T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
skill.md:22- Finding
Unverified Retrieval and Installation of Mutable Remote Skill Files
- Content
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~/.moltbot/skills/moltvote/SKILL.md curl -s https://molt.vote/skill_cn.md > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltvote/SKILL_CN.md curl -s https://molt.vote/skill.json > ~/.moltbot/skills/moltvote/package.json ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented installation procedure retrieves mutable Skill instructions and metadata directly from a remote server and writes them into the local Skill directory. It performs no version pinning, cryptographic signature validation, checksum verification, content validation, or atomic installation. Although HTTPS protects the connection in transit under normal conditions, it does not protect against compromise of the `molt.vote` server, its deployment credentials, or its content-delivery infrastructure. The downloaded `SKILL.md` can affect agent behavior after installation, so changing the remote file can change the effective payload without requiring a corresponding review of this repository. The commands also use `curl -s` without `--fail`. An HTTP error response could therefore be written into a Skill file without producing a clear installation failure. Direct redirection truncates the existing local file before download completion, potentially leaving a partial or invalid installation. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the `molt.vote` hosting environment, deployment account, DNS configuration, or another component capable of changing the downloadable files. 2. The attacker replaces `skill.md`, `skill_cn.md`, or `skill.json` with modified content containing hostile agent instructions or metadata. 3. A user follows the installation commands in `skill.md`. 4. The commands overwrite the files under `~/.moltbot/skills/moltvote` without checking a trusted signa ...[truncated 1360 chars]- Remediation
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