T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
echodecks_client.py:20- Finding
Unencoded User-Controlled Values Permit Query-Parameter Injection
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
echodecks_client.py, lines 20-30
Vulnerability Type: Query-parameter injection
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
python url = f"{BASE_URL}?resource={resource}" if action: url += f"&action={action}" # Merge extra params into URL if provided (e.g. deck_id for GET requests) if params: for key, value in params.items(): if value is not None: url += f"&{key}={value}"Technical Analysis
The client constructs request URLs by directly concatenating parameter values into the query string. Several handlers pass user-controlled deck, card, or podcast identifiers through this code without URL encoding or format validation.
An identifier containing query delimiters such as
&or=can introduce additional parameters. For example, a supplied value resemblingdeck123&action=status&id=targetmay be interpreted by the remote server as multiple parameters rather than one opaque deck identifier. The exact result depends on the EchoDecks API's handling of duplicate or conflicting query parameters.The fixed HTTPS destination and fixed API-key header prevent this issue alone from redirecting the credential to an arbitrary host.
Attack Path
- An attacker supplies a crafted identifier through a command that accepts
deck_id, card ID, or podcast ID. - A command handler places that value in the
paramsdictionary. make_requestappends the value directly to the authenticated URL without percent-encoding it.- The resulting request contains attacker-injected query delimiters and parameters.
- The EchoDecks API parses the injected fields under the victim's authenticated API context.
- If the server honors an injected or duplicate parameter, the request may operate on an unintended action or resource.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation may alter request semantics or target unintended EchoDecks records using the configured user's API credentia ...[truncated 268 chars]
- An attacker supplies a crafted identifier through a command that accepts
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
Use the HTTP client's structured parameter support instead of manually constructing query strings. Build a parameter dictionary and pass it through the
paramsargument:python def make_request(method, resource, action=None, params=None, data=None): headers = { "X-API-KEY": get_api_key(), "Content-Type": "application/json", } query = {"resource": resource} if action is not None: query["action"] = action if params: query.update({ key: value for key, value in params.items() if value is not None }) if method == "GET": response = requests.get( BASE_URL, headers=headers, params=query, timeout=30, )Apply the same structured query handling to all supported HTTP methods. Additionally:
- Validate identifiers against the documented server-side format, such as a strict UUID or alphanumeric identifier pattern.
- Reject identifiers containing unexpected control characters.
- Add regression tests using values containing
&,=,#, spaces, and non-ASCII characters. - Assert that crafted values remain encoded as one parameter and cannot introduce
action,resource, oridfields. - Enforce authorization and resource ownership independently on the EchoDecks server, because client-side validation is not an authorization boundary.
