Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
The skill’s image generation, cloud uploads, credentials, and local output files are disclosed and fit its stated purpose.
Prompts and selected reference images are processed externally and may incur charges. Set --provider explicitly and use --dry-run to check routing and inputs. Share only images and brand references you authorize for that provider, protect API keys, and pin external dependency versions.
The declared primary outcome is an image, but the shown execution path extracts result.data.texts[0] and prints it. No image-generation or image-editing operation is shown. This could support a larger image workflow, but the supplied chunk alone does not demonstrate the declared functionality.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node scripts/gen.mjs --task creative-scene \
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| 统一入口的全部选项 | `node scripts/gen.mjs --help` |
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
The workflow directs the agent to submit prompts and optional reference images to an external generation provider without explaining that disclosure or requiring a check for sensitive content. Although external processing is intrinsic to the advertised feature, users could unintentionally disclose private portraits, unreleased product images, or confidential prompt details, especially because the unified entry point can select a backend automatically.
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
4. **定稿后 `--imageSize 2K`** 出正式图。
5. **要连续改**（先定人，再改姿势，再改搭配）：把上一步的输出作为下一步的 `--images`，每步只改一个维度。
6. **质检**：构图景别对不对、是否够真实、手部、服装细节是否受控。
7. **要上架的图**建议过一遍 [detect-task](https://github.com/dlazy-ai/ecommerce-skills/blob/main/skills/detect-task/skill.md) 做投前检测。
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npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
model: () => env.GEN_MODEL_OPENAI || 'gpt-image-1',
describe(req) {
const ep = req.images?.length ? 'images/edits' : 'images/generations'
return `POST https://api.openai.com/v1/${ep} model=${openai.model()} size=${mapSize(req.size)} n=${req.batch}`
},
async run(req) {
const key = env.OPENAI_API_KEY
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
: await readFile(p)
fd.append('image[]', new Blob([buf], { type: mimeOf(p) }), path.basename(p))
}
r = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/images/edits', {
method: 'POST', headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${key}` }, body: fd,
})
} else {
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
: await readFile(p)
fd.append('image[]', new Blob([buf], { type: mimeOf(p) }), path.basename(p))
}
r = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/images/edits', {
method: 'POST', headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${key}` }, body: fd,
})
} else {
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
method: 'POST', headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${key}` }, body: fd,
})
} else {
r = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/images/generations', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${key}`, 'content-type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
method: 'POST', headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${key}` }, body: fd,
})
} else {
r = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/images/generations', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${key}`, 'content-type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
model: (req) =>
env.GEN_MODEL_REPLICATE ||
(req?.images?.length ? 'black-forest-labs/flux-kontext-pro' : 'black-forest-labs/flux-dev'),
describe(req) { return `POST https://api.replicate.com/v1/models/${replicate.model(req)}/predictions` },
async run(req) {
const input = { prompt: req.prompt, num_outputs: req.batch }
if (req.images?.length) input.input_image = await asDataUri(req.images[0])
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
const input = { prompt: req.prompt, num_outputs: req.batch }
if (req.images?.length) input.input_image = await asDataUri(req.images[0])
const j = await postJson(
`https://api.replicate.com/v1/models/${replicate.model(req)}/predictions`,
{ input },
{ authorization: `Bearer ${env.REPLICATE_API_TOKEN}`, prefer: 'wait' },
req.timeoutMs,
Detected: suspicious.dangerous_exec, suspicious.env_credential_access