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Security audit

Musify MooreThreads

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a straightforward CUDA-to-MUSA conversion guide with disclosed file-modification commands and one ordinary but unpinned Python dependency risk.

Install the Python dependency in a dedicated virtual environment, consider pinning ahocorapy to a reviewed version, and run in-place conversion only after backing up or committing your project so generated source changes can be reviewed and reverted.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Insecure DependenciesIntroduces malicious components through unsafe dependency sources
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Findings (1)

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning
Location
SKILL.md:13
Finding
Unpinned and Unverified Third-Party Dependency Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `SKILL.md`, lines 13–17 **Vulnerability Type**: Insecure third-party dependency installation **Risk Level**: Medium ### Vulnerable Code ```bash # Install dependencies pip install ahocorapy # musify-text should be available in MUSA toolkit ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation command retrieves `ahocorapy` and its transitive dependencies from the package index configured for pip without specifying an exact version or verifying cryptographic hashes. The project includes no dependency lockfile, checksum, trusted-index requirement, or provenance-verification procedure. Consequently, the code executed during installation is not fixed to the dependency state reviewed during this audit. A compromised package release, compromised transitive dependency, malicious package-index configuration, or dependency-resolution attack could cause pip to retrieve and execute attacker-controlled package build or installation logic. This finding does not establish that `ahocorapy` is malicious. The vulnerability is the unpinned and unverified installation process. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a package release or one of its transitive dependencies, or influences the package index used by the victim. 2. A user or Agent follows the documented `pip install ahocorapy` instruction. 3. Pip resolves the dependency versions available through its configured index at installation time. 4. Pip downloads the attacker-controlled distribution and may execute its build or installation logic. 5. The payload runs with the operating-system privileges of the account invoking pip. ### Impact Assessment Successful exploitation could permit arbitrary code execution under the installing user's privileges. Depending on that account's access, an attacker could read or modify accessible source code and files, steal credentials available to the process, alter the Python environment, or tamper with subsequent conversion workflows. The in ...[truncated 172 chars]
Remediation
## Remediation Suggestions 1. Pin `ahocorapy` and every transitive dependency to reviewed, exact versions in a checked-in requirements or lock file. 2. Record cryptographic hashes for all distributions and enforce them with: ```bash python -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 3. Explicitly use an organization-approved package index or reviewed artifact repository rather than relying on ambient pip configuration. 4. Verify package provenance and inspect the selected distributions before adding their versions and hashes to the lock file. 5. Install dependencies inside a dedicated virtual environment using a non-privileged account. 6. Add a documented dependency-update process that includes security review, testing, and regeneration of pinned hashes.
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.