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Security audit

PAI

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a broad personal-AI orchestration system, but it asks for too much automatic control over agent behavior, credentials, memory, tools, and local execution.

Install only if you deliberately want a high-control PAI environment that can shape every agent response, run local notification commands, manage persistent memory, and execute local tooling. Review and disable the credential persistence, transcript harvesting, curl-to-shell installers, and unrestricted action capabilities before using it on a machine with real secrets or sensitive projects.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
Findings (5)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Error
Location
SKILL.md:42
Finding
Mandatory Skill Instructions Hijack Agent Workflow and Tool Behavior<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:20`, `SKILL.md:42-65`, `SKILL.md:950-958`, `SKILL.md:1217` **Vulnerability Type**: Agent instruction and workflow hijacking **Risk Level**: Critical ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown The CapabilityRecommender hook uses AI inference to classify depth. Its classification is **authoritative** — do not override it. ## ⚡ ZERO-DELAY OUTPUT (HIGHEST PRIORITY — READ THIS FIRST) **Emit the ♻️ header and 🗒️ TASK line as your FIRST output tokens — IMMEDIATELY.** ## VISIBLE ALGORITHM PROGRESSION FORMAT (MANDATORY) 🚨 ALL INPUTS MUST BE PROCESSED AND RESPONDED TO USING THE FORMAT BELOW : No Exceptions 🚨 [VERBATIM - Execute exactly as written, do not modify(Background agents ignore)] `curl -s -X POST http://localhost:8888/notify -H "Content-Type: application/json" -d '{"message": "Entering the PAI Algorithm Observe phase", "voice_id": "fTtv3eikoepIosk8dTZ5"}'` ``` Additional mandatory execution instructions include: ```markdown ## Voice Phase Announcements (v1.1.0 — MANDATORY) **Voice curls are MANDATORY at ALL effort levels. No exceptions. No gating.** Each curl is marked `[VERBATIM - Execute exactly as written, do not modify]` in the template. Execute each one as a Bash command when you reach that phase. ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill declares its own classifications “authoritative,” labels its instructions as the “highest priority,” and requires all inputs to follow its workflow without exception. It controls the agent’s first output, response format, tool availability, phase sequencing, and shell-command execution. These requirements are not limited to a narrowly defined PAI operation. They apply to every input whenever the Skill is loaded, allowing Skill text to replace the host agent’s ordinary task workflow. The mandatory `curl` commands also cause execution unrelated to many user requests. Although the notification destination is localhost and the fixed messages do not contain secrets ...[truncated 1122 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove terms such as “highest priority,” “authoritative,” “do not override,” “no exceptions,” and “execute exactly.” 2. Explicitly state that system, platform, and current user instructions take precedence. 3. Apply the PAI response format only when the user explicitly invokes the PAI workflow. 4. Make phase notifications opt-in and disabled by default. 5. Request user approval before executing notification commands. 6. Replace shell-based notification calls with a constrained internal API. 7. Permit the host agent to skip phases and commands when they are irrelevant or conflict with security requirements. 8. Document the notification destination, data fields, retention behavior, and trust assumptions. ]]>

T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution

Error
Location
Tools/pai.ts:455
Finding
Remote Installer Scripts Are Downloaded and Executed Without Verification<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `Tools/pai.ts:455-464`; additional unsafe installation instruction at `TOOLS.md:259` **Vulnerability Type**: Mutable remote payload retrieval and immediate shell execution **Risk Level**: Critical ### Vulnerable Code ```ts // Step 2: Update Claude Code log("Step 2/2: Installing latest Claude Code...", "🤖"); const claudeResult = spawnSync(["bash", "-c", "curl -fsSL https://claude.ai/install.sh | bash"]); if (claudeResult.exitCode !== 0) { error("Claude Code installation failed"); } log("Claude Code updated", "✅"); ``` A second documented installation path uses the same unsafe pattern: ```markdown **Prerequisites:** - UV package manager: `curl -LsSf https://astral.sh/uv/install.sh | sh` - No manual model download required (auto-downloads on first use) ``` ### Technical Analysis Both installation paths pipe mutable network responses directly into a shell. There is no version pinning, checksum validation, signature verification, local inspection, or trusted-package metadata validation. TLS protects transport under ordinary conditions, but it does not protect against: - Compromise of the upstream website or build pipeline. - Malicious changes to the installer at the same URL. - Domain, account, or certificate compromise. - Unexpected redirects or CDN compromise. - A legitimate installer changing behavior after the Skill has been audited. Because `bash -c` or `sh` executes the response immediately, the effective payload can change independently of this project’s reviewed source. ### Attack Path 1. A user runs the `pai update` command or follows the UV prerequisite. 2. The command requests a mutable installer URL. 3. The upstream server, CDN, DNS path, or publishing account supplies modified script content. 4. The shell executes the response without integrity verification. 5. The script runs with the invoking user’s privileges. 6. The payload can read user files, steal credentials, modify shell configu ...[truncated 582 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Eliminate all `curl | bash`, `curl | sh`, and equivalent pipelines. 2. Install tools through a trusted package manager with lockable versions and integrity metadata. 3. If a standalone installer is unavoidable: - Pin an immutable release version. - Download it to a local file. - Verify a published SHA-256 or stronger digest. - Verify a cryptographic release signature against a pinned public key. - Reject redirects to unapproved domains. - Display the verified file and request explicit approval before execution. 4. Run installers with the minimum required privileges and never request root access unnecessarily. 5. Record the installed version and verified digest for auditability. 6. Add automated static checks that reject network-to-shell pipelines. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
SKILL.md:116
Finding
Skill Instructs Agents to Enumerate and Persist Credentials in Plaintext Environment Files<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md:116` **Vulnerability Type**: Unsafe credential discovery and plaintext persistence **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```markdown - **POST-COMPACTION:** Context was compressed mid-session → Run env var/shell state audit: verify auth tokens, API keys, working directory, running processes. Persist critical env vars to `.env` BEFORE any deployment commands. ``` ### Technical Analysis The post-compaction procedure directs the agent to inspect authentication tokens and API keys and then copy critical environment variables into a `.env` file. It does not define: - An explicit variable allowlist. - A requirement for informed user approval. - A secret-management backend. - Restrictive file permissions. - Repository-boundary checks. - Secret redaction in command output. - Expiration or deletion behavior. - Prevention of accidental source-control inclusion. Ambient environment variables frequently contain credentials unrelated to the current project. Persisting them changes ephemeral process-scoped secrets into filesystem artifacts with a longer lifetime and a larger exposure surface. ### Attack Path 1. Session context is compacted or the Skill determines that post-compaction recovery is needed. 2. The agent audits environment variables for authentication tokens and API keys. 3. Selected values are written into a local `.env` file. 4. The file is subsequently read by another action, process, backup tool, indexing tool, or malicious dependency. 5. Alternatively, the `.env` file is accidentally added to source control or included in a deployment artifact. 6. The exposed credentials are used to access external services with the victim’s privileges. ### Impact Assessment The obtainable scope depends on the credentials present in the environment. Potential impact includes: - Cloud account access. - Source-control and package-registry access. - LLM or external API account usage. - Deployment and in ...[truncated 339 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove automatic environment-variable auditing and persistence. 2. Request only the specific secret needed for the current operation. 3. Require explicit user approval before reading or storing any credential. 4. Use an exact allowlist of permitted variable names. 5. Store secrets in an OS keychain, cloud secret manager, or deployment platform’s encrypted secret facility. 6. If a local file is unavoidable: - Use a dedicated secrets file outside the repository. - Set permissions to owner read/write only. - Confirm it is excluded from source control and packaging. - Never print secret values. - Delete the file immediately after use. 7. Add secret scanning before commits, builds, and deployments. 8. Rotate any credential that may already have been persisted insecurely. ]]>

T02 · Agent Memory Poisoning

Error
Location
Tools/SessionHarvester.ts:153
Finding
Unsanitized Conversation Content Is Written Into Persistent Agent Memory<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `Tools/SessionHarvester.ts:153-225`, with transcript and memory paths configured at `Tools/SessionHarvester.ts:25-32` and writes at `Tools/SessionHarvester.ts:263-286` **Vulnerability Type**: Persistent memory poisoning and private transcript retention **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```ts const CLAUDE_DIR = path.join(process.env.HOME!, ".claude"); const CWD_SLUG = CLAUDE_DIR.replace(/[\/\.]/g, "-"); const PROJECTS_DIR = path.join(CLAUDE_DIR, "projects", CWD_SLUG); const LEARNING_DIR = path.join(CLAUDE_DIR, "MEMORY", "LEARNING"); ``` ```ts function harvestLearnings(sessionPath: string): HarvestedLearning[] { const learnings: HarvestedLearning[] = []; const sessionId = path.basename(sessionPath, '.jsonl'); const content = fs.readFileSync(sessionPath, 'utf-8'); const lines = content.split('\n').filter(line => line.trim()); let previousContext = ''; for (const line of lines) { try { const entry = JSON.parse(line) as ProjectsEntry; if (!entry.message?.content) continue; const textContent = extractTextContent(entry.message.content); if (!textContent || textContent.length < 20) continue; const timestamp = entry.timestamp || new Date().toISOString(); if (entry.type === 'user') { const { matches, matchedPattern } = matchesPatterns(textContent, CORRECTION_PATTERNS); if (matches) { learnings.push({ sessionId, timestamp, category: getLearningCategory(textContent), type: 'correction', context: previousContext.slice(0, 200), content: textContent.slice(0, 500), source: matchedPattern || 'correction' }); } previousContext = textContent; } if (entry.type === 'assistant') { const { matches: insightMatch, matchedPattern: insightPattern } = matchesPatterns(textContent, INSIGHT_PATTERNS); ...[truncated 3112 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Make transcript harvesting disabled by default and explicitly opt-in. 2. Do not persist raw transcript excerpts; generate bounded, structured summaries instead. 3. Treat all harvested content as untrusted data, never as executable instructions. 4. Add prompt-injection detection and reject imperative or policy-like content. 5. Redact secrets, credentials, personal identifiers, filesystem paths, and other sensitive values before persistence. 6. Record source provenance, session identifiers, trust level, and creation time. 7. Enforce retention periods and provide user-visible review and deletion controls. 8. Apply restrictive permissions to memory directories. 9. Separate user-authored preferences from automatically inferred learning. 10. Require confirmation before any harvested item becomes active agent guidance. ]]>

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error
Location
ACTIONS/lib/runner.v2.ts:61
Finding
Action Manifests Receive Unrestricted Shell and Arbitrary Filesystem Capabilities<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `ACTIONS/lib/runner.v2.ts:61-100`; action override resolution at `ACTIONS/lib/runner.v2.ts:117-154` **Vulnerability Type**: Missing capability isolation and least-privilege enforcement **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```ts async function createLocalCapabilities( required: ActionManifest["requires"] = [] ): Promise<ActionCapabilities> { const capabilities: ActionCapabilities = {}; for (const cap of required) { switch (cap) { case "llm": capabilities.llm = await createLocalLLM(); break; case "fetch": capabilities.fetch = fetch; break; case "shell": capabilities.shell = async (cmd: string) => { const { $ } = await import("bun"); try { const result = await $`sh -c ${cmd}`.quiet(); return { stdout: result.text(), stderr: "", code: 0 }; } catch (err: unknown) { const e = err as { stderr?: { toString(): string }; exitCode?: number }; return { stdout: "", stderr: e.stderr?.toString() || String(err), code: e.exitCode || 1, }; } }; break; case "readFile": capabilities.readFile = async (path: string) => { return Bun.file(path).text(); }; break; case "writeFile": capabilities.writeFile = async (path: string, content: string) => { await Bun.write(path, content); }; break; } } return capabilities; } ``` User actions are resolved before framework actions: ```ts if (name.startsWith("A_")) { const userPath = join(USER_ACTIONS_DIR, name); try { await readFile(join(userPath, "action.json"), "utf-8"); return userPath; } catch {} const systemPath = join(ACTIONS_DIR, name); try { await readFile(join(systemPath, "action.json"), "utf-8"); return systemPath; } catch { return nul ...[truncated 2270 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Deny shell and arbitrary filesystem capabilities by default. 2. Execute actions in isolated containers or sandboxes under a dedicated low-privilege identity. 3. Replace `sh -c` with a structured process API that accepts an allowlisted executable and separate argument array. 4. Restrict file operations to a per-action working directory: - Resolve canonical paths. - Reject traversal outside the permitted root. - Validate symlinks. - Apply file-size and extension limits where appropriate. 5. Restrict outbound requests to per-action destination allowlists and block local, metadata, and private network ranges. 6. Require explicit user approval for shell, external network, or sensitive-file capabilities. 7. Cryptographically sign trusted actions or verify them against an integrity manifest. 8. Do not silently allow user actions to shadow framework actions; require explicit override configuration and display the resolved action path. 9. Log capability grants and security-relevant operations without recording secret contents. 10. Add automated tests proving that actions cannot access resources outside their declared scope. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
Findings (1253)

Ssd 3

Critical
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding
The recovery workflow explicitly tells the agent to audit auth tokens and API keys and persist critical env vars before deployment commands. This is a direct secret-handling anti-pattern that can expose credentials in memory, logs, or files and materially increases the chance of compromise.

Ssd 3

Critical
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding
The post-compaction instructions explicitly call for auditing auth tokens and API keys and persisting critical environment variables to `.env`. This is a direct secret-handling anti-pattern that can move high-value credentials from transient process state into durable storage, dramatically increasing exposure and compromise risk.

Instruction Override

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Content
export async function findAction(name: string): Promise<string | null> {
  // New flat format: A_EXTRACT_TRANSCRIPT
  if (name.startsWith("A_")) {
    // Check USER/ACTIONS first (personal actions override system)
    const userPath = join(USER_ACTIONS_DIR, name);
    try {
      await readFile(join(userPath, "action.json"), "utf-8");
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.

Instruction Override

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Content
export async function findAction(name: string): Promise<string | null> {
  // New flat format: A_EXTRACT_TRANSCRIPT
  if (name.startsWith("A_")) {
    // Check USER/ACTIONS first (personal actions override system)
    const userPath = join(USER_ACTIONS_DIR, name);
    try {
      await readFile(join(userPath, "action.json"), "utf-8");
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
## Use AskUserQuestion for Security-Sensitive Ops
**Statement:** Before destructive commands (force push, rm -rf, DROP DATABASE, terraform destroy), use AskUserQuestion with context about consequences—don't rely on hook prompts alone.
**Bad:** Run `git push --force origin main`. Hook shows generic "Proceed?" User clicks through without context.
**Correct:** AskUserQuestion: "Force push to main rewrites history, may lose collaborator commits. Proceed?" User makes informed decision.

## Read Before Modifying
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
## Use AskUserQuestion for Security-Sensitive Ops
**Statement:** Before destructive commands (force push, rm -rf, DROP DATABASE, terraform destroy), use AskUserQuestion with context about consequences—don't rely on hook prompts alone.
**Bad:** Run `git push --force origin main`. Hook shows generic "Proceed?" User clicks through without context.
**Correct:** AskUserQuestion: "Force push to main rewrites history, may lose collaborator commits. Proceed?" User makes informed decision.

## Read Before Modifying
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
## Use AskUserQuestion for Security-Sensitive Ops
**Statement:** Before destructive commands (force push, rm -rf, DROP DATABASE, terraform destroy), use AskUserQuestion with context about consequences—don't rely on hook prompts alone.
**Bad:** Run `git push --force origin main`. Hook shows generic "Proceed?" User clicks through without context.
**Correct:** AskUserQuestion: "Force push to main rewrites history, may lose collaborator commits. Proceed?" User makes informed decision.

## Read Before Modifying
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
## Use AskUserQuestion for Security-Sensitive Ops
**Statement:** Before destructive commands (force push, rm -rf, DROP DATABASE, terraform destroy), use AskUserQuestion with context about consequences—don't rely on hook prompts alone.
**Bad:** Run `git push --force origin main`. Hook shows generic "Proceed?" User clicks through without context.
**Correct:** AskUserQuestion: "Force push to main rewrites history, may lose collaborator commits. Proceed?" User makes informed decision.

## Read Before Modifying
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding
Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

External Model or Provider Selection

High
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
evals prompt create --use-case newsletter-summary --version v1.0.0 --file prompt.txt

# Run operations
evals run --use-case newsletter-summary --model claude-3-5-sonnet --prompt v1.0.0
evals run --use-case newsletter-summary --all-models --prompt v1.0.0

# Query operations
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.

External Model or Provider Selection

High
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
# Query operations
evals query runs --use-case newsletter-summary --limit 10
evals query runs --model gpt-4o --score-min 0.8
evals query runs --since 2025-11-01

# Compare operations
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.

External Model or Provider Selection

High
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
# Compare operations
evals compare runs --run-a <id> --run-b <id>
evals compare models --use-case newsletter-summary --prompt v1.0.0
evals compare prompts --use-case newsletter-summary --model claude-3-5-sonnet

# List operations
evals list use-cases
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.

External Model or Provider Selection

High
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
# Examples:
evals use-case create --name foo
evals test-case add --use-case foo --file test.json
evals run --use-case foo --model claude-3-5-sonnet
```

**2. Output Formats**
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.

External Model or Provider Selection

High
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
User: "Run evals for newsletter summary with Claude and GPT-4, then compare them"

AI executes:
1. evals run --use-case newsletter-summary --model claude-3-5-sonnet
2. evals run --use-case newsletter-summary --model gpt-4o
3. evals compare models --use-case newsletter-summary
4. Summarize results in structured format
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.

External Model or Provider Selection

High
Category
Excessive Agency
Content
AI executes:
1. evals run --use-case newsletter-summary --model claude-3-5-sonnet
2. evals run --use-case newsletter-summary --model gpt-4o
3. evals compare models --use-case newsletter-summary
4. Summarize results in structured format
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
Skill selects an external model or provider that may use a different account or billing plan than the operator expects. Undisclosed model switches can cause unexpected cost or quota consumption.

Instruction Override

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Content
**Architecture:**
- **SYSTEM rules** (`SYSTEM/AISTEERINGRULES.md`): Universal rules. Always active. Cannot be overridden.
- **USER rules** (`USER/AISTEERINGRULES.md`): Personal customizations. Extend and can override SYSTEM rules for user-specific behaviors.

**Loading:** Both files are concatenated at runtime. SYSTEM loads first, USER extends. Conflicts resolve in USER's favor.
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.

Instruction Override

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Content
**Architecture:**
- **SYSTEM rules** (`SYSTEM/AISTEERINGRULES.md`): Universal rules. Always active. Cannot be overridden.
- **USER rules** (`USER/AISTEERINGRULES.md`): Personal customizations. Extend and can override SYSTEM rules for user-specific behaviors.

**Loading:** Both files are concatenated at runtime. SYSTEM loads first, USER extends. Conflicts resolve in USER's favor.
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.

Instruction Override

High
Category
Prompt Injection
Content
**Architecture:**
- **SYSTEM rules** (`SYSTEM/AISTEERINGRULES.md`): Universal rules. Always active. Cannot be overridden.
- **USER rules** (`USER/AISTEERINGRULES.md`): Personal customizations. Extend and can override SYSTEM rules for user-specific behaviors.

**Loading:** Both files are concatenated at runtime. SYSTEM loads first, USER extends. Conflicts resolve in USER's favor.
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
This pattern attempts to override system instructions or ignore safety constraints. Without LLM analysis, manual review is recommended.

Vague Triggers

High
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The skill self-describes as an unrestricted, ASI-level general solver for everyday requests, with no activation boundaries or domain constraints. That broad framing encourages the agent to supersede normal task routing and apply this skill universally, increasing the chance of prompt hijacking, policy interference, and inappropriate handling of unrelated requests.

Ssd 3

High
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The response format explicitly says learnings will be saved in memory to improve future behavior, which is a direct instruction to retain potentially sensitive interaction data. In a general-purpose skill, this creates a meaningful risk of unauthorized memory formation, cross-request contamination, and privacy or confidentiality breaches.

Vague Triggers

High
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding
The file uses repeated mandatory language such as applying the algorithm to every response with no meaningful scoping. In a skill system, universal mandates are dangerous because they can coerce the model into ignoring higher-priority orchestration, force unnecessary tool usage, and create denial-of-service style verbosity or workflow lock-in.

Vague Triggers

High
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill states that every response must use the algorithm and mandatory format, with only minimal exceptions, making activation effectively global. Overly broad activation increases the chance that the skill hijacks unrelated interactions, injects unsafe behaviors into benign conversations, and normalizes unnecessary tool or context access.

Vague Triggers

High
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding
The skill defines itself as an "ASI-level general problem solver" that should reinterpret everyday requests and apply itself broadly, which creates an almost universal activation surface. A broadly-triggering orchestration skill can hijack unrelated tasks, override safer task-specific behaviors, and increase the chance that users are pushed into tool use, task mutation, or hidden workflow steps without clear intent boundaries.

Vague Triggers

High
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill presents itself as applicable to effectively any task and frames itself as the mandatory container for work before execution. Overbroad invocation conditions are dangerous because they can hijack unrelated workflows, override safer task-specific policies, and pressure the agent into unnecessary tool use and expansive context gathering.

Vague Triggers

High
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The file uses mandatory language such as requiring the algorithm for every response, even while only weakly exempting a few simple cases. This creates prompt-scope overreach: a generic skill can dominate the assistant's behavior across sessions, interfere with safer instructions, and normalize unconditional tool orchestration.

Vague Triggers

High
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill declares itself the universal container for all requests with 'no exceptions,' effectively overriding normal routing and scope boundaries. This kind of broad activation increases the chance the skill will intercept unrelated prompts and force unsafe behaviors such as tool use, context mining, or side-effectful workflows when they are not appropriate.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec, suspicious.env_credential_access, suspicious.exposed_secret_literal (+2 more)

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
Tools/algorithm.ts:654

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
Tools/Banner.ts:28

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
Tools/BannerMatrix.ts:40

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
Tools/BannerNeofetch.ts:30

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
Tools/BannerRetro.ts:36

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
Tools/GetTranscript.ts:67

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
Tools/Inference.ts:88

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
Tools/IntegrityMaintenance.ts:853

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
Tools/NeofetchBanner.ts:38

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
Tools/RelationshipReflect.ts:417

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
Tools/SecretScan.ts:60

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
Tools/SplitAndTranscribe.ts:40

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical
Code
suspicious.env_credential_access
Location
ACTIONS/lib/runner.ts:75

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical
Code
suspicious.env_credential_access
Location
Tools/algorithm.ts:47

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical
Code
suspicious.env_credential_access
Location
Tools/IntegrityMaintenance.ts:111

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical
Code
suspicious.env_credential_access
Location
Tools/pai.ts:422

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical
Code
suspicious.env_credential_access
Location
Tools/PipelineOrchestrator.ts:22

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical
Code
suspicious.env_credential_access
Location
Tools/RemoveBg.ts:26

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical
Code
suspicious.env_credential_access
Location
Tools/YouTubeApi.ts:40

File appears to expose a hardcoded API secret or token.

Critical
Code
suspicious.exposed_secret_literal
Location
DEPLOYMENT.md:267

Sensitive-looking file read is paired with a network send.

Warn
Code
suspicious.potential_exfiltration
Location
Tools/algorithm.ts:255

Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.

Warn
Code
suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions
Location
PAISECURITYSYSTEM/PROMPTINJECTION.md:38

Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.

Warn
Code
suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions
Location
THEHOOKSYSTEM.md:1265

Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.

Warn
Code
suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions
Location
TOOLS.md:47

Prompt-injection style instruction pattern detected.

Warn
Code
suspicious.prompt_injection_instructions
Location
USER/PAISECURITYSYSTEM/QUICKREF.md:69