T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:31- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Dependencies Create a Supply-Chain Risk
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 31–40
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependencies
Risk Level: Mediumyaml install: - kind: uv package: requests bins: [] - kind: uv package: beautifulsoup4 bins: [] - kind: uv package: anthropic bins: []Technical Analysis
The installation configuration declares
requests,beautifulsoup4, andanthropicwithout exact versions, integrity hashes, or a lockfile. Each installation can therefore resolve to the latest package version accepted by the package manager rather than a previously reviewed artifact.These dependencies are consistent with the Skill's declared website crawling and Anthropic API functionality, and there is no evidence that their package names are intentionally malicious. Nevertheless, unconstrained dependency resolution weakens build reproducibility and exposes installations to upstream package compromise, malicious releases, or unexpected security regressions.
The artifact contains only
SKILL.md; the referencedseo_audit_skill.pyimplementation is absent. Therefore, dependency import behavior and the handling ofANTHROPIC_API_KEYcannot be verified.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises an upstream dependency project, maintainer account, publishing token, or package distribution channel.
- The attacker publishes a malicious or backdoored release under one of the declared package names.
- A user installs the Skill after that release becomes the version selected by the unconstrained resolver.
- Malicious package logic executes during installation or when the package is imported by the Skill.
- The malicious logic accesses resources available to the installation or runtime process, potentially including environment variables such as
ANTHROPIC_API_KEY, local files, and outbound network access. - The accessed information may then be transmitted to at ...[truncated 661 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Pin every dependency to an explicitly reviewed version, for example with exact
==constraints. - Generate and commit a lockfile containing resolved transitive dependencies.
- Require cryptographic hashes for downloaded distributions where supported.
- Restrict dependency retrieval to an approved package registry and disable untrusted supplemental indexes.
- Prefer reviewed, immutable artifacts and verify package provenance or signatures when available.
- Add automated dependency vulnerability and provenance scanning to the release process.
- Re-review and deliberately update pinned versions on a controlled schedule.
- Include the referenced
seo_audit_skill.pyin future audit submissions so API-key handling, outbound destinations, SSRF protections, redirect behavior, timeouts, and response-size limits can be assessed.
- Pin every dependency to an explicitly reviewed version, for example with exact
