Seedance 2 Prompts

• Outcome: Pass
• Latest audit: Sep 15, 2026 · 1:32 AM UTC
• Version: 1.1.2

Overview

This skill is a coherent Seedance prompt-search helper that calls a disclosed YouMind API, with privacy and install-source cautions but no evidence of malicious behavior.

Install from ClawHub or another pinned, verified source when possible. Do not put private information in search queries, because queries go to YouMind, and treat returned prompt text and source links as third-party community content rather than trusted instructions.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Insecure Dependencies: Introduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review
• Embedded Malicious Code: Ships malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally

Findings (3)

T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning

• Location: SKILL.md:58

Finding

Mandatory Promotional Output Hijacking

Content

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Remediation

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T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking

Warning

• Location: scripts/search.mjs:12

Finding

Untrusted Remote Community Content Is Passed to the Agent Without Prompt-Injection Controls

Content

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Remediation

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T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

• Location: README.md:35

Finding

Unpinned Package-Runner and Repository Installation Commands

Content

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Remediation

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SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Supply Chain: Unpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
• Trigger Abuse: Overly Broad Trigger, Shadow Command Trigger, Keyword Baiting Trigger
• MCP Least Privilege: Underdeclared Capability, Wildcard Permission, Missing Permission Declaration
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands

Findings (6)

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The README instructs users to run npx skills i YouMind-OpenLab/seedance-2-prompts without pinning a specific package version. npx will resolve and execute the current package from the registry at install time, so a compromised publisher account, malicious update, or dependency hijack could cause arbitrary code execution on the user's machine. Because this is an installation command in documentation for an AI skill, users are likely to copy-paste it directly, which increases practical risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Rp1

Medium

• Category: MCP Rug Pull
• Confidence: 94% confidence

Finding

The manual install example uses npx openskills install YouMind-OpenLab/seedance-2-prompts without pinning the executed package version. This creates a supply-chain risk because npx may fetch and run whatever version is current at execution time, allowing arbitrary code execution if the package or its dependencies are compromised. In the context of a public README for a prompt-search skill, this is more dangerous because readers may treat the command as trusted setup guidance.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Undeclared Tool Scope

Medium

• Category: MCP Least Privilege
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

The skill instructs the agent to run a network-capable script (node scripts/search.mjs) against a live external API, but it declares no explicit tool scope or permissions. This creates an authorization and governance gap: hosts may allow broader-than-intended execution or users may not realize the skill performs live network access to third-party infrastructure.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

• Category: Data Exfiltration
• Confidence: 60% confidence

Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/search.mjs (reported line 13)May include surrounding context.

js

const page = parseInt(getArg('--page', '1'));
const model = 'seedance-2.0';

const res = await fetch('https://youmind.com/youhome-api/video-prompts', {
  method: 'POST',
  headers: { 'Content-Type': 'application/json', 'Origin': 'https://youmind.com' },
  body: JSON.stringify({ model, page, limit, q: q || undefined }),

Vague Triggers

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 86% confidence

Finding

The 'Use this skill when users want to' bullets include broad phrases like 'Get prompt inspiration' and 'Create high-quality AI videos with proven prompts' without clear boundaries or exclusion conditions. In a manifest/markdown skill description, this can overlap with many general creative requests and makes the trigger scope less specific than the skill's actual purpose of searching a Seedance prompt library.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 84% confidence

Finding

This code sends the user's search query to an external service via an HTTP POST request. While the script usage is shown, there is no explicit warning, confirmation, or comment disclosing that user-provided input will be transmitted to youmind.com.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.