Back to skill

Security audit

docspring-signature-requests

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

ClawScan rates this skill benign with medium confidence: the flagged API deletion and external-service examples were judged consistent with its purpose, though the scan was partial.

The verdict is benign, but it is not a guarantee of safety. Consider whether you trust the skill to interact with DocSpring and handle signature submissions. Skillspector inspected all three reported components, but marked coverage partial because some local references could not be resolved, so the evidence is incomplete.

Vulnerability Patterns
  • Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
  • Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
  • Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
  • Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
  • Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (3)

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 317)May include surrounding context.

md
again). After a bounce, DocSpring stops emailing that signer. A signer's email can't change, so ask the user for the right address,
  expire the submission and send a new request.
- Look at the result with `get_submission_pages`.
- To cancel before everyone signs, expire the submission (`expire_submission`, `DELETE /submissions/{submission_id}`):
  its data and metadata are deleted, `expired` becomes `true`, and its signing links say the document is no longer
  available. Its `state` and its signature requests' states don't change. It can't be undone, so ask the user first.

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Confidence
80% confidence
Finding

Tool parameters are crafted to achieve unintended or unsafe behavior. Parameter abuse can bypass intended safety checks (e.g. shell=True, --force, dangerous glob patterns).

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api.md (reported line 26)May include surrounding context.

md
| ----------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------------- | -------------------------------------------------- |
| `createSubmission`            | `POST /templates/{template_id}/submissions`              | Creates the submission and its signature requests. |
| `getSubmission`               | `GET /submissions/{submission_id}`                       | The submission, its signature requests and files.  |
| `expireSubmission`            | `DELETE /submissions/{submission_id}`                    | Cancels it: deletes its data, links stop working.  |
| `getSignatureRequest`         | `GET /signature_requests/{signature_request_id}`         | One signature request, with the values so far.     |
| `updateSignatureRequest`      | `PUT /signature_requests/{signature_request_id}`         | Changes its metadata or authentication details.    |
| `createSignatureRequestToken` | `POST /signature_requests/{signature_request_id}/tokens` | Makes a signing link, for a lin

External Transmission

Medium
Category
Data Exfiltration
Confidence
60% confidence
Finding

Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/api.md (reported line 67)May include surrounding context.

curl:

bash
curl -s -u "$DOCSPRING_TOKEN_ID:$DOCSPRING_TOKEN_SECRET" \
  -H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
  -X POST https://sync.api.docspring.com/api/v2/templates/tpl_.../submissions \
  -d '{