Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill openly supports outbound sales automation, but it collects and uses sensitive personal contact and home-address data without adequate privacy or consent guardrails.
Review this skill carefully before installing. Use it only for lawful, authorized business outreach, avoid personal emails, phone numbers, and home addresses unless you have a documented basis to process them, and verify vendor terms, suppression lists, unsubscribe handling, data retention, and privacy obligations before running any campaign.
This section instructs users to perform skip tracing to obtain physical addresses and then use those addresses for handwritten outreach, which materially increases sensitivity and potential harm. Physical-address enrichment and unsolicited mail campaigns can enable stalking-like behavior, harassment, or serious privacy violations if recipients did not consent or if the data is inaccurate.
The skill is explicitly designed to scrape LinkedIn profiles, enrich them with email and phone data, and obtain mailing addresses for outbound campaigns, yet it provides no warning about privacy, consent, lawful basis, or sensitive-data handling. Because it operationalizes collection and use of personal data across multiple third-party services, users may process regulated personal information in ways that violate privacy policies, data protection law, or internal compliance requirements.
This API call sends LinkedIn profile URLs to a third-party scraping service, which is an external transmission of prospect data. In context, the transmission is intentional functionality rather than covert exfiltration, but it is still security-relevant because users are not warned that prospect identifiers are being disclosed to an external processor.
curl -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/harvestapi~linkedin-profile-scraper/run-sync-get-dataset-items" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $APIFY_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This API call sends LinkedIn profile URLs to a third-party scraping service, which is an external transmission of prospect data. In context, the transmission is intentional functionality rather than covert exfiltration, but it is still security-relevant because users are not warned that prospect identifiers are being disclosed to an external processor.
curl -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/harvestapi~linkedin-profile-scraper/run-sync-get-dataset-items" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $APIFY_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
The Apollo enrichment request transmits personal identifiers to a third party and requests additional sensitive contact data, including personal emails and phone numbers. In this skill's ABM/outreach context, that makes the transmission more dangerous because it directly supports large-scale contact enrichment without any privacy or authorization safeguards.
curl -X POST "https://api.apollo.io/api/v1/people/bulk_match" \
-H "X-Api-Key: $APOLLO_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This step transmits a person's name to a skip-tracing service to retrieve a mailing address, which is a particularly sensitive external disclosure because it facilitates identifying residential location data. In context, the data is then used for outreach, increasing the risk of privacy harm, targeting, and misuse if the lookup is inaccurate or unauthorized.
curl -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/one-api~skip-trace/run-sync-get-dataset-items" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $APIFY_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": ["John Doe"]}'
The outreach workflow automates transmission of personal data to email, LinkedIn, and direct-mail providers without any warning that user-supplied and enriched PII will be sent to external systems and may trigger real-world communications. This raises risks of privacy noncompliance, spam/anti-harassment issues, accidental disclosure, and unwanted side effects at scale.
This call pushes contacts into an email campaign platform, causing external transmission of prospect data and potentially immediate campaign enrollment. While expected for the feature, the skill does not warn that this action may trigger real outbound messaging and share PII with a third-party provider.
Option 1: Apollo Sequences (Recommended)
curl -X POST "https://api.apollo.io/api/v1/emailer_campaigns/add_contact_ids" \
-H "X-Api-Key: $APOLLO_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This Instantly.ai request transmits personal contact details and personalization content to a third-party outbound system for campaign use. The risk is amplified by the automation context because users may unknowingly upload leads and initiate outreach without reviewing privacy, spam, or disclosure implications.
Option 2: Instantly.ai
curl -X POST "https://api.instantly.ai/api/v1/lead/add" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $INSTANTLY_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/harvestapi~linkedin-profile-scraper/run-sync-get-dataset-items" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $APIFY_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"profileUrls": ["https://linkedin.com/in/username"]}'
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/harvestapi~linkedin-profile-scraper/run-sync-get-dataset-items" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $APIFY_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"profileUrls": ["https://linkedin.com/in/username"]}'
This reference explicitly instructs collection and enrichment of sensitive personal data, including personal emails, phone numbers, and home addresses from public records, without any discussion of consent, lawful basis, minimization, or handling restrictions. In the context of an outbound automation skill, this materially increases privacy, stalking, harassment, and compliance risk because the data is meant to be operationalized for multi-channel contact, including physical mail.
This API call transmits personal identifiers to Apollo while explicitly enabling revelation of personal emails and phone numbers. In this skill's ABM outbound context, the transmission is part of a workflow to acquire sensitive contact data for unsolicited outreach, making it more dangerous than a generic third-party API call because it facilitates doxxing-like enrichment and privacy-invasive targeting.
curl -X POST "https://api.apollo.io/api/v1/people/bulk_match" \
-H "X-Api-Key: $APOLLO_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This API call transmits personal identifiers to Apollo while explicitly enabling revelation of personal emails and phone numbers. In this skill's ABM outbound context, the transmission is part of a workflow to acquire sensitive contact data for unsolicited outreach, making it more dangerous than a generic third-party API call because it facilitates doxxing-like enrichment and privacy-invasive targeting.
curl -X POST "https://api.apollo.io/api/v1/people/bulk_match" \
-H "X-Api-Key: $APOLLO_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{
This API call sends a person's name to a skip-trace service specifically to obtain a home mailing address and additional personal contact details. In an outbound campaign skill that coordinates physical mail, this is especially dangerous because it operationalizes residential-address discovery for contact or targeting, creating severe privacy, harassment, stalking, and regulatory risk.
curl -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/one-api~skip-trace/run-sync-get-dataset-items" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $APIFY_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": ["John Doe"]}'
This API call sends a person's name to a skip-trace service specifically to obtain a home mailing address and additional personal contact details. In an outbound campaign skill that coordinates physical mail, this is especially dangerous because it operationalizes residential-address discovery for contact or targeting, creating severe privacy, harassment, stalking, and regulatory risk.
curl -X POST "https://api.apify.com/v2/acts/one-api~skip-trace/run-sync-get-dataset-items" \
-H "Authorization: Bearer $APIFY_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name": ["John Doe"]}'
This markdown file includes example API usage that sends an API key in headers and recipient-identifying data in request bodies. While the file warns that the API key cannot be viewed again, it does not warn users that they are transmitting personal/contact data to an external service or remind them to ensure they have authority to share that data.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
The Scribeless API uses the X-API-Key header for authentication.
curl -X POST "https://platform.scribeless.co/api/recipients" \
-H "X-API-Key: YOUR_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '...'
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl --location 'https://platform.scribeless.co/api/recipients' \
-H "X-API-Key: YOUR_API_KEY" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
--data '{
No suspicious patterns detected.