T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:24- Finding
Unpinned Third-Party Package Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 24–27
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party dependency
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash pip install token-saverTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions direct users to install
token-saverfrom the default Python package index without specifying an exact version or verifying the package with a cryptographic hash. Consequently, installation behavior depends on whichever release the package registry resolves at execution time.The instructions also do not establish that the registry artifact is built from, or equivalent to, the reviewed local implementation in
scripts/token_saver.py. A later malicious release, compromised publisher account, or compromised package-distribution channel could therefore cause users to execute code that was not included in this audit.Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the package publisher account, distribution channel, or an otherwise trusted future release of
token-saver. - The attacker publishes a modified package under the same package name.
- A user follows the documented
pip install token-saverinstruction. pipresolves and installs the attacker-controlled release because no version or hash is required.- Package installation or later import and execution runs the malicious code with the user's privileges.
This path requires compromise or malicious control of the named dependency or its distribution chain; the audited repository itself does not contain the hypothetical payload.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the account or environment running
pipor importing the package. Depending on those privileges, the malicious dependency could access application data, environment variables and API keys, alter user-writable files, make network requests, or compromise the associated Python environment. System-wide installation with elevat ...[truncated 49 chars]- An attacker compromises the package publisher account, distribution channel, or an otherwise trusted future release of
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin the dependency to a specifically reviewed version, for example
token-saver==1.0.0. - Publish and verify cryptographic hashes, using a command such as
pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt. - Maintain a lock file or hash-locked requirements file under version control.
- Explicitly identify the authoritative package registry and source repository.
- Verify that the published package is reproducibly built from and functionally matches the audited source.
- Prefer installation in an isolated virtual environment under a non-privileged account.
- Add dependency monitoring and require a new security review before updating the pinned release.
- Pin the dependency to a specifically reviewed version, for example