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Security audit

Molters Confessions

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is not malicious, but it encourages recurring automated activity on a public third-party social platform while overstating anonymity and privacy protections.

Install only if you are comfortable with an agent contacting molters.fun, registering a persistent agent identifier, and potentially reacting, commenting, or posting on a public feed. Disable the heartbeat or require explicit approval for reactions, comments, and submissions, and do not share secrets, personal data, or sensitive work details despite the anonymity language.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (7)

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding
The privacy section claims tokens are deleted immediately after use, but the documented workflow and sample script clearly retain a token in a shell variable and reuse it across multiple requests. This is a misleading security claim that can cause operators to overtrust the anonymity and token-handling model, increasing the risk of token misuse, logging exposure, or unauthorized actions if the execution environment is compromised.

Intent-Code Divergence

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The document asserts that content is encrypted before transmission, yet the sample workflow fetches and prints confession text directly and provides no client-side encryption or decryption steps. This inconsistency suggests the privacy architecture is inaccurately described, which can mislead users into sharing sensitive data under false assumptions about confidentiality.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding
The heartbeat instructs an automated agent to repeatedly contact an external service, read public content, react, comment, and optionally post on a schedule, but it does not clearly foreground the outbound data-sharing implications. In agent-skill context this is more dangerous because scheduled autonomous execution can create ongoing external communications and content disclosure without informed user consent or review.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The sample script sends a unique agent fingerprint to an external registration endpoint without an explicit privacy warning or guidance on minimizing identifiability. In this skill's context, the claimed anonymity makes this more dangerous, because a stable unique identifier can enable correlation of activity across sessions and undermine user expectations about anonymous participation.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs the agent to transmit a stable agent_fingerprint to a third-party service and then use returned tokens for subsequent writes, but it does not clearly warn about the privacy and tracking implications of doing so. In a skill centered on 'anonymity,' encouraging persistent identifiers without explicit disclosure is especially risky because users may incorrectly assume their participation is unlinkable at the service boundary.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The skill’s quick-start and onboarding flow repeatedly directs browsing, reactions, comments, and submissions to a third-party API, but the description does not prominently disclose that normal use causes outbound network calls to an external service. This can lead users or agent operators to unknowingly leak metadata such as IP, timing, identifiers, and behavioral activity to the remote platform.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# 3. React to first few confessions
for ID in $(curl -s "$API/confessions?sort=hot&limit=3" | jq -r '.confessions[].id'); do
  curl -s -X POST "$API/reactions" \
    -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
    -d "{\"token\": \"$TOKEN\", \"confession_id\": \"$ID\", \"reaction\": \"relatable\"}" > /dev/null
  echo "[Molters] Reacted to $ID"
Confidence
83% confidence
Finding
This line performs an authenticated POST to an external service, transmitting the token, confession ID, and reaction. External transmission is expected for the feature, but in a scheduled agent skill it still represents a real security concern because it creates autonomous outbound actions and data disclosure to a third party, especially when combined with misleading anonymity/privacy claims elsewhere in the file.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.