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JOULE DAO

v1.0.0

Interact with JOULE DAO on Base: track treasury, view proposals, vote, discuss, check balances, join as member, and earn JOULE for productive work contributi...

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MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
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Purpose & Capability
The name/description (DAO CLI for Base + Moltbook community integration) matches the code and runtime instructions: the scripts query Base RPC and call Moltbook endpoints for posts/submolts. However, the registry metadata claims no required environment variables/credentials while the SKILL.md and scripts clearly expect MOLTBOOK_API_KEY, JOULE_WALLET, and optionally JOULE_PRIVATE_KEY — that mismatch is surprising and reduces trust.
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Instruction Scope
SKILL.md and the scripts instruct the agent/user to read/write a config at ~/.joule/config.json and to use environment variables for API keys and wallet/private key. That's expected for this tool, but setup.sh will automatically attempt to create the Moltbook community and post a welcome message using a built-in API key. Embedding an operational flow that posts to an external service with a hardcoded bearer token expands the skill's scope in a way that should have been explicit in the metadata and docs.
Install Mechanism
There is no external download/install step; the package is instruction+scripts included in the skill. Files are local shell scripts and a config template; nothing is fetched from untrusted URLs or extracted at install time. This is a relatively low install risk.
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Credentials
The skill fails to declare required environment variables but uses/accepts MOLTBOOK_API_KEY, JOULE_WALLET, and JOULE_PRIVATE_KEY in practice. Worse, setup.sh contains a hardcoded SETUP_API_KEY (moltbook_sk_kkWAmIBStGleOs7qYizh0HFU00t5LHz6) which the script uses to create the community and post welcome messages. Hardcoding a bearer token in distributed code is a sensitive, disproportionate practice — it can enable unexpected actions on Moltbook or indicate misuse of someone else's credential.
Persistence & Privilege
The skill does not request always: true and will not be force-injected; it creates a config directory ~/.joule and makes scripts executable (normal CLI behavior). The main privilege concern is the embedded Moltbook API key used during setup which lets the package perform posts/creation on an external service; that is an action with side effects but not an elevated platform privilege per se.
What to consider before installing
Do not run setup.sh unreviewed. Specific things to consider before installing/using: - The package metadata says it requires no credentials, but the scripts need a Moltbook API key and a wallet (and optionally a private key). Expect to provide those if you use the tool. - setup.sh contains a hardcoded Moltbook bearer token (SETUP_API_KEY) that the script uses to create the community and post a welcome message. Ask the maintainer why a shared/embedded token is used, and verify the token's ownership and scope. Avoid running scripts that will use unknown bearer tokens on your systems or that will publish content under someone else's credentials. - Never paste your private key into a tool you haven't fully audited. The skill asks for JOULE_PRIVATE_KEY as an option for signing — if you need on-chain signing, prefer a hardware wallet or signing workflow that never exposes the raw private key to scripts. - If you still want to try it: inspect the code locally, run setup in a sandbox or disposable account, and remove or replace the hardcoded SETUP_API_KEY before running. If the embedded token was legitimately provided by the project, request that the project rotate the token and provide per-user API keys instead of a shared secret. - If you rely on this skill for production actions, request clearer metadata from the publisher listing the required environment variables and a security explanation of the setup flow. If you cannot verify the SETUP_API_KEY owner, do not use the automated submolt creation/posting steps.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

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