T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:107- Finding
Hard-Coded App-Key in a Plaintext Local API Request
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 107-118
Vulnerability Type: Hard-coded credential and insecure credential transmission
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
markdown **Base URL**: `http://127.0.0.1:8000` (replace with the actual domain in production) **POST** `/gateway/vane_marketing/content` ### Request Example ```bash curl --location --request POST 'http://127.0.0.1:8000/gateway/vane_marketing/content' \ --header 'App-Key: S6YVomNq2PYl4bnjGYXDeaM1J9jhojwv' \ --header 'Content-Type: application/json' \Technical Analysis
The request example embeds a credential-shaped App-Key directly in reusable documentation. If the value is valid, copying the example can expose it through shell history, process inspection, terminal recordings, logs, documentation mirrors, or source-control history.
The documented content-generation request also sends the App-Key to an HTTP service on
127.0.0.1:8000. Although loopback traffic is not ordinarily exposed to remote network interception, HTTP provides no server authentication. Any local process able to bind to or control port 8000 could impersonate the expected gateway and capture the key. The documentation does not prescribe endpoint authentication, key scoping, secret redaction, secure storage, or validation of the process receiving the credential.The same skill instructs users to submit their App-Key during the conversation and then forwards it to external or local API endpoints. This can cause user credentials to enter conversation histories and request logs. The audit cannot establish whether the embedded example value remains active, but placing a realistic credential value in published instructions is independently an insecure practice.
Attack Path
- A user or agent copies the documented command without replacing the embedded App-Key.
- The key is retained in shell history, execution logs, chat history, or other moni ...[truncated 914 chars]
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Remove the literal App-Key from all examples and replace it with an unmistakable placeholder such as
${VANE_APP_KEY}orREPLACE_WITH_YOUR_APP_KEY. - Treat the published value as potentially compromised. Verify whether it is real and, if so, revoke and rotate it immediately.
- Obtain credentials from a protected secret store or runtime environment injection rather than asking users to disclose complete keys in ordinary conversation.
- Redact keys from chat transcripts, command output, application logs, error messages, telemetry, and audit records.
- Replace the unspecified HTTP gateway with a documented HTTPS endpoint whose certificate and hostname are validated.
- If a loopback gateway is required, authenticate the local service, verify its identity, restrict port access, and avoid forwarding the primary billing credential to it.
- Prefer scoped, short-lived tokens dedicated to the content-generation operation instead of long-lived account-level App-Keys.
- Add key rotation, revocation, rate limits, anomaly detection, and quota alerts to reduce the consequences of credential exposure.
- Update examples to load the secret safely without exposing it in command-line arguments or shell history.
- Remove the literal App-Key from all examples and replace it with an unmistakable placeholder such as
