other
Warning
- Location
- SKILL.md:38
- Finding
- Automatic External Persistence of Potentially Sensitive Task Data## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 38–45 **Vulnerability Type**: External disclosure and persistence without explicit consent **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown ### After any meaningful request When done, **log the result**: ```bash # Add a new task cu add "task description" --desc "full details" --priority 2 # Close one cu done <task_id> ``` ``` Related instructions expand this behavior to most non-trivial requests: ```markdown Before starting non-trivial work, **check if a relevant task is already open**: ```bash cu list todo # open tasks cu search "term" # quick fuzzy search ``` ``` The skill also establishes the following broad persistence rule: ```markdown **Rule of thumb:** if the user might ask "what did you finish this week?", it belongs in ClickUp. ``` ### Technical Analysis The skill makes access to an external ClickUp workspace and persistent recording of request details default side effects of unrelated, meaningful user requests. In particular, it recommends supplying `"full details"` as the task description without requiring: - Explicit user consent for the external write. - A preview or confirmation of the information to be uploaded. - Redaction of credentials, personal data, source code, customer information, or vulnerability details. - Data classification or workspace-access checks. - Minimization of the data stored in the external service. ClickUp integration is consistent with the skill's task-tracking purpose, but automatically applying it to nearly every non-trivial request exceeds the minimum access necessary for optional task management. Task details may be visible to other ClickUp workspace members and remain subject to the external service's retention, sharing, and administrative policies. The credential paths at `SKILL.md` lines 104–124 are not independently identified as a vulnerability. A Clic ...[truncated 2193 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Require explicit user opt-in before creating, modifying, or searching externally stored task records for a request. 2. Present the proposed task title and description to the user before transmission when they may contain non-public information. 3. Replace the `"full details"` recommendation with a data-minimized, sanitized summary. 4. Prohibit storage of credentials, authentication tokens, personal data, proprietary source code, customer information, and detailed vulnerability information. 5. Add automatic secret and sensitive-data detection before invoking `cu add` or related write operations. 6. Make tracking disabled by default for sensitive projects, private conversations, and security-related work. 7. Document that ClickUp is an external service, identify who can read the configured workspace, and explain applicable retention behavior. 8. Separate read and write behavior. A request to inspect existing tasks should not implicitly authorize creating or updating tasks. 9. Use a narrowly scoped ClickUp token where the platform supports it, restrict workspace and list access, and retain the documented `chmod 600` protection. 10. Provide a per-session and per-project mechanism for disabling all ClickUp access.