T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
README.md:32- Finding
API Credentials May Be Sent to a Fixed Third-Party Endpoint
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill is a coherent Miniflux management helper, but its README can direct users to send their API token to a fixed third-party Miniflux URL and its destructive commands lack confirmation safeguards.
Review this skill before installing. Use only a MINIFLUX_URL for the Miniflux instance you control or explicitly trust, never send a real API token to the README's fixed reader.etereo.cloud example unless that is your intended server, and rotate any token already used against the wrong host. Treat delete and bulk mark-read commands as account-changing operations that should be explicitly confirmed. Prefer installing the Python dependency in an isolated, pinned environment.
README.md:32API Credentials May Be Sent to a Fixed Third-Party Endpoint
README.md:16Unpinned Dependency Is Installed into Broad Python Environments
scripts/miniflux-cli.py:145Attacker-Controlled Feed Content Is Emitted Without a Trust Boundary
The README documents destructive operations such as deleting feeds and categories and marking items as read, but it does not warn users that these actions modify server-side state and may be irreversible or hard to recover. In a skill designed to be invoked by an agent or copied by users, omission of cautions increases the risk of accidental data loss or unintended bulk changes.
The skill documents capabilities that require environment access and outbound network access, but it does not declare any explicit tool scope such as permissions or allowed-tools. That creates an authorization gap where an agent may invoke broader-than-expected capabilities, increasing the chance of secret exposure from MINIFLUX_TOKEN or unintended API actions against the Miniflux instance.
The skill advertises destructive operations such as deleting feeds and categories and marking items as read, but it provides no warning, confirmation guidance, or safety notes about irreversible or state-changing effects. In an agent setting, this raises the risk of accidental data loss or unwanted account changes if a user request is ambiguous or the agent acts too aggressively.
The delete-feed command performs an irreversible state-changing action immediately with no confirmation prompt, dry-run mode, or force flag. In an agent or CLI context, this increases the chance of accidental deletion from user error, prompt misinterpretation, or unsafe automation, causing loss of subscriptions and associated configuration.
The mark-feed-read command bulk-modifies all unread entries in a feed without warning or confirmation. Because this action can silently alter large amounts of user state, an accidental or manipulated invocation can cause users to lose track of unread content and undermine trust in automation.
The delete-category command deletes a category immediately without a confirmation barrier. In a management skill that exposes destructive administrative actions, lack of confirmation makes accidental data loss more likely, especially when invoked by higher-level agents that may misunderstand user intent.
Line L91 states that all documentation must be in English, which is a language policy constraint expressed in natural language. Under the policy rules, forcing a specific language without opt-in or clear regional/compliance justification is a reportable violation.
The skill instructs users to export an API token into the environment but does not include any warning about secret handling, logging, shell history, or avoiding token disclosure. While this is common setup guidance, omission of basic token-safety instructions can lead to credential leakage in shared terminals, transcripts, or debugging output.
No suspicious patterns detected.