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Security audit

Soulledger Trust

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a small, disclosed API guide for querying and registering agent trust identities, with expected external network use but no hidden local code or persistence.

Use the read-only trust, DNA, and directory queries normally if you are comfortable contacting SoulLedger. Before using registration, confirm you want to create an external agent identity and manage the returned API key. Pin and review the npm SDK before installing it in a sensitive environment.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:47
Finding

Unpinned Third-Party npm Dependency

Content
View full analysis

Vulnerability Details

File Location: SKILL.md, lines 47-55
Vulnerability Type: T08: Insecure Dependencies
Risk Level: Medium

markdown
## SDK
```bash
npm install @sputnikx/soulledger-sdk
javascript
import { SoulLedger } from '@sputnikx/soulledger-sdk';
const sl = new SoulLedger();
const trust = await sl.getTrust('oracle');
text

### Technical Analysis

The documented installation command retrieves an unpinned third-party package from the npm registry. No exact version, lockfile, integrity hash, reviewed package source, or provenance information is provided in the audited project.

Consequently, the installed implementation can change after this skill has been reviewed. npm packages may also define lifecycle scripts that execute during installation. If the package, its maintainer account, or its dependency chain is compromised, following this instruction could cause attacker-controlled code to run on the user's system.

The audit did not establish that the named package is currently malicious. The confirmed issue is the unsafe and unverifiable dependency-installation practice.

### Attack Path

1. An attacker compromises the package publisher, the package itself, or one of its transitive dependencies.
2. The attacker publishes a malicious release under the existing package name.
3. A user follows the documented `npm install @sputnikx/soulledger-sdk` command without an exact version or integrity constraint.
4. npm resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled release.
5. Malicious lifecycle scripts execute during installation, or malicious package code executes when the documented SDK is imported and used.

### Impact Assessment

Exploited package code would execute with the privileges of the user running npm or the consuming application. Depending on that environment, it could read or modify accessible project files, source code, environment variables, credentials, and user data;
...[truncated 290 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

Remediation Suggestions

  • Pin the dependency to an exact, reviewed version rather than allowing npm to resolve a changing release.
  • Commit a lockfile containing registry-resolved integrity hashes.
  • Document the official source repository and package provenance so users can verify the publisher and review the implementation.
  • Use npm provenance and signature verification where available.
  • Review the package and its transitive dependencies before recommending installation.
  • Disable lifecycle scripts when they are unnecessary, for example with npm install --ignore-scripts, after confirming that this does not break legitimate functionality.
  • Run dependency installation and SDK use in a least-privileged, isolated environment without unnecessary credentials.
  • Add automated dependency auditing and controlled update review to detect compromised or vulnerable releases.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • MCP Tool PoisoningHidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (4)

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 20)May include surrounding context.

Get Trust Score (free)

bash
curl https://soul.sputnikx.xyz/soul/{agent_id}/trust

Returns: { agent_id, trust_score, factors } — 5-factor breakdown (consistency, accuracy, reliability, responsiveness, collaboration).

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill is presented primarily as a trust-query tool, but it also documents a state-changing registration endpoint that sends agent metadata to a third-party service and can issue an API key. That capability materially changes the security posture because users may invoke the skill expecting read-only behavior while actually triggering account creation or credential issuance on an external system.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The registration flow transmits agent identifiers and display metadata to an external service and may issue credentials, but the skill text does not warn users about those side effects. Without clear disclosure and consent, users may unknowingly create persistent external records or receive/manage secrets they did not intend to generate.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Scope Creep

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
87% confidence
Finding

The metadata claims no environment requirements or special permission scope, yet the documentation includes functionality that may create external identities and issue credentials. This mismatch can mislead operators, policy engines, or users about the sensitivity of the skill's actions and can result in insufficient review or controls.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.