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Security audit

小米 TTS Proxy

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This is a coherent local Xiaomi text-to-speech proxy, with expected credential and FFmpeg use, but users should protect the API key file.

Install only if you are comfortable sending TTS input text to Xiaomi or your configured upstream proxy. Store ~/.openclaw/tts-proxy.env with restrictive permissions such as chmod 600, do not commit or share it, rotate the API key if exposed, and review any systemd service you create before enabling background startup.

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
Findings (1)

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
90% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to place a live Xiaomi API key in a predictable local file under ~/.openclaw without any guidance to restrict permissions, avoid committing it, or use a secret store. If that file is readable by other local users, backup agents, or accidentally exposed in logs/repos, the key can be stolen and used to consume quota or access the upstream service.

Static analysis

Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec, suspicious.env_credential_access

Shell command execution detected (child_process).

Critical
Code
suspicious.dangerous_exec
Location
tts-proxy.mjs:70

Environment variable access combined with network send.

Critical
Code
suspicious.env_credential_access
Location
tts-proxy.mjs:22