T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
README.md:14- Finding
Unpinned External Repository and Dependency Installation
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
README.md, lines 14–18
Vulnerability Type: Unpinned third-party source and dependency installation
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash git clone https://github.com/dmoraine/ClawInboxRAG.git cd ClawInboxRAG/skill uv sync --extra devTechnical Analysis
The documented installation process clones the repository's mutable default branch and immediately resolves and installs its project dependencies, including development extras. It does not pin a reviewed commit or signed release, verify a checksum or signature, or otherwise establish that the downloaded content is identical to the version reviewed during this audit.
The remote repository and its dependency metadata are outside the audited artifact. Consequently, their current or future installation behavior cannot be verified from this project. If the repository, maintainer account, release process, or dependency configuration is compromised, the instructions could cause users to install attacker-controlled code.
This is a supply-chain weakness rather than evidence that the currently audited scripts are malicious.
Attack Path
- An attacker compromises the referenced repository, its maintainer account, or a dependency declared by the remote project.
- The attacker changes the default branch or dependency metadata to include malicious installation or runtime code.
- A user follows the documented instructions and clones the mutable default branch.
- The user runs
uv sync --extra dev, which resolves and installs the attacker-controlled project or dependencies. - Malicious code executes during installation or when an installed component is subsequently invoked, subject to the behavior of the compromised package and tooling.
Impact Assessment
Successful exploitation could execute code with the privileges of the user performing installation. Depending on that user's access, the attack ...[truncated 433 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Pin installation to a reviewed immutable commit SHA or cryptographically signed release rather than the default branch.
- Publish expected checksums or signature-verification instructions and require verification before installation.
- Commit and enforce a dependency lockfile containing exact versions and integrity information.
- Avoid installing development extras in normal runtime setup; provide a minimal production dependency group.
- Use protected release branches, signed tags, mandatory review, and tightly controlled maintainer access.
- Add automated dependency and provenance scanning to the release process.
- Document a reproducible installation procedure that maps each Skill release to a specific reviewed backend revision.
