币安代理配置（中国大陆）

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 12, 2026 · 6:06 AM UTC
• Version: 1.0.0

Overview

This is a coherent Binance proxy setup guide, but it asks users to install an unverified proxy binary and run it persistently with high privileges while handling financial API credentials.

Install only after reviewing and tightening the setup: download mihomo from an official source, verify a pinned checksum or signature, avoid enabling boot persistence until tested, run the service as a dedicated unprivileged user with systemd hardening, and use read-only/IP-restricted Binance API keys through proxy infrastructure you control.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review

Findings (2)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:43

Finding

Unverified Executable Downloaded from a Third-Party Mirror and Run with Administrative Privileges

Content

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Remediation

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/tmp/mihomo.gz" | sha256sum --check - ``` 6. Extract into a newly created, permission-restricted temporary directory instead of directly using a predictable file in `/tmp`. 7. Do not execute the installed binary until integrity verification succeeds. 8. Document the expected version and checksum in the skill so upgrades require an explicit security review. ]]>

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error

• Location: SKILL.md:113

Finding

Persistent Mihomo Service Runs with Unnecessary Root Privileges and No Systemd Hardening

Content

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/etc/systemd/system/mihomo.service << 'EOF' [Unit] Description=Mihomo Proxy Service After=network.target [Service] Type=simple ExecStart=/usr/local/bin/mihomo -d /etc/mihomo Restart=on-failure RestartSec=5 [Install] WantedBy=multi-user.target EOF systemctl daemon-reload systemctl enable mihomo systemctl start mihomo ``` ### Technical Analysis The unit does not specify `User=` or `Group=`. System services default to running as `root`, so Mihomo receives unrestricted administrative privileges. Its documented listeners use ports `7890` and `9090`, both above the privileged-port boundary, and the configuration does not demonstrate a need for unrestricted root execution. The unit also lacks standard systemd sandboxing controls such as `NoNewPrivileges`, `ProtectSystem`, `ProtectHome`, `PrivateTmp`, capability restrictions, and syscall or namespace protections. Consequently, exploitation of Mihomo, loading of a malicious replacement binary, or abuse of an unsafe configuration would occur without meaningful operating-system containment. Running continuously and enabling the unit at boot are reasonable operational choices for an always-available proxy. Therefore, `systemctl enable mihomo` is not by itself evidence of a hidden backdoor. However, persistence magnifies the excessive-privilege issue: the privileged process survives user sessions and is automatically restored after reboot. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises or replaces `/usr/local/bin/mihomo`, exploits a vulnerability in Mihomo, or gains an applicable configuration-manipulation capability. 2. An administrator starts the documented systemd unit, or the enabled unit starts automatically during boot. 3. Systemd launches Mihomo as `root` because no less-privileged service identity is confi ...[truncated 824 chars]

Remediation

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SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Rogue Agent: Self-Modification, Session Persistence
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code

Findings (8)

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 95% confidence

Finding

The skill downloads and installs an executable as root from a third-party mirror URL without checksum, signature verification, or provenance validation. This creates a supply-chain risk: if the mirror or transit path is compromised, a malicious binary could gain persistent privileged execution on the host.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.

bash

# 下载（选一个镜像）
curl -sL "https://ghfast.top/https://github.com/MetaCubeX/mihomo/releases/download/v1.19.0/mihomo-linux-amd64-v1.19.0.gz" -o /tmp/mihomo.gz
cd /tmp && gunzip -f mihomo.gz && chmod +x mihomo && mv mihomo /usr/local/bin/mihomo
mihomo -v  # 验证安装

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 105)May include surrounding context.

bash

mihomo -d /etc/mihomo -t  # 测试配置
# 测试币安API连通性
curl -s --proxy http://127.0.0.1:7890 https://api.binance.com/api/v3/time
# 预期返回: {"serverTime":1773828714609}

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 177)May include surrounding context.

bash

mihomo -d /etc/mihomo -t  # 测试配置
# 测试币安API连通性
curl -s --proxy http://127.0.0.1:7890 https://api.binance.com/api/v3/time
# 预期返回: {"serverTime":1773828714609}

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 50% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 195)May include surrounding context.

bash

mihomo -d /etc/mihomo -t  # 测试配置
# 测试币安API连通性
curl -s --proxy http://127.0.0.1:7890 https://api.binance.com/api/v3/time
# 预期返回: {"serverTime":1773828714609}

Session Persistence

Medium

• Category: Rogue Agent
• Confidence: 89% confidence

Finding

Enabling the proxy service at boot creates persistent system-wide network behavior changes and long-lived exposure if the configuration is unsafe, compromised, or later forgotten. Persistence is especially relevant here because the service mediates outbound traffic for financial API access and can continue operating beyond the immediate setup session.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 128)May include surrounding context.

EOF

systemctl daemon-reload systemctl enable mihomo systemctl start mihomo

text

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 91% confidence

Finding

The skill instructs users to configure a system proxy and perform signed Binance account API requests, but it does not clearly warn that API keys, signatures, account metadata, and all proxied traffic may be exposed to the proxy operator or via shell history/logging. In this context, the combination of credentialed financial API access and network reconfiguration raises meaningful confidentiality and operational risk even if the intent appears instructional.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

This command sends a credentialed signed request to a Binance account endpoint through a locally configured proxy, exposing sensitive financial account access to proxy-path risk, shell history leakage, and accidental disclosure in logs or transcripts. In a guide specifically about routing traffic through third-party VPS/proxy infrastructure, that context makes the transmission more dangerous than an ordinary API example.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 173)May include surrounding context.

md

# 查询账户（需签名）
curl -s --proxy http://127.0.0.1:7890 \
  -H "X-MBX-APIKEY: $API_KEY" \
  "https://api.binance.com/api/v3/account?$QUERY&signature=$SIG"

# 查询价格（无需签名）
curl -s --proxy http://127.0.0.1:7890 \

Natural-Language Policy Violations

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 92% confidence

Finding

The skill metadata description is entirely in Chinese and the file consistently assumes Chinese-language interaction, but it does not offer any user language choice or explain that the skill is intentionally limited to Chinese-speaking users. Under the stated policy, forcing a specific language without opt-in is a natural-language policy violation.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.