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Security audit

Garmin Connect Pro

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This Garmin integration is mostly transparent about its purpose, but it handles sensitive health-account access and supports storing Garmin passwords and tokens locally in risky ways.

Review before installing. Prefer a dedicated Garmin account if possible, avoid the credentials.json option, do not put GARMIN_PASSWORD directly in cron/OpenClaw cron commands, protect or remove cached tokens when no longer needed, and consider pinning or auditing the garminconnect dependency before use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Findings (3)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
package.json:25
Finding

Unbounded Third-Party Dependency Permits Unaudited Future Releases

Content
View full analysis
=0.2.38"] }, ``` The same unsafe installation pattern is documented in `README.md:69`, `SKILL.md:11`, and `SKILL.md:94`: ```bash pip3 install garminconnect ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill permits any current or future `garminconnect` release greater than or equal to version `0.2.38`. No exact version, lock file, package hash, or trusted artifact digest constrains installation. This dependency occupies a particularly sensitive trust boundary: it receives the Garmin email, password, and cached OAuth tokens and performs all remote API communication. Although the audited project contains no evidence that the current dependency is malicious, the open-ended constraint means a future compromised, malicious, or behaviorally incompatible release could be installed without a corresponding review of this Skill. Because Python executes package initialization code during import, a compromised dependency would not need to wait for an explicit API request to run code under the invoking user's account. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises the upstream package publisher, release process, distribution account, or another relevant package-distribution component. 2. The attacker publishes a release satisfying `garminconnect>=0.2.38`. 3. A user or automated Skill installer resolves and installs that release because no upper bound, exact pin, or hash is enforced. 4. `scripts/garmin.py` or `scripts/garmin-pro.py` imports the installed package. 5. Malicious package code executes with the operating-system privileges of the user running the Skill. 6. The package can access credentials supplied to it, cached Garmin tokens, returned health information, and other files available to that user. ### Impact ...[truncated 675 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
"] ``` 2. Use a lock file containing hashes and install with hash verification, such as: ```bash pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 3. Install dependencies in a dedicated virtual environment under a low-privilege service account. 4. Review the dependency and its transitive dependencies before updating the version pin. 5. Update `README.md` and `SKILL.md` so installation examples use the same pinned, hash-verified dependency policy. 6. Consider generating and reviewing a software bill of materials for release artifacts. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
scripts/garmin-pro.py:746
Finding

Interactive Login Stores the Garmin Password Before Applying Restrictive Permissions

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
README.md:169
Finding

Recommended Cron Command Persists the Garmin Password in Plaintext

Content
View full analysis
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • YARA SignaturesMalware Match, Webshell Match, Cryptominer Match
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
Findings (41)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The README explicitly instructs users to store Garmin account credentials in a plaintext JSON file under the home directory. Even with mode 600, any process running as that user, malware in the user session, backups, shell history mistakes, or accidental file disclosure can expose the password and lead to account compromise.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 25)May include surrounding context.

Option 2: Credentials File

bash
mkdir -p ~/.config/garmin-connect
echo '{"email": "your-email@example.com", "password": "your-password"}' > ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json
chmod 600 ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json
  • Stored in plaintext (any process with file access can read it)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This line continues the insecure credential-file pattern by combining a plaintext password file with a permission-setting command, which may give users a false sense of safety. The core risk remains theft of Garmin credentials from local disk by any code with access to the user account or copied backups.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

bash
mkdir -p ~/.config/garmin-connect
echo '{"email": "your-email@example.com", "password": "your-password"}' > ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json
chmod 600 ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json
  • Stored in plaintext (any process with file access can read it)
  • File permissions set to 600 (owner read/write only)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The quick-start section repeats instructions to persist email and password in plaintext on disk, normalizing an insecure setup path. Because this skill handles health and activity data tied to a real account, account takeover could expose sensitive personal information in addition to service access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 77)May include surrounding context.

md
# Option B: Credentials file
mkdir -p ~/.config/garmin-connect
echo '{"email": "you@example.com", "password": "your-password"}' > ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json
chmod 600 ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json

# Login (generates OAuth tokens)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This finding is substantively the same insecure practice: the user is told to create and keep a plaintext password file for later script use. Long-lived secrets on disk materially increase the likelihood and blast radius of compromise, especially for scheduled automation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 78)May include surrounding context.

md
# Option B: Credentials file
mkdir -p ~/.config/garmin-connect
echo '{"email": "you@example.com", "password": "your-password"}' > ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json
chmod 600 ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json

# Login (generates OAuth tokens)
python3 scripts/garmin.py login

YARA rule 'backdoor_persistence': Backdoor persistence with malicious payloads (shell commands, SSH key injection, hidden root users) [malware]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 172)May include surrounding context.

ities

bash
python3 scripts/garmin.py download          # List recent activities
python3 scripts/garmin.py download --id 123456 --format fit
python3 scripts/garmin.py download --id 123456 --format gpx

Cron Job Setup

⚠️ Security Note: Using environment variables is more secure than storing credentials on disk.

Option A: Environment Variables (Recommended)

bash
# In your crontab or OpenClaw cron config:
GARMIN_EMAIL="you@example.com" GARMIN_PASSWORD="your-password" python3 ~/.agents/skills/garmin-connect-pro/scripts/garmin.py summary

Option B: Credentials File

bash
# Morning motivation at 6:30
openclaw cron add --name "Morning Fitness" --cron "30 6 * * *" \
  --message "python3 ~/.agents/skills/garmin-connect-pro/scripts/garmin.py summary"

# Midday check at 12:00
openclaw cron add --name "Midday Check" --cron "0 12 * * *" \
  --message "python3 ~/.agents/skills/garmin-connect-pro/scripts/garmin.py ask 'body battery'"

Note: Cron jobs that

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 262)May include surrounding context.

md
### "Authentication failed"
- Verify email and password in credentials file or environment variables
- Delete tokens: `rm -rf ~/.config/garmin-connect/tokens/`
- Re-run login

### "No data for date"

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 288)May include surrounding context.

md
### "Authentication failed"
- Verify email and password in credentials file or environment variables
- Delete tokens: `rm -rf ~/.config/garmin-connect/tokens/`
- Re-run login

### "No data for date"

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 262)May include surrounding context.

md
### "Authentication failed"
- Verify email and password in credentials file or environment variables
- Delete tokens: `rm -rf ~/.config/garmin-connect/tokens/`
- Re-run login

### "No data for date"

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 288)May include surrounding context.

md
### "Authentication failed"
- Verify email and password in credentials file or environment variables
- Delete tokens: `rm -rf ~/.config/garmin-connect/tokens/`
- Re-run login

### "No data for date"

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · README.md (reported line 262)May include surrounding context.

md
### "Authentication failed"
- Verify email and password in credentials file or environment variables
- Delete tokens: `rm -rf ~/.config/garmin-connect/tokens/`
- Re-run login

### "No data for date"

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 288)May include surrounding context.

md
### "Authentication failed"
- Verify email and password in credentials file or environment variables
- Delete tokens: `rm -rf ~/.config/garmin-connect/tokens/`
- Re-run login

### "No data for date"

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

This mismatch is more serious because the skill appears to expose capabilities beyond the advertised scope while omitting declared permissions. In a credentialed health-data integration, inaccurate descriptions reduce informed consent and can hide access to additional personal data categories, persistent auth tokens, and export functions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

This mismatch is more serious because the skill appears to expose capabilities beyond the advertised scope while omitting declared permissions. In a credentialed health-data integration, inaccurate descriptions reduce informed consent and can hide access to additional personal data categories, persistent auth tokens, and export functions.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly supports reading credentials from a plaintext JSON file in the user's home directory. Even with 600 permissions, any compromise of the user account, backup leakage, or accidental inclusion in sync/backup systems can expose Garmin credentials and associated health data.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 23)May include surrounding context.

md
required: false
          secret: true
      files:
        - path: ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json
          description: "Fallback: Credentials file if env vars not set. WARNING: Plaintext - use env vars instead."
          required: false
          permissions: "600"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The documented credential priority still normalizes a plaintext credentials file as a supported authentication source. That encourages insecure secret persistence for a skill handling personal health and activity data, increasing risk of account takeover and privacy loss if the local system is accessed.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 35)May include surrounding context.

md
security:
      - "CREDENTIAL PRIORITY: Environment variables > Credentials file > macOS Keychain (if configured)"
      - "RECOMMENDED: Use GARMIN_EMAIL/GARMIN_PASSWORD env vars - not stored on disk, survives reboots with launchd/keychain"
      - "FALLBACK: Credentials file at ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json (plaintext, 600 permissions)"
      - "OAuth tokens are cached locally after first login - subsequent logins use tokens, not password"
      - "Third-party library: garminconnect (https://github.com/cyberjunkie/garminconnect) - open source, auditable"
      - "NO data transmission except to Garmin API servers via official garminconnect library"

YARA rule 'backdoor_persistence': Backdoor persistence with malicious payloads (shell commands, SSH key injection, hidden root users) [malware]

High
Category
YARA Match
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

YARA rule matched a known malware signature (reverse shell, backdoor, ransomware, C2 framework, or info stealer).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.

ntials.json (plaintext, 600 permissions)" - "OAuth tokens are cached locally after first login - subsequent logins use tokens, not password" - "Third-party library: garminconnect (https://github.com/cyberjunkie/garminconnect) - open source, auditable" - "NO data transmission except to Garmin API servers via official garminconnect library" - "For cron jobs: Pass env vars in crontab or use launchd with EnvironmentVariables key"

Garmin Connect Pro

The most comprehensive Garmin Connect skill for OpenClaw. Retrieve activities, health data, sleep analysis, heart rate, stress, body battery, training readiness, VO2 max, and more from your Fenix, Forerunner, Index scales, or other Garmin devices.

Security & Privacy

⚠️ Important Security Information:

Credential Options

Option 1: Environment Variables (Recommended for cron jobs)

bash
export GARMIN_EMAIL="your-email@example.com"
export GARMIN_PASSWORD="your-password"
  • More secure for a

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The setup instructions directly tell users to create a plaintext file containing their email and password. This is dangerous because the skill context involves long-lived personal credentials and sensitive fitness/health data, making local secret theft especially impactful.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 64)May include surrounding context.

Option 2: Credentials File

bash
mkdir -p ~/.config/garmin-connect
echo '{"email": "your-email@example.com", "password": "your-password"}' > ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json
chmod 600 ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json
  • Stored in plaintext (any process with file access can read it)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This line reinforces storing a password-bearing credentials file on disk, which remains sensitive even with restrictive file permissions. Local malware, shared-user environments, terminal history mistakes, or backup replication can still expose the secrets.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 65)May include surrounding context.

bash
mkdir -p ~/.config/garmin-connect
echo '{"email": "your-email@example.com", "password": "your-password"}' > ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json
chmod 600 ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json
  • Stored in plaintext (any process with file access can read it)
  • File permissions set to 600 (owner read/write only)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The first-time login workflow again encourages creating a plaintext credential file before performing authentication. Repetition of this pattern increases the chance users will adopt insecure storage for convenience and leave reusable credentials resident on disk.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 102)May include surrounding context.

md
# Option B: Use credentials file
mkdir -p ~/.config/garmin-connect
echo '{"email": "your-email@example.com", "password": "your-password"}' > ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json
chmod 600 ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json

# Login (generates OAuth tokens)

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

This instruction couples plaintext credential storage with token generation, creating two forms of credential material on disk: the password file and cached OAuth tokens. That expands the attack surface and can permit persistent unauthorized access even after the initial login.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 103)May include surrounding context.

md
# Option B: Use credentials file
mkdir -p ~/.config/garmin-connect
echo '{"email": "your-email@example.com", "password": "your-password"}' > ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json
chmod 600 ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json

# Login (generates OAuth tokens)
python3 ~/.agents/skills/garmin-connect-pro/scripts/garmin.py login

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly declares access to a plaintext credentials file containing Garmin email and password, which means the skill is designed to consume highly sensitive authentication material from disk. Even if this is for legitimate login purposes, storing and reading raw credentials increases the blast radius of any compromise, especially in an agent ecosystem where skills may be over-privileged or logs/errors may expose paths and contents.

Content

Scanner excerpt · package.json (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.

json
},
      "files": [
        {
          "path": "~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json",
          "description": "Garmin Connect login credentials (email + password). Used if env vars not set.",
          "required": false,
          "permissions": "600",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

The security metadata confirms that credentials may be stored in plaintext at a fixed filesystem location, documenting a sensitive secret-handling pattern rather than mitigating it. This makes the issue more credible because the skill context involves long-lived health-account access and cached OAuth tokens, so compromise could expose private fitness/health data and account access.

Content

Scanner excerpt · package.json (reported line 60)May include surrounding context.

json
},
    "security": [
      "Credentials can be provided via GARMIN_EMAIL/GARMIN_PASSWORD environment variables OR credentials file",
      "If using credentials file: stored in plaintext at ~/.config/garmin-connect/credentials.json with 600 permissions",
      "OAuth tokens cached at ~/.config/garmin-connect/tokens/",
      "Third-party library 'garminconnect' handles all Garmin API communication - audit at https://github.com/cyberjunkie/garminconnect",
      "No direct external transmission except via garminconnect library to Garmin servers",

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill explicitly defines a plaintext credentials file path and elsewhere uses it to persist username/password material. In the context of a fitness-data integration, this is especially sensitive because the same account unlocks personal health and activity history, making credential theft materially harmful.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/garmin-pro.py (reported line 59)May include surrounding context.

python
sys.exit(1)

TOKEN_DIR = Path.home() / ".config" / "garmin-connect" / "tokens"
CREDENTIALS_FILE = Path.home() / ".config" / "garmin-connect" / "credentials.json"

# Emoji indicators
EMOJI = {

Missing User Warnings

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The login flow stores the user's Garmin email and password in plaintext JSON on disk at a predictable location. Even with chmod 0600, any local malware, backup leakage, multi-process compromise, or account-level intrusion can recover the credentials and reuse them against the Garmin account.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/garmin.py (reported line 53)May include surrounding context.

python
sys.exit(1)

TOKEN_DIR = Path.home() / ".config" / "garmin-connect" / "tokens"
CREDENTIALS_FILE = Path.home() / ".config" / "garmin-connect" / "credentials.json"

# Emoji indicators
EMOJI = {