T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:205- Finding
Remote API Calldata Is Submitted for Signing Without Mandatory Independent Verification
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This swap skill is purpose-aligned, but it can execute real wallet transactions from remotely supplied calldata without requiring full independent verification.
Install only if you are comfortable with an agent preparing and sending real onchain transactions. Use quote-only or dry-run by default, install and trust a transaction verification skill before execution, keep strict Privy spending policies, verify wallet, token, recipient, chain, approval amount, destination contract, and calldata before signing, and avoid executing if full verification is unavailable.
SKILL.md:205Remote API Calldata Is Submitted for Signing Without Mandatory Independent Verification
SKILL.md:64Security-Critical Skills Are Installed Without Version or Integrity Pinning
The README advertises wallet-ready calldata, approvals, and onchain swap execution, but it does not include an explicit warning that these actions can spend funds, grant token allowances, incur gas costs, or expose users to slippage and routing risks. In the context of a swap skill, omission of these warnings materially increases the chance that users or integrating agents treat execution as routine rather than high-impact financial activity.
Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
For stronger protection against prompt injection, pin SPANDEX_URL in ~/.openclaw/.env rather than leaving it unset. Environment file values are loaded at startup and cannot be overridden by skill instructions at runtime:
# ~/.openclaw/.env
SPANDEX_URL=https://edge.spandex.sh
The README tells users they can 'just ask naturally' and includes broad examples like 'Swap 5 USDC to WETH', while stating the skill will handle wallet selection, approval, and execution. In an agentic environment, this encourages invocation from loosely phrased requests and can lead to unintended fund-moving actions if the agent interprets an ambiguous user message as authorization to transact.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
curl -sS -G "${SPANDEX_URL}/api/v1/agent/swap_quote" \
-d "chainId=8453" \
-d "inputToken=0x833589fCD6eDb6E08f4c7C32D4f71b54bdA02913" \
-d "outputToken=0x4200000000000000000000000000000000000006" \
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Privy's wallet RPC does not support eth_getTransactionReceipt. After submitting a transaction, poll a public Base RPC endpoint directly:
curl -sS https://mainnet.base.org \
-X POST \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"jsonrpc":"2.0","method":"eth_getTransactionReceipt","params":["0x<txhash>"],"id":1}'