T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
echodecks_client.py:8- Finding
API Key Is Sent to a Domain Different from the Documented Service Domain
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Ultimate Flashcards and Podcast Tutor
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
Overview
The skill mostly matches its study-tool purpose, but it sends a sensitive EchoDecks API key to a hardcoded domain that is not the same domain documented for obtaining the key.
Review this before installing. Only use it if you trust the EchoDecks provider and are comfortable with your API key, deck/card content, submitted text, review activity, podcast requests, and account metadata being sent to the configured remote API. Confirm that echodecks.com is an official EchoDecks API host for keys obtained from echodecks.app, and consider using a revocable, least-privilege key if EchoDecks supports one.
Vulnerability Patterns
- Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
- Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
- Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
- Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
- Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)
T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Warning
- Location
echodecks_client.py:21- Finding
Unencoded User-Controlled Values Are Concatenated into API Query Strings
- Content
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- Remediation
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T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
Note
- Location
echodecks_client.py:34- Finding
Outbound HTTP Requests Have No Timeout
- Content
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- Remediation
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Vulnerability Patterns
- Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
- MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
- Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
- Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
- Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (7)
Undeclared Tool Scope
Medium
- Category
- MCP Least Privilege
- Confidence
- 95% confidence
- Finding
The skill declares access to an API key and describes API-backed wrappers, but it does not declare an explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That weakens containment and reviewability, making it easier for a skill with environment and network capabilities to access sensitive data or perform external actions beyond what a user would reasonably expect.
- Content
Missing User Warnings
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 91% confidence
- Finding
The skill presents deck management and AI generation features without clearly warning that user study content, deck text, and related metadata may be transmitted to an external service. Users may provide private notes or educational content under the assumption it stays local, creating confidentiality and consent risks.
- Content
Missing User Warnings
Medium
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 94% confidence
- Finding
The client sends request parameters and JSON payloads, including user-supplied text and deck/card data, to the remote EchoDecks API via requests.get/post/put/delete. Although the command names imply API usage, there is no visible warning, comment, or docstring in the code that user content may be transmitted to an external service, especially for generation features that may send free-form text.
- Content
External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Confidence
- 80% confidence
- Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- Content
python if method == "GET": response = requests.get(url, headers=headers) elif method == "POST": response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data) elif method == "PUT": response = requests.put(url, headers=headers, json=data) elif method == "DELETE":
External Transmission
Medium
- Category
- Data Exfiltration
- Confidence
- 80% confidence
- Finding
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
- Content
python elif method == "POST": response = requests.post(url, headers=headers, json=data) elif method == "PUT": response = requests.put(url, headers=headers, json=data) elif method == "DELETE": response = requests.delete(url, headers=headers) else:
Missing User Warnings
Low
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 93% confidence
- Finding
The skill notes per-action credit costs in individual tool descriptions, but it does not provide a prominent user warning that generation features consume paid account resources. This can lead to unexpected charges or depletion of limited credits if a user triggers generation without understanding the account impact.
- Content
Missing User Warnings
Low
- Category
- Not specified by scanner
- Confidence
- 89% confidence
- Finding
This code accesses the sensitive environment variable ECHODECKS_API_KEY to authenticate outbound API requests, but there is no comment, docstring, or other user-facing warning explaining that credentials will be read from the environment. Under the code-file criteria, sensitive credential access should have some visible disclosure unless already documented elsewhere in the skill materials.
- Content
Static analysis
No suspicious patterns detected.