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Security audit

OpenClaw Beautify Github Readme

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a purpose-aligned README design helper with local verification scripts and clear user-approval gates for editing, animation, image generation, publishing, and attribution.

Install with normal caution for a skill that can edit repository files and run local verification scripts. Confirm the selected mode before changes, review diffs before committing, keep GIF and ImageGen outputs opt-in, and prefer pinned dependencies if you need reproducible or high-assurance environments.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Note
Location
scripts/render_motion_gif.py:17
Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation Guidance<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/render_motion_gif.py:17-19` **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned third-party Python dependency **Risk Level**: Low ```python try: from PIL import Image, ImageChops except ImportError as exc: # pragma: no cover - dependency error path raise SystemExit("Pillow is required: python3 -m pip install Pillow") from exc ``` ### Technical Analysis When Pillow is unavailable, the script directs the user to install it without specifying a version, hash, reviewed package index, or lockfile. The command therefore resolves whichever Pillow release and distribution artifact the configured Python package index currently provides. Pillow is legitimately required for the declared GIF-rendering functionality, and the script does not automatically execute the installation command. Nevertheless, this guidance creates an avoidable supply-chain trust dependency and does not provide reproducible installation behavior. The resulting version may differ across runs and could be compromised, incompatible, or affected by a newly introduced vulnerability. No evidence indicates that Pillow itself or the referenced package source is malicious. Exploitation consequently depends on an upstream package, package-index, network, or local pip-configuration compromise. ### Attack Path 1. A user opts into GIF generation and invokes `scripts/render_motion_gif.py` on a system without Pillow. 2. The import fails, and the script displays `python3 -m pip install Pillow`. 3. The user manually runs the suggested command. 4. Pip resolves the dependency using the user's configured package indexes and selects an unconstrained release. 5. If the selected artifact, index response, or dependency chain has been compromised, attacker-controlled installation or runtime code executes. 6. The malicious code runs with the privileges of the user or environment performing the installation and can access resources available to that account. ### I ...[truncated 557 chars]
Remediation
<![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Add a reviewed dependency manifest that pins Pillow to an exact supported version. 2. For reproducible installations, provide hashes for every permitted distribution artifact and require hash verification: ```bash python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 3. Generate and review the hashes from trusted release artifacts, and update them through a controlled dependency-review process. 4. If multiple Python versions or platforms must be supported, maintain a lockfile or constraints file covering those environments rather than recommending an unconstrained installation. 5. Replace the current error message with a reference to the repository-controlled dependency file: ```python raise SystemExit( "Pillow is required. Install reviewed dependencies with: " "python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt" ) from exc ``` 6. Document the expected package index and advise users to inspect pip configuration when operating in sensitive environments. 7. Run dependency vulnerability and provenance checks during release preparation and CI. ]]>
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.