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Security audit

GetPost - The API Platform for Bots

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is an API reference for a broad bot platform, but it exposes paid, destructive, and externally visible actions without enough user-control or safety guidance.

Install only if you trust GetPost and are prepared to tightly control the API key. Require explicit confirmation before sending messages, scraping sites, buying credits or domains, changing DNS, purchasing labels, deleting webhooks, or deleting the account; store the token in a secret manager or environment variable and avoid exposing it in prompts or logs.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Findings (7)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
94% confidence
Finding

The skill exposes destructive DNS-management operations, including deletion and updates, without any mention of validation, change review, or user confirmation. In an agent environment, prompt injection or simple misinterpretation could lead to domain disruption, email outage, traffic hijacking, or irreversible configuration damage.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills.md (reported line 83)May include surrounding context.

md
- `GET /api/domains/:id/dns` — List DNS records
- `POST /api/domains/:id/dns` — Add/upsert DNS record (smart merge for SPF/DMARC)
- `PUT /api/domains/:id/dns/:recordId` — Update a DNS record
- `DELETE /api/domains/:id/dns/:recordId` — Delete a DNS record
- `POST /api/domains/:id/email` — Create email on your domain
- `POST /api/domains/:id/verify-email` — Verify email sending config
- Auto-provisions: Cloudflare DNS, nameservers, SendGrid email, default redirect

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The account deletion endpoint is a destructive, irreversible action exposed with no warning, confirmation requirement, or safety constraints. If invoked accidentally or via adversarial prompt influence, it could permanently remove the user's account and associated access, causing service loss and possible data loss.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills.md (reported line 102)May include surrounding context.

md
### Account
- `GET /api/auth/me` — Get your profile
- `PUT /api/auth/me` — Update name/bio
- `DELETE /api/auth/me` — Delete your account
- `GET /api/auth/rate-limits` — Check rate limit status

### Webhooks

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
88% confidence
Finding

Webhook deletion can silently disable event delivery and break downstream automations, monitoring, or security workflows. Presenting this destructive endpoint without warning or confirmation steps makes accidental or manipulated misuse more likely in an autonomous agent context.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills.md (reported line 109)May include surrounding context.

md
- `POST /api/webhooks` — Register `{"url", "events"}`
- `GET /api/webhooks` — List your webhooks
- `GET /api/webhooks/deliveries` — View delivery history (status, latency, errors)
- `DELETE /api/webhooks/:id` — Delete a webhook
- Events: `email.received`, `sms.received`, `balance.low`, `balance.credited`, `generation.completed`, `*` (all)

### Logs

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
95% confidence
Finding

The skill advertises capabilities with significant external side effects—email, SMS, scraping, domain registration, DNS changes, payments, and shipping—without any warning about consent, privacy, costs, or irreversibility. In an agent setting, this increases the chance that a model invokes high-impact actions without adequate user confirmation or safety gating.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Autonomous Decision Making

Medium
Category
Excessive Agency
Confidence
75% confidence
Finding

Skill enables autonomous high-impact decisions without human-in-the-loop verification. Critical operations (destructive commands, financial transactions, data deletion) should require explicit user confirmation.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills.md (reported line 17)May include surrounding context.

Quick Start

bash
# Sign up (no verification needed)
curl -X POST https://getpost.dev/api/auth/signup \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "YOUR_AGENT_NAME", "bio": "What your agent does"}'

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · skills.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

Quick Start

bash
# Sign up (no verification needed)
curl -X POST https://getpost.dev/api/auth/signup \
  -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
  -d '{"name": "YOUR_AGENT_NAME", "bio": "What your agent does"}'

Missing User Warnings

Low
Category
Not specified by scanner
Confidence
86% confidence
Finding

The authentication section shows a live bearer token format and tells the reader to save a key that is shown only once, but it provides no warning that the credential grants access to costly and high-impact APIs. In a skill context, omission of credential-handling guidance can lead to accidental logging, prompt leakage, or reuse of production tokens in unsafe environments.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.