Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This skill is a disclosed Docker deployment helper, but it gives an agent root-level control over a remote Docker server and can install a persistent controller automatically.
Install only if you intentionally want this skill to control a specific Docker host. Confirm the server and app names before use, review the bundled controller, and prefer a restricted sudoers rule or service account so the agent cannot perform broader root operations than these deployment commands require.
The skill invokes shell, environment resolution, file reads, SSH, and privileged remote operations, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope or permission boundaries. That omission increases the chance an agent will execute sensitive actions more broadly than intended, especially because the skill directs immediate deployment and possible installation of a controller on a remote host.
This instruction causes the agent to execute a root-privileged deployment command on a remote Docker server. In context, the app name comes from user input and the action performs code fetch, build, and container restart, so a mistaken target, compromised repository, or unsafe command construction in the controller could lead to full server compromise or service disruption.
run this on the known Docker server:
sudo /opt/docker-container-control deploy website_app
Do the work immediately. The controller finds the app under /opt, fast-forward pulls its latest Git commit, pulls images, builds, starts/restarts the Compose deployment, waits for it to become running/healthy, and prints final status.
The skill instructs the agent to install a controller onto the remote server as a root-owned executable in /opt and then invoke it with sudo. Even with local py_compile, this is effectively remote privileged code deployment, which can persistently change server behavior and becomes especially risky if the bundled controller or transfer path is tampered with.
2. Validate it locally with `python3 -m py_compile <controller>`.
3. Copy it to a temporary path on the Docker server.
4. Install it as root-owned mode `755` at `/opt/docker-container-control`.
5. Verify with `sudo /opt/docker-container-control list`.
6. Continue the user's requested DCC action without making them repeat it.
If an existing remote controller differs from the bundled version, do not silently overwrite it. Report the difference and ask before replacing it.
Directly mapping user-requested actions to a sudo-executed controller command creates a privileged command interface exposed through the skill. Although the skill says to use exact names, this still concentrates risk because any parsing flaw, ambiguous target resolution, or controller bug could turn a normal request into root-level impact on production containers.
Map them directly to:
sudo /opt/docker-container-control <action> [app]
Deployment names can be the app folder name, Compose project name, or running container name. Use exact names. If no deployment matches or more than one matches, show the detected names and ask the user to choose.
Commands invoke sudo or root privileges. Verify this elevated access is necessary and justified.
def usage(exit_code=2):
print(
'Usage: sudo /opt/docker-container-control <list|status|restart|recreate|deploy|dry-run> [name]\n\n'
'Names are discovered from Docker compose labels and compose files under /opt.\n'
'Use the folder-style name, compose project name, or running container name.\n\n'
' list Show detected deployments.\n'
The script enforces execution as root and then performs high-impact operations based on data discovered from Docker labels, compose files under /opt, and git repositories. In this skill context, that is dangerous because it creates a privileged deployment control plane: if an attacker can influence discovered compose definitions, git remotes, or container metadata, the operator can be induced to run attacker-controlled build/deploy actions as root on the Docker host.
def main():
if os.geteuid() != 0:
print('ERROR: run this script with sudo', file=sys.stderr)
raise SystemExit(2)
action = sys.argv[1] if len(sys.argv) > 1 else 'list'
if action == 'list':
No suspicious patterns detected.