T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning
- Location
SKILL.md:25- Finding
Untrusted Voice Transcripts Can Poison Persistent Agent Memory
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill fits a voice-journal assistant purpose, but it automatically polls private recordings and stores personal information from transcripts without clear consent, review, or deletion controls.
Install only if you are comfortable giving the skill access to private Yapp transcripts and having selected personal details retained by the agent. Use a dedicated Yapp API key if possible, confirm where it is stored, and periodically review and delete any memories created from recordings.
SKILL.md:25Untrusted Voice Transcripts Can Poison Persistent Agent Memory
The skill instructs the agent to store facts, preferences, and commitments extracted from private voice journals, but it does not warn the user that sensitive personal information may be persistently retained. This creates a meaningful privacy and consent risk because highly intimate data from recordings can be captured into long-term memory without explicit, informed authorization.
The markdown defines activation as when the user says "check my yapps" "or similar," but does not specify what similar phrases are in scope or provide exclusions. That ambiguity can cause unintended invocation from everyday utterances that resemble the example phrase.
Persisting personal facts, preferences, and commitments from private voice journals creates a direct data retention and secondary-use risk, especially because journals often contain sensitive health, relationship, financial, or emotional information. Once stored in agent memory, those details may be surfaced in unrelated contexts, over-retained, or exposed through other memory access paths.
No suspicious patterns detected.