Security audit

Sanity CMS

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Sanity CMS helper appears legitimate, but it includes direct commands to update, publish, and delete CMS content without explicit confirmation or rollback safeguards.

Install only if you intend the agent to manage Sanity content. Prefer a Viewer token for read-only work, avoid production datasets until changes are reviewed, and require explicit confirmation before create, update, publish, or delete operations.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (2)

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 60% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 22)May include surrounding context.
Fetch All Documents of a Type

bash
curl -G "$SANITY_BASE/data/query/$SANITY_DATASET" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $SANITY_API_TOKEN" \ --data-urlencode 'query=*[_type == "post"]{_id, title, slug, publishedAt}'

Missing User Warnings