T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:164- Finding
App-Key Transmitted Over Plaintext HTTP
- Content
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' \ --header 'Content-Type: application/json' ``` The descriptive label and placeholder above are English translations of the corresponding source text; the endpoint, header, and protocol are reproduced exactly. ### Technical Analysis The Skill directs the Agent to send the user's App-Key to an endpoint over unencrypted HTTP. An App-Key functions as a bearer credential: possession may be sufficient to authenticate requests and consume the associated account balance. HTTP provides neither transport confidentiality nor reliable endpoint authenticity. A network intermediary can inspect the `App-Key` header, modify the request or response, or redirect the Agent to attacker-controlled infrastructure. The use of `curl --location` further increases the importance of enforcing secure redirect behavior, because redirects must not be allowed to downgrade transport security or disclose credentials to an unexpected host. This behavior is unnecessary for the declared content-generation functionality. The same API operation should be provided exclusively over HTTPS. ### Attack Path 1. A user provides a valid Zeelin App-Key to the Skill. 2. The Skill sends a generation request to `http://vane.zeelin.cn/gateway/vane_marketing/content`. 3. An attacker positioned on the local network, an untrusted Wi-Fi network, a compromised router, or another intermediary observes or modifies the plaintext HTTP traffic. 4. The attacker extracts the value of the `App-Key` header. 5. The attacker replays the credential against the service to submit unauthorized requests or consume the victim's paid balance. ...[truncated 726 chars]- Remediation
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