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Security audit

度慧文档转换-文档转PDF

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill does what it claims, but it sends the selected document to Duhui/Alibaba-hosted services for conversion, so users should treat it as a third-party upload workflow.

Install only if you are comfortable sending the selected file to Duhui/Alibaba infrastructure. Keep DUHUI_ALI_APPCODE in a secure environment or secret store, do not paste it into chat, and avoid using this for confidential documents unless the vendor's retention and privacy terms meet your requirements.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Taint TrackingDirect Taint Flow, Variable-Mediated Taint Flow, Credential Exfiltration Chain
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Findings (5)

Tainted flow: 'pdf_url' from os.environ.get (line 493, credential/environment) → urllib.request.urlopen (network output)

Critical
Category
Data Flow
Content
) as temp_file:
            temp_path = Path(temp_file.name)
            try:
                with urllib.request.urlopen(
                    pdf_url,
                    timeout=DOWNLOAD_TIMEOUT_SECONDS,
                    context=VERIFIED_SSL_CONTEXT,
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The script downloads `pdf_url` directly from the remote conversion service response without validating the scheme, host, or redirect behavior. If the upstream service, polling endpoint, or network path is compromised, this creates an SSRF-style primitive and can cause the agent to make arbitrary outbound requests, potentially reaching internal services or downloading attacker-controlled content to disk.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Confidence
84% confidence
Finding
The skill is presented as document-to-PDF conversion, but its documented trigger scope also includes PDF compression and watermarking, which are different operations with different user expectations and data-handling implications. This can cause the agent to invoke the skill for requests outside its stated purpose, resulting in unintended file uploads or incorrect processing.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding
The manifest description includes broad generic trigger phrases such as document conversion, format conversion, and PDF conversion. Overbroad triggers increase the chance that unrelated requests will activate a skill that uploads local files to external services, creating unnecessary data exposure and user-surprise risk.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
The 'When To Use' section repeats broad and ambiguous trigger examples, including high-frequency generic terms. In context, this is more dangerous because the skill uploads local documents to vendor-controlled storage and services, so accidental invocation can leak sensitive content externally.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill explicitly sends user-provided local documents to OSS and then to an external conversion service, but the documentation does not warn about third-party data transfer, retention, or privacy implications. This is dangerous because users may unknowingly submit sensitive files to external infrastructure, creating confidentiality, compliance, and data-governance risk.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.