config because it is sourced by the shell script, and only run this on a trusted management network unless you modify it to validate the iDRAC certificate instead of using curl -k. Require explicit human approval before any power or BIOS-changing action.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (11)

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 93% confidence
Finding: The documentation includes authenticated power-control examples that can power on, gracefully shut down, or forcibly restart a production server, but it does not warn about service disruption, data loss, or require any confirmation step. In an agent skill context, exposing ready-to-run destructive commands increases the chance that an automated system or inattentive user triggers an outage against real infrastructure.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 85% confidence
Finding: The session-auth examples show direct handling of usernames, passwords, session tokens, and session URIs without warning that these values are sensitive secrets that should not be logged, echoed, or retained. In a tool/agent setting, such examples normalize unsafe secret handling and can lead to credential or token leakage through shell history, logs, transcripts, or process inspection.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Confidence: 94% confidence
Finding: When CREDS_SOURCE=env, the script writes the supplied username and password to ~/.idrac-credentials on disk. Even with mode 600, this creates persistent plaintext secret storage as a side effect, which increases exposure through backups, endpoint compromise, or later unintended reuse.

Session Persistence

Medium

Category: Rogue Agent
Content: ## First-Time Setup Create a config file at `~/.config/idrac-skill/config`: ```bash mkdir -p ~/.config/idrac-skill
Confidence: 89% confidence
Finding: The skill instructs users to persist configuration in `~/.config/idrac-skill/config`, which creates durable local state containing connection details and credential-source selection. While persistent config is common, it increases the chance of sensitive infrastructure metadata being left on disk and reused by later sessions or other local processes.

Session Persistence

Medium

Category: Rogue Agent
Content: # OP_ITEM="<1password-item-name>" # # For CREDS_SOURCE="file": # Create ~/.idrac-credentials with contents: username:password # chmod 600 ~/.idrac-credentials # # For CREDS_SOURCE="env":
Confidence: 96% confidence
Finding: The skill directs users to store `username:password` in `~/.idrac-credentials`, creating a plaintext credential cache on disk. Even with mode 600, this is a real credential-exposure risk on compromised hosts, through backups, shell history mistakes during creation, or accidental mishandling of file permissions.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High

Category: Tool Misuse
Content: 3. **Determine operation type:** - **Read-only** (status, health, logs, inventory) → Execute directly - **Destructive** (power off, restart, BIOS changes) → Confirm with user first 4. **Query Redfish API** via curl + Basic Auth (or session token for batch ops) 5. **Parse JSON** with jq 6. **Surface findings** to user in natural language 7. **Never expose credentials** in responses
Confidence: 91% confidence
Finding: The skill performs authenticated `curl` requests to a user-configured iDRAC endpoint and explicitly supports destructive operations such as power control. Because the target host is configurable and TLS verification is disabled elsewhere in the document, misuse or manipulation of request parameters could expose credentials to an attacker-controlled endpoint or enable unauthorized destructive actions against infrastructure.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High

Category: Tool Misuse
Content: All examples use the helper script's `api_get` pattern. For raw curl: ```bash curl -k -s -u "$(cat "$CREDS_FILE")" "https://${IDRAC_IP}/redfish/v1${ENDPOINT}" ``` ## Table of Contents
Confidence: 98% confidence
Finding: The documentation instructs users to run curl with -k, which disables TLS certificate verification and makes HTTPS connections vulnerable to man-in-the-middle interception or impersonation. Because this skill handles administrator credentials for hardware management, bypassing certificate validation materially increases the risk of credential theft and unauthorized control of servers.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High

Category: Tool Misuse
Content: ```bash # Create session (returns X-Auth-Token in headers) SESSION_RESPONSE=$(curl -k -i -X POST \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"UserName\":\"${IDRAC_USER}\",\"Password\":\"${IDRAC_PASS}\"}" \ "https://${IDRAC_IP}/redfish/v1/SessionService/Sessions")
Confidence: 99% confidence
Finding: Using curl -k when creating a Redfish session exposes the username and password exchange to man-in-the-middle attacks, allowing an attacker to impersonate the iDRAC and harvest credentials or issue a malicious token. Since these are privileged management credentials for out-of-band server control, compromise can lead to full administrative control over hardware operations.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High

Category: Tool Misuse
Content: SESSION_TOKEN=$(echo "$SESSION_RESPONSE" | grep -i "X-Auth-Token:" | awk '{print $2}' | tr -d '\r') # Use session token for subsequent calls curl -k -H "X-Auth-Token: $SESSION_TOKEN" \ "https://${IDRAC_IP}/redfish/v1/Systems/System.Embedded.1" | jq # Delete session when done
Confidence: 97% confidence
Finding: Using curl -k for authenticated follow-up requests means the session token is sent to an endpoint whose identity is not verified, enabling interception or replay by an attacker on the network path. In the context of iDRAC management, a stolen session token can permit sensitive inventory access or privileged state-changing operations depending on the account scope.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High

Category: Tool Misuse
Content: # Delete session when done SESSION_URI=$(echo "$SESSION_RESPONSE" | grep -i "Location:" | awk '{print $2}' | tr -d '\r') curl -k -X DELETE -H "X-Auth-Token: $SESSION_TOKEN" "${SESSION_URI}" ``` ## Power Operations
Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: Deleting the session with curl -k still sends the live authentication token over a connection without certificate validation, so the token can be exposed even during cleanup. While the intent is to close the session, the insecure transport undermines that safety measure and can leak management credentials or session context.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High

Category: Tool Misuse
Content: api_get "/Systems/System.Embedded.1" | jq -r '.PowerState' # Power on (if off) curl -k -s -u "$(cat "$CREDS_FILE")" \ -X POST -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d '{"ResetType":"On"}' \ "https://${IDRAC_IP}/redfish/v1/Systems/System.Embedded.1/Actions/ComputerSystem.Reset"
Confidence: 99% confidence
Finding: The example performs a privileged power action over HTTPS with certificate validation disabled, so an attacker able to intercept traffic could impersonate the iDRAC, capture credentials, or manipulate the command flow. Because the endpoint controls server power state, abuse can directly cause outages and potentially broader infrastructure disruption.

VirusTotal

65/65 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.