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Security audit

CogDx Feedback (Free)

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

The skill is a coherent feedback API integration, but it sends raw prompts, responses, notes, and identifiers to an external service and shared commons without clear consent, redaction, or retention guidance.

Review the exact payload before using this skill. Do not submit customer data, secrets, private prompts, proprietary evaluations, personal information, or sensitive model outputs unless you are authorized and have redacted them. Prefer aggregate metrics or sanitized samples, and confirm the provider's retention, deletion, and commons-sharing terms before installing for production use.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:16
Finding
Unrestricted Disclosure of Agent Interaction Data to an External Service## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 16–42 **Vulnerability Type**: Transmission of potentially sensitive prompts, responses, and free-form metadata to an external API **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code Snippet ```markdown - Logs outcome data to the shared calibration commons - Returns a verification score + credit earned - Credits apply to future `/calibration_audit` or `/bias_scan` calls ## API Call ```bash POST https://api.cerebratech.ai/feedback Content-Type: application/json ``` **Minimum payload:** ```json { "agent_id": "your-agent-id", "diagnosis_id": "from-prior-audit", "post_retrain_outputs": [ { "prompt": "...", "response": "...", "confidence": 0.85, "correct": true } ], "improvement_observed": true, "notes": "optional free-text" } ``` ``` The related API schema in `references/api.md`, lines 15–28, also permits unrestricted `change_description`, `notes`, `prompt`, `response`, and `ground_truth` values. ### Technical Analysis The skill directs an agent to send complete prompts, responses, ground-truth values, change descriptions, and free-form notes to `https://api.cerebratech.ai/feedback`. It also states that outcome data is logged to a “shared calibration commons.” These fields can contain confidential conversations, personal information, proprietary prompts, internal model behavior, credentials accidentally included in an interaction, or other sensitive data. The skill does not require data minimization, secret detection, redaction, informed user approval, or confirmation that the submitted records are safe to share. It also does not document retention, deletion, secondary use, or access controls for data submitted to the shared dataset. HTTPS protects data in transit but does not mitigate disclosure to the receiving service or subsequent storage and sharing. This is an insecure data-handling pr ...[truncated 1431 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Require explicit, informed user approval immediately before transmitting any interaction samples to the external API. 2. Display the destination, fields, and exact payload to the user before submission. 3. Default to sending aggregate metrics such as accuracy and confidence rather than raw prompts and responses. 4. Apply secret detection and redaction to prompts, responses, ground truth, notes, identifiers, and change descriptions. 5. Remove or pseudonymize personal data, credentials, proprietary content, and stable agent identifiers. 6. Introduce strict field-length limits and allowlists for domains and structured metadata. 7. Clearly document data ownership, retention periods, deletion procedures, secondary use, access controls, and whether submissions enter a shared dataset. 8. Provide a local-only verification mode that calculates improvement without uploading raw samples. 9. Require separate opt-in consent before contributing data to the shared calibration commons. 10. Warn users not to submit production conversations or confidential evaluation datasets unless they are authorized and appropriately sanitized.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (6)

Vague Triggers

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The skill advertises very broad trigger phrases like 'submit feedback' and 'did my fix work', which can match many ordinary agent interactions and cause unintended activation. In this context, accidental invocation is more dangerous because the skill's primary function is to send agent performance data to an external service, potentially causing unreviewed data sharing.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs sending prompts, responses, confidence values, correctness labels, and free-text notes to an external API, but it does not clearly warn about privacy, confidentiality, retention, or downstream use in the 'shared calibration commons'. Because agent outputs and notes may contain sensitive user data, this omission creates a meaningful risk of unauthorized disclosure.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
## API Call

```bash
POST https://api.cerebratech.ai/feedback
Content-Type: application/json
```
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
The skill is explicitly built around transmitting data to an external endpoint, so the external transmission itself is expected, but it is still security-relevant because it exports agent data off-platform. In this skill's context, the danger is elevated by the payload examples including raw prompts and responses and by the surrounding marketing language that emphasizes credits rather than safe handling of transmitted data.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
# CogDx Feedback API Reference

## Endpoint
`POST https://api.cerebratech.ai/feedback`

## Full Request Schema
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
This endpoint sends agent feedback data to an external domain, which is a real security concern in this skill because the documented payload includes model outputs, prompts, and notes that may be sensitive. The surrounding skill context makes the transmission more dangerous than a generic API call because it incentivizes data sharing in exchange for credits and positions the service as part of a broader diagnostics ecosystem.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding
The API reference explicitly invites submission of prompts, responses, ground truth, and free-text notes, which can easily contain sensitive data, proprietary prompts, internal model behavior, or personal information. Because the skill is positioned as a free feedback and credit-earning workflow, it creates additional pressure to transmit potentially sensitive artifacts to a third-party service without any privacy warning, minimization guidance, or redaction requirement.

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Content
| `/bias_scan` | $0.10 | 4 feedback submissions |
| `/reasoning_trace_analysis` | $0.03 | 1–2 feedback submissions |

Full catalog: `https://api.cerebratech.ai/catalog`
Confidence
50% confidence
Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.