T08 · Insecure Dependencies
- Location
SKILL.md:5- Finding
Unaudited Third-Party CLI Installation and Execution
- Content
View full analysis
Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, line 5
Vulnerability Type: Third-party dependency and supply-chain exposure
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
yaml metadata: {"clawdbot":{"emoji":"🎨","requires":{"bins":["npm","npx"],"env.optional":["DLAZY_API_KEY"]},"install":"npm install -g @dlazy/cli@1.2.3","installAlternative":"npx @dlazy/cli@1.2.3","homepage":"https://dlazy.com","configLocation":"~/.dlazy/config.json","apiEndpoints":["api.dlazy.com","files.dlazy.com"]},"openclaw":{"systemPrompt":"When invoking this skill, run `dlazy <model> -h` to confirm the current flags before building a command."}}Technical Analysis
The skill instructs the host to install
@dlazy/cli@1.2.3globally or execute it throughnpx. The package is version-pinned and retrieved from the npm ecosystem rather than from an obviously suspicious URL, which reduces but does not eliminate supply-chain risk.The audited project does not include the CLI source code, a package lockfile, cryptographic integrity values, package signatures, or other verifiable provenance information. Consequently, the executable dependency and its installation lifecycle scripts remain outside the audit boundary.
This dependency has access to sensitive resources needed by the documented workflow:
- The optional
DLAZY_API_KEYenvironment variable. - The persistent credential file at
~/.dlazy/config.json. - Local image paths supplied by users.
- Network access to
api.dlazy.comandfiles.dlazy.com.
The documentation discloses that local images are uploaded to
files.dlazy.com, so this expected transfer is not covert data exfiltration. However, the CLI's access to credentials, files, and the network increases the impact of any malicious or compromised package release.Attack Path
- A user or agent activates the skill and follows its installation metadata.
- The host runs either
npm install -g @dlazy/cli@1.2.3ornpx @dlazy/cli@1.2.3. - npm retrieves ...[truncated 1325 chars]
- The optional
- Remediation
View remediation
Remediation Suggestions
- Include the CLI source in the security-review scope or provide a verifiable link between the npm artifact and a reviewed source revision.
- Publish and verify npm integrity hashes, signatures, or provenance attestations before installation.
- Prefer a project-local installation governed by a lockfile instead of a global installation.
- Avoid unrestricted ad hoc
npxexecution; install the verified version once and invoke the locally pinned executable. - Audit the complete transitive dependency tree and all npm lifecycle scripts.
- Run the CLI in a sandbox with access limited to the specific input files, required API endpoints, and necessary credentials.
- Provide the API key only to the individual process that needs it rather than exposing it broadly in the environment.
- Require explicit user confirmation before uploading local images, especially when they may contain confidential or personal information.
- Rotate credentials and review account activity if package integrity or provenance cannot be established.
