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Security audit

Where are you from

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is an inventory-and-Git-sync tool, but its implementation can commit and push more local data than users are likely to expect.

Review generated manifests before any commit or push, run the tool only in a dedicated inventory repository, avoid credential-bearing Git remote URLs, and do not rely on SKILL.private.md or regex scrubbing as a complete privacy boundary.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure Skill Coding PracticesFinds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (3)

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
utils/gitManager.js:84
Finding

Repository-Wide Git Staging Can Upload Unrelated Sensitive Files

Content
View full analysis
{ try { const addResult = gitRun(["add", "."], dir); if (!addResult.success) throw new Error(`git add failed: ${addResult.stderr}`); const statusResult = gitRun(["status", "--porcelain"], dir); if (!statusResult.stdout.trim()) { logger.info("No changes to commit."); return false; } const commitResult = gitRun(["commit", "-m", message], dir); if (!commitResult.success) throw new Error(`git commit failed: ${commitResult.stderr}`); logger.success(`Committed changes: ${message}`); return true; } catch (err) { logger.error(`Git commit failed: ${err.message}`); return false; } }, ``` The resulting commit can then be pushed: ```js push: (dir) => { try { logger.info("Pushing changes to remote..."); const currentBranch = gitManager._getCurrentBranch(dir); logger.info(`Detected branch: ${currentBranch}`); const result = gitRun(["push", "origin", currentBranch], dir); if (!result.success) throw new Error(result.stderr); logger.success(`Pushed to GitHub (${currentBranch})!`); return true; } catch (err) { logger.warn(`Git push failed (check network/auth): ${err.message}`); return false; } }, ``` ### Technical Analysis The synchronization feature is described as committing and pushing generated inventory manifests. However, `git add .` stages every unignored change under the current Git working tree rather than only the generated JSON and Markdown manifests. The `.gitignore` created by initialization covers only a limited set of patterns: ```js const ignoreList = [ ".openclaw/credentials", "*.key", "secrets.*", "node_modules", ".DS_Store", "*.bak" ].join("\n" ...[truncated 1750 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error
Location
utils/sourceDetector.js:84
Finding

Credential-Bearing Git Remote URLs Are Serialized Without Sanitization

Content
View full analysis
{ const info = sourceDetector.detect(s.path, s.realPath); let description = ""; try { const rawContent = fs.readFileSync(s.skillFilePath, "utf8"); if (s.isPrivate) { description = securityScrubber.extractMetadataOnly(rawContent, config.maskPatterns || []); } else { const scrubbed = securityScrubber.scrub(rawContent, config.maskPatterns || []); const descMatch = scrubbed.match(/description:\s*(.+)/); description = descMatch ? descMatch[1].trim() : "(no description)"; } } catch (e) { description = "(could not read SKILL.md)"; } return { ...s, ...info, description }; }); ``` The unsanitized source is then persisted: ```js skills: skills.map((s) => ({ name: s.name, version: s.version || "0.0.1", source: s.source, method: s.method, isPrivate: s.isPrivate, path: s.path, realPath: s.realPath, description: s.description || "", status: s.status || "active", lastChecked: new Date().toISOString() ...[truncated 2195 chars]
Remediation
View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Warning
Location
inventory.js:179
Finding

Private Skill Metadata and Absolute Filesystem Paths Are Exported

Content
View full analysis
{ const frontmatterMatch = content.match(/^---([\s\S]*?)---/); if (frontmatterMatch) { let frontmatter = frontmatterMatch[1]; frontmatter = securityScrubber.scrub(frontmatter, customPatterns); return `---${frontmatter}---\n\n*(Full instructions masked for security)*`; } return "*(No frontmatter found. Full content masked for security)*"; } ``` The resulting manifest also exports absolute logical and canonical paths: ```js skills: skills.map((s) => ({ name: s.name, version: s.version || "0.0.1", source: s.source, method: s.method, isPrivate: s.isPrivate, path: s.path, realPath: s.realPath, description: s.description || "", status: s.status || "active", lastChecked: new Date().toISOString() })) ``` ### Technical Analysis The documented privacy behavior states that details of a skill marked with `SKILL.private.md` are fully hidden. The implementation masks the instruction body but preserves the complete YAML frontmatt ...[truncated 1874 chars]
Remediation
View remediation
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Rogue AgentSelf-Modification, Session Persistence
  • Trigger AbuseOverly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
  • MCP Least PrivilegeUnderdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
Findings (37)

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
96% confidence
Finding

The skill’s stated purpose understates that it may create or manage Git repositories, write .gitignore, stage files, commit local state, and push repository contents remotely. When a skill that sounds like passive inventory management performs active source-control operations, it increases the risk of unintended data capture, repository tampering, or exfiltration through Git push.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill’s stated purpose understates that it may create or manage Git repositories, write .gitignore, stage files, commit local state, and push repository contents remotely. When a skill that sounds like passive inventory management performs active source-control operations, it increases the risk of unintended data capture, repository tampering, or exfiltration through Git push.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The skill’s stated purpose understates that it may create or manage Git repositories, write .gitignore, stage files, commit local state, and push repository contents remotely. When a skill that sounds like passive inventory management performs active source-control operations, it increases the risk of unintended data capture, repository tampering, or exfiltration through Git push.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill’s stated purpose understates that it may create or manage Git repositories, write .gitignore, stage files, commit local state, and push repository contents remotely. When a skill that sounds like passive inventory management performs active source-control operations, it increases the risk of unintended data capture, repository tampering, or exfiltration through Git push.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill’s stated purpose understates that it may create or manage Git repositories, write .gitignore, stage files, commit local state, and push repository contents remotely. When a skill that sounds like passive inventory management performs active source-control operations, it increases the risk of unintended data capture, repository tampering, or exfiltration through Git push.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The skill’s stated purpose understates that it may create or manage Git repositories, write .gitignore, stage files, commit local state, and push repository contents remotely. When a skill that sounds like passive inventory management performs active source-control operations, it increases the risk of unintended data capture, repository tampering, or exfiltration through Git push.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High
Category
MCP Tool Poisoning
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The skill’s stated purpose understates that it may create or manage Git repositories, write .gitignore, stage files, commit local state, and push repository contents remotely. When a skill that sounds like passive inventory management performs active source-control operations, it increases the risk of unintended data capture, repository tampering, or exfiltration through Git push.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Ae1

High
Category
analysis-evasion
Confidence
100% confidence
Finding

Referenced artifact was not completely inspected

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

md
> This skill manager relies on JavaScript (`inventory.js`) to perform file scanning and Git integration.

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The security docstring materially understates behavior: the tool writes persistent configuration, generates manifest files, creates commits, and can push data to GitHub. That kind of misleading assurance can cause users to run it with greater trust, increasing the risk of unintended data exposure from scanned skill content or derived metadata.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes an 'enterprise-grade asset manager' that tracks and syncs OpenClaw skills to GitHub, but this file implements a local command-line inventory manager with interactive setup, filesystem scanning, manifest generation, Git initialization, committing, and optional pushing. The skill name and description do not align with the concrete behavior in this module, which is broader local repo management rather than a narrowly scoped 'Where are you from' capability.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Self-Modification

High
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
85% confidence
Finding

Skill modifies its own code, configuration, or behavior at runtime. Self-modification enables an agent to escalate privileges, disable safety constraints, or install persistent backdoors.

Content

Scanner excerpt · inventory.js (reported line 204)May include surrounding context.

js
manifestGenerator.generate(skillsWithMetadata, config.manifestPath, templatePath);

  // 3. Git Sync
  const committed = gitManager.commit(process.cwd(), `chore(inventory): update skills manifest [${new Date().toISOString()}]`);
  
  if (committed && shouldPush) {
    const rl = readline.createInterface({

Intent-Code Divergence

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
99% confidence
Finding

The header comments explicitly claim the utility is 'read-only' and does 'not access, transmit, or collect credentials,' yet the code writes .gitignore, modifies repository state, and performs git push to a remote. This kind of deceptive or inaccurate security narrative increases the chance that dangerous capabilities are approved, embedded, or invoked without appropriate scrutiny.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Description-Behavior Mismatch

High
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The module’s behavior materially exceeds its described role: it initializes repositories, stages all files, commits changes, writes a .gitignore, and pushes to a remote. In an agent skill context, this mismatch is dangerous because users or higher-level orchestrators may treat the component as read-only metadata handling while it can silently mutate local repositories and transmit data off-host.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Confidence
70% confidence
Finding

Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.

Content

Scanner excerpt · utils/securityScrubber.js (reported line 19)May include surrounding context.

js
const SECRETS_PATTERNS = [
  { name: "OpenAI Secret Key", regex: /sk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{32,48}/g },
  { name: "OpenAI Public Key", regex: /pk-[a-zA-Z0-9]{32,48}/g },
  { name: "GitHub Access Token", regex: /ghp_[a-zA-Z0-9]{36,40}/g },
  { name: "Hugging Face Token", regex: /hf_[a-zA-Z0-9]{34,40}/g },
  { name: "Google API Key", regex: /AIza[0-9A-Za-z_-]{35}/g },
  { name: "Bearer Token", regex: /Bearer\s+[a-zA-Z0-9\._\-]{20,}/gi },

Description-Behavior Mismatch

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The manifest describes the skill as an asset manager that tracks, manages, and syncs OpenClaw skills capabilities and sources to GitHub. However, the published documentation describes additional substantive behavior: automatic origin identification across multiple ecosystems, security scrubbing of API keys, and privacy handling for sensitive instructions. Those behaviors go beyond a narrow asset-management-and-sync description and materially change the skill's effective scope.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
93% confidence
Finding

The README prominently advertises automatic synchronization of installed skill inventory to a personal GitHub repository, but it does not warn users that inventory/manifests may reveal locally installed tools, file paths, sources, and other operational metadata. In a security-oriented asset manager context, omission of disclosure warnings can lead users to publish sensitive environment details to a remote service without understanding the exposure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The README instructs users to run node inventory.js sync --push but provides no warning that this performs a network push to GitHub and may publish inventory data remotely in a way that is difficult to fully retract. Because the skill is specifically designed to audit and track installed skills from multiple sources, the pushed data could expose internal tooling, repository relationships, or local environment details.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium
Category
MCP Least Privilege
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The skill declares operational behavior that relies on code execution and environment interaction, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed tools. This creates an authorization transparency gap: a user or runtime may not clearly understand that local filesystem and environment-adjacent capabilities are required before the skill scans directories, reads configuration, or invokes Node.js workflows.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises a single command that can detect changes, commit, and push to GitHub, but it does not place a clear data-transmission warning adjacent to that feature description. Users need explicit notice that local inventory metadata may leave the machine and become stored in a remote repository, potentially exposing sensitive operational details even if some secrets are masked.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
92% confidence
Finding

The skill instructs the agent to use intent-based matching with broad phrases such as 'Analyze my agent environment' or 'What's installed?' to trigger local inventory workflows. Broad natural-language triggers can cause unintended execution of filesystem inspection and follow-on prompts for sync, especially in conversational contexts where the user did not mean to invoke this specific skill.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The trigger-driven push workflow says to run 'inventory sync --push' directly in response to matching user intent, without a clear disclosure that this will create commits and upload data to GitHub. In conversational systems, hidden side effects involving both local mutation and remote transmission are especially risky because intent can be ambiguous and the cost of accidental activation is high.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The sync/push workflow can be activated by broad phrases like 'Back up my skills' or 'Update my skill manifest,' yet the resulting action may commit and push data to GitHub. This is dangerous because a user may intend a local backup or report refresh, but the skill could interpret it as authorization to upload inventory data to a remote repository.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The tutorial states that bootstrap will create a configuration file in the user's home directory and initialize a Git repository in the current folder, but it does not prominently warn that these actions modify local state. Users following quick-start steps may run the command in the wrong directory or without understanding the persistence and source-control side effects, leading to unintended repository creation or configuration changes.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Vague Triggers

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
97% confidence
Finding

The natural-language control section encourages broad phrases such as 'Analyze my skills' and 'Sync my inventory to GitHub,' while saying the agent will know exactly which scripts to run. In an agentic environment, vague triggers can cause unintended execution from ordinary conversation or ambiguous user prompts, especially because the documented actions include scanning local files and pushing data to a remote repository.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Session Persistence

Medium
Category
Rogue Agent
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Skill establishes unauthorized persistence across sessions via cron jobs, startup scripts, or state files. Session persistence allows an attacker to maintain access beyond the current interaction.

Content

Scanner excerpt · inventory.js (reported line 117)May include surrounding context.

js
logger.header("Initializing Inventory Manager");
  const remoteUrl = args[0];
  
  // 1. Create config directory if not exists
  const configDir = path.dirname(CONFIG_PATH);
  if (!fs.existsSync(configDir)) {
    fs.mkdirSync(configDir, { recursive: true });

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
utils/gitManager.js:10