dotfile

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Aug 21, 2026 · 5:55 AM UTC
• Version: 0.6.0

Overview

This skill is mostly coherent for dotfile and sync management, but it can make broad agent-configuration changes, persist session knowledge, and create hidden Syncthing startup behavior that users should review carefully.

Install only if you intentionally want this skill to manage dotfiles and AI-agent configuration across tools. Review the exact symlink targets before running the bootstrap scripts, avoid storing secrets in Serena memory, treat the Syncthing API key as sensitive, and use the DB reset or Windows scheduled-task migration steps only when you understand their service and persistence impact.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Rogue Agent: Self-Modification, Session Persistence
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands

Findings (7)

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 92% confidence
• Finding: The skill advertises general synchronization and dotfile management, but the documented behavior includes modifying local filesystem state by creating/replacing symlinks, backing up existing paths, and bridging Windows/WSL paths across multiple agent ecosystems. That mismatch is security-relevant because users may invoke the skill for benign sync tasks without realizing it can alter sensitive configuration locations for other tools, expanding blast radius and enabling unintended config hijacking or destructive relinking.

Vague Triggers

Medium

• Confidence: 84% confidence
• Finding: Broad trigger phrases like 'external sync' and 'dotfile management' can cause the agent to select this skill in contexts far outside the user's intended scope. Because the skill governs synchronization with external tools and may lead to configuration changes or diagnostics on sensitive sync systems, overbroad routing increases the chance of accidental invocation and unintended modification of user environments.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 88% confidence
• Finding: The skill instructs the agent to extract information from sessions/current conversations and persist it into Serena memory or project documentation, including infrastructure details, issue histories, and decisions, without requiring sensitivity review, minimization, or user confirmation for potentially secret material. This creates a real risk of unintentionally storing credentials, internal paths, ports, or other sensitive operational context in long-lived memory and files, expanding exposure beyond the original session.

Missing User Warnings

Low

• Confidence: 86% confidence
• Finding: The document instructs users to extract the Syncthing API key directly from the local config and then reuse it in shell commands, but it does not warn that this value is a sensitive credential. Even though the calls target localhost, exposing the key in shell history, logs, screenshots, or copied snippets could allow local or adjacent misuse of the Syncthing admin API.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 92% confidence
• Finding: The DB reset section contains commands that move and later permanently delete the Syncthing index backup, including a recursive rm -rf path, with only limited cautionary framing. A user following the instructions incorrectly, adapting paths, or running them in the wrong environment could destroy recovery material or remove unintended files.

Missing User Warnings

Medium

• Confidence: 89% confidence
• Finding: This section provides admin-level commands that delete services, register scheduled tasks, and forcibly terminate Syncthing processes, but the warnings are not sufficiently prominent relative to the system-level impact. If copied blindly, the procedure can alter persistence behavior, interrupt services, or cause unintended operational changes on Windows hosts.

Session Persistence

Medium

• Category: Rogue Agent

Content

**Recommended approach**: Task Scheduler at user logon + VBS launcher for hidden execution. No password storage required. Run admin steps via `gsudo` (a Windows `sudo`-equivalent — installs via `winget install gerardog.gsudo`; if `gsudo` is unavailable, run an elevated PowerShell prompt manually for the `Register-ScheduledTask` step below).

##### Step 1: Create VBS hidden launcher

`syncthing.exe` is a console app — running it directly from Task Scheduler shows a console window that, **when closed, terminates the process**. Wrap it in VBS to launch hidden.

• Confidence: 78% confidence
• Finding: The skill recommends creating a hidden VBS launcher and scheduled task so Syncthing runs invisibly at logon, which establishes persistence and reduces user visibility into the process. In a security review context, hidden autorun mechanisms are sensitive because the same pattern can be abused to conceal unwanted long-lived execution.

VirusTotal

VirusTotal findings are pending for this skill version.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.