Back to skill

Security audit

Agent Memory Kit 2.1.0

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a disclosed local memory kit whose persistence and search behavior match its purpose, though users should be careful about what they store in memory and optional shell setup steps.

This can be installed as a local memory aid, but review any AGENTS.md, HEARTBEAT.md, shell profile, chmod, git pull, or rm commands before applying them. Keep the memory folder private, redact secrets and credentials from logs, and treat stored memory as helpful context rather than authoritative instructions.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Memory PoisoningPersistent Context Injection, Context Window Stuffing, Memory Manipulation
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (11)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · INSTALL-SEARCH.md (reported line 389)May include surrounding context.

If you want to remove search (keep Memory Kit):

bash
rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/bin/memory-search
rm -rf skills/agent-memory-kit/lib/
rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/SEARCH.md
rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/QUICKSTART-SEARCH.md

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · INSTALL-SEARCH.md (reported line 390)May include surrounding context.

bash
rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/bin/memory-search
rm -rf skills/agent-memory-kit/lib/
rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/SEARCH.md
rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/QUICKSTART-SEARCH.md
rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/EXAMPLES.md

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · INSTALL-SEARCH.md (reported line 391)May include surrounding context.

bash
rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/bin/memory-search
rm -rf skills/agent-memory-kit/lib/
rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/SEARCH.md
rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/QUICKSTART-SEARCH.md
rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/EXAMPLES.md

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · INSTALL-SEARCH.md (reported line 392)May include surrounding context.

rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/bin/memory-search rm -rf skills/agent-memory-kit/lib/ rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/SEARCH.md rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/QUICKSTART-SEARCH.md rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/EXAMPLES.md

text

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · INSTALL-SEARCH.md (reported line 393)May include surrounding context.

rm -rf skills/agent-memory-kit/lib/ rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/SEARCH.md rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/QUICKSTART-SEARCH.md rm -f skills/agent-memory-kit/EXAMPLES.md

text

**Note:** Keeps Memory Kit v2.0 core features intact.

Context Leakage

High
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Code or instructions that leak agent conversation context to external services, potentially exposing sensitive user interactions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SEARCH.md (reported line 455)May include surrounding context.

md
- Parse frontmatter (YAML between `---` markers)
   - Check frontmatter matches filters (tags, project, agent)
   - Search content with grep (case-insensitive)
   - Extract context window (N lines before/after)
   - Parse inline tags from matching lines
   - Calculate relevance score
4. **Sort results** by score (descending)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The declared description suggests a substantive agent memory framework covering episodic, semantic, and procedural memory. The supplied code chunk does not implement such a framework. Instead, it is a small shell utility that echoes guidance about checking token usage and performing pre-compaction maintenance actions. It does not manage memory structures, store or retrieve episodic/semantic/procedural data, or provide framework functionality. This is a materially different primary purpose, so it should be flagged as a mismatch.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Memory Manipulation

High
Category
Memory Poisoning
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Skill manipulates agent memory, state, or stored context. Memory corruption can alter personality, override safety rules, or cause unpredictable behavior.

Content

Scanner excerpt · templates/ARCHITECTURE.md (reported line 110)May include surrounding context.

md
## Compaction Survival

Context compactions wipe conversation history. Survive them by:

**Pre-compaction flush:**
- Capture current state in `context-snapshot.md`

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SEARCH.md (reported line 582)May include surrounding context.

md
### Tagging

**Do:**
- ✅ Tag as you write (part of daily flow)
- ✅ Use 2-4 tags per entry
- ✅ Prefer specific tags (`#kits`) over generic (`#work`)
- ✅ Tag decisions, learnings, blockers (high value)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding

The guide tells users to copy exact commands, full error output, and environment details into memory/feedback.md without warning that command output can contain secrets, tokens, internal paths, hostnames, or personal data. In a memory framework, those notes may be retained long-term and later surfaced by search, increasing the chance of unintended disclosure beyond the original debugging context.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding

This markdown file includes rm -f and rm -rf commands that delete files and directories during uninstallation. Although the section labels the action as removal, it does not explicitly warn users that these commands permanently delete search-related files or advise verifying paths before running them.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.