T03 · Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution
- Location
SKILL.md:29- Finding
Unverified Mutable Binary Download and Execution
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 29–32
Vulnerability Type: Remote payload retrieval without version pinning or integrity verification
Risk Level: Mediumbash PLATFORM="$(uname -s | tr '[:upper:]' '[:lower:]')-$(uname -m | sed 's/aarch64/arm64/')" curl -fL -o /usr/local/bin/smartclaws \ "https://github.com/skalenetwork/smartclaws/releases/latest/download/smartclaws-${PLATFORM}" chmod +x /usr/local/bin/smartclawsTechnical Analysis
The installation instructions download a precompiled executable from a mutable
releases/latestURL and mark it executable without verifying a cryptographic checksum, digital signature, or provenance attestation. Becauselatestcan resolve to a different artifact after the skill has been reviewed, the code ultimately executed by users is not fixed by the audited project contents.The URL points to the declared SmartClaws GitHub repository, and there is no evidence in the audited file that the current upstream artifact is malicious. Nevertheless, compromise of the upstream repository, its release workflow, a maintainer account, or the published release artifacts could cause these instructions to install attacker-controlled code.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the upstream repository, release workflow, maintainer credentials, or release artifact publication process.
- The attacker publishes or replaces the platform-specific binary referenced by the mutable
latestrelease URL. - A user or agent follows the documented installation procedure.
curlwrites the unverified payload to/usr/local/bin/smartclaws.- The payload is granted executable permissions.
- The binary executes when subsequent documented commands such as
smartclaws init,smartclaws wallet info, orsmartclaws readare invoked.
Impact Assessment
A substituted binary could execute arbitrary code with the privileges of the user invoking it. This ...[truncated 554 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin installation instructions to a specific reviewed release version rather than using
releases/latest. - Publish SHA-256 or stronger checksums through a separately protected release channel and verify the selected platform artifact before making it executable.
- Prefer signed releases and validate the signature against a pinned, documented maintainer or project public key.
- Use provenance attestations, such as Sigstore verification, to confirm that the binary was produced by the expected repository and build workflow.
- Download to a temporary file, fail closed on any verification error, and move the file into the destination only after successful validation.
- Avoid elevated installation where possible. Install into a user-controlled executable directory with restrictive permissions unless system-wide installation is explicitly required.
- Document the expected version and digest so reviewers can confirm that the installed executable corresponds to the audited artifact.
- Pin installation instructions to a specific reviewed release version rather than using
