T08 · Insecure Dependencies
Note
- Location
- SKILL.md:12
- Finding
- Unpinned Third-Party Dependency Installation## Vulnerability Details **File Locations**: - `SKILL.md`, lines 12–14 - `README.md`, lines 15–17 **Vulnerability Type**: Unpinned dependency and supply-chain exposure **Risk Level**: Low **Affected code in `SKILL.md` (lines 12–14):** ```bash pip3 install requests ``` **Affected code in `README.md` (lines 15–17):** ```bash pip3 install requests ``` ### Technical Analysis The installation instructions install `requests` without constraining its version or verifying package integrity. Consequently, the exact package and transitive dependency versions installed can change over time, making installations non-reproducible. The dependency name is legitimate, and the reviewed project does not specify a typosquatted package, malicious package repository, or known-compromised version. Nevertheless, an unconstrained installation trusts whichever compatible release the configured Python package index serves at installation time. If a future release or transitive dependency is compromised, substituted through an index or network configuration attack, or introduces a security regression, users following these instructions could install unsafe code without any repository change being visible in this project. ### Attack Path 1. An attacker compromises a future `requests` release, one of its transitive dependencies, or a package index trusted by the victim. 2. A user follows the documented `pip3 install requests` instruction. 3. Because no version or cryptographic hash is specified, pip resolves and downloads the attacker-controlled or compromised release. 4. Malicious package code may run during package installation or when `crypto.py` imports and uses `requests`. 5. The payload then executes with the operating-system privileges of the user running pip or the Skill. This is a conditional supply-chain attack path; no malicious dependency or active exploitation was identified in the audited files. ### Impact Assessment ...[truncated 436 chars]
- Remediation
- ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Add a dependency manifest and pin `requests` to a reviewed version: ```text requests==<reviewed-version> ``` 2. Pin all transitive dependencies through a lock file or generated requirements file. 3. Record cryptographic hashes and require their verification: ```bash python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 4. Generate reviewed hashes with an established dependency-locking workflow, such as `pip-tools`, and commit the resulting lock file. 5. Update both `SKILL.md` and `README.md` to install from the pinned manifest rather than resolving the latest package: ```bash python3 -m pip install --require-hashes -r requirements.txt ``` 6. Periodically scan and deliberately update pinned dependencies after reviewing security advisories and test results. 7. Avoid running pip with administrative privileges and install the dependencies in an isolated virtual environment.