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Security audit

Volcano Plot Labeler

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a local plotting utility whose behavior matches its stated purpose, with the main caveat that its Python dependencies are unpinned.

Install it in a virtual environment or container, preferably after pinning reviewed versions of pandas, numpy, and matplotlib and removing scipy unless needed. Use only trusted input files and choose output paths carefully because the script writes to the path you provide.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
requirements.txt:1
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `requirements.txt`, lines 1–3 **Vulnerability Type**: Supply-chain exposure caused by unpinned dependencies **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```text matplotlib numpy pandas ``` Related installation instructions also appear in `SKILL.md`, line 32: ```bash pip install pandas matplotlib numpy scipy ``` ### Technical Analysis The project specifies third-party packages without exact versions or integrity hashes. Consequently, each installation resolves whichever package releases are available from the configured Python package index at that time. This prevents reproducible dependency resolution and means the installed code can change without any modification to the audited project. If a package repository, publisher account, configured package index, or dependency release is compromised, installation could introduce attacker-controlled package code. Python packages may execute code during the build or installation process, and malicious behavior may also trigger when the application imports the package. The documentation additionally instructs users to install `scipy`, although the implementation does not import it and `requirements.txt` does not declare it. This unnecessary dependency expands the supply-chain attack surface and creates inconsistency between the documented and actual environment. ### Attack Path 1. A user follows `SKILL.md` or installs packages from `requirements.txt`. 2. `pip` resolves mutable package versions from the user's configured package index because no versions or hashes are specified. 3. An attacker compromises a relevant publisher, release, index, mirror, or dependency distribution channel. 4. `pip` downloads and installs the attacker-controlled artifact because the project imposes no reviewed-version or integrity constraint. 5. Malicious installation, build, or import-time code executes under the account running `pip` or the plotting script. This path depends on compromise ...[truncated 769 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin every direct dependency to an explicitly reviewed version, for example: ```text matplotlib==<reviewed-version> numpy==<reviewed-version> pandas==<reviewed-version> ``` 2. Generate and verify cryptographic hashes for all resolved distributions. Install with a hash-enforcing workflow such as: ```bash python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 3. Use a lock file or a compiled requirements file that captures reviewed transitive dependencies as well as direct dependencies. 4. Remove `scipy` from `SKILL.md` unless it becomes a genuine runtime requirement, and keep installation documentation synchronized with `requirements.txt`. 5. Install only from a trusted, explicitly configured package index. In controlled environments, mirror approved artifacts into an internal repository. 6. Add automated dependency vulnerability and provenance scanning to the release process. Review and regenerate pins and hashes through a controlled update procedure. 7. Perform installation in an isolated virtual environment or container under a non-privileged account, avoiding system-wide or administrator-level installation.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (5)

Unpinned Dependencies

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Content
matplotlib
numpy
pandas
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The dependency on matplotlib is unpinned, so installations may resolve to different versions over time. This creates a supply-chain risk because a future vulnerable or breaking release could be installed without review, reducing build reproducibility and making security posture unverifiable.

Unpinned Dependencies

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Content
matplotlib
numpy
pandas
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The dependency on numpy is unpinned, so the environment may install any available version. Because numpy has had historical advisories, leaving it unpinned makes it impossible to verify whether deployments are using a safe release and increases supply-chain and reproducibility risk.

Unverifiable Dependency: numpy has 16 known advisory(ies) (CVE-2014-1859 (Numpy arbitrary file write via symlink attack); CVE-2021-41495 (NumPy NULL Pointer Dereference); CVE-2021-33430 (NumPy Buffer Overflow (Disputed)) +13 more), but the manifest does not pin a version, so it is unknown whether the installed release is affected

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding
Numpy has known advisories, but because no version is specified, the manifest does not allow verification that a non-vulnerable release will be installed. In this skill's context, the package is used for data analysis/plotting rather than inherently dangerous operations, so the issue is mainly uncertainty and supply-chain exposure rather than direct immediate exploitability.

Unpinned Dependencies

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Content
matplotlib
numpy
pandas
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The dependency on pandas is unpinned, allowing future installs to pull different versions with potentially different security properties. This weakens reproducibility and can expose the project to vulnerable releases or unexpected dependency behavior.

Unverifiable Dependency: pandas has 1 known advisory(ies) (CVE-2020-13091 (** DISPUTED ** pandas through 1.0.3 can unserialize and execute commands from an)), but the manifest does not pin a version, so it is unknown whether the installed release is affected

Low
Category
Supply Chain
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Pandas has at least one historical advisory, and the lack of version pinning means the installed release cannot be assessed from the manifest alone. While the skill context is a plotting utility and does not increase the danger, unverified dependency resolution still creates avoidable supply-chain and security uncertainty.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.