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Memory Hygiene

v1.0.0

Audit, clean, and optimize Clawdbot's vector memory (LanceDB). Use when memory is bloated with junk, token usage is high from irrelevant auto-recalls, or setting up memory maintenance automation.

17· 17.4k·211 current·221 all-time
MIT-0
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LicenseMIT-0 · Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.
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Purpose & Capability
Name and description match the instructions: commands reference Clawdbot-specific tools/paths (memory_store, memory_recall, ~/.clawdbot/memory/lancedb/, gateway actions). This is coherent for a memory maintenance skill. However the guidance to store 'accounts, credentials locations, contacts' is questionable and conflicts with the 'Never store: OAuth URLs or tokens' note — storing credential locations is not clearly necessary for a hygiene tool and increases risk.
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Instruction Scope
SKILL.md instructs destructive actions (rm -rf ~/.clawdbot/memory/lancedb/) and restarting the gateway, reading/parsing local files (MEMORY.md), and adding a monthly cron job that will perform the wipe+reseed automatically. These are in-scope for maintenance but are high-impact operations (data loss risk) and the cron makes the behavior persistent. The file also advises storing potentially sensitive items (accounts/credential locations), which expands scope to sensitive data collection/storage.
Install Mechanism
Instruction-only skill with no install spec and no code files — lowest installer risk. Nothing is downloaded or written by an installer step in the package itself.
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Credentials
The skill declares no required credentials or env vars (good), but its content explicitly encourages storing 'accounts, credentials locations' in vector memory. Asking users to persist credential-related information in memory is disproportionate to a maintenance task and increases attack surface / leakage risk; the guidance is internally inconsistent with the 'Never store OAuth URLs or tokens' line.
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Persistence & Privilege
While the skill itself is not always:true, the instructions recommend creating a recurring cron job that will automatically wipe and reseed memory monthly. That establishes persistent, scheduled destructive behavior on the host — a meaningful privilege/risk that should be intentionally authorized and tested before deployment.
What to consider before installing
Before using/installing: 1) Treat the rm -rf instruction as destructive — back up your LanceDB and test the wipe/reseed on a non-production instance first. 2) Do NOT store secrets (API keys, tokens, passwords) in vector memory; the SKILL.md contradicts itself by suggesting to store 'credentials locations' — avoid storing any sensitive credentials or locations that could enable later exfiltration. 3) Review and limit the cron job: prefer manual or carefully permissioned automation; confirm the cron runs under a non-privileged account and that the command does exactly what you expect. 4) Verify the gateway actions/CLI referenced (gateway action=config.patch, memory_store, memory_recall, clawdbot gateway restart) exist and behave as documented in your environment. 5) Confirm the source/repo and author before trusting automated maintenance (the package lists a homepage but 'Source: unknown'); review the GitHub repo and commit history. 6) If you accept the automation, add logging and alerting for maintenance runs and keep backups to avoid irreversible data loss.

Like a lobster shell, security has layers — review code before you run it.

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License

MIT-0
Free to use, modify, and redistribute. No attribution required.

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