Incomplete referenced artifact analysis
- Category
- analysis-evasion
- Confidence
- 100% confidence
- Finding
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
- Content
md node scripts/gen.mjs --task clothing-grass-planting \
Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
ClawScan rates this skill suspicious with medium confidence, mainly because it may send user images to external image-generation services without a privacy warning, while parts of the package were only partially inspected.
Review before installing. Consider whether you are comfortable sending outfit or model-reference images and prompts to external providers, and confirm the provider and transfer terms first. The scan was partial: only 5 of 9 components were fully inspected, so some behavior remains unevaluated.
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
node scripts/gen.mjs --task clothing-grass-planting \
Referenced artifact was not completely inspected
| 统一入口的全部选项 | `node scripts/gen.mjs --help` |
Without declared permissions the skill's intent is opaque and cannot be validated.
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
**穿搭不动,人 / 场景 / 姿势全换**,换成社交平台的种草风格。
和 [one-shot](https://github.com/dlazy-ai/ecommerce-skills/blob/main/skills/one-shot/skill.md) 的区别:one-shot 面向电商主图(保持棚拍规范、构图不动),本技能面向**内容种草**——要的是生活感、抓拍感、氛围光,构图和景别都可以变。
---
The workflow directs the agent to submit user images to an external image-generation provider without explicitly disclosing that upload or requiring informed approval. Outfit and model-reference images can contain identifiable people, private surroundings, or unpublished commercial assets, making undisclosed third-party processing a meaningful privacy risk even though remote generation is the intended functionality.
Skill enumerates or reads other installed skills. Access to other skills' SKILL.md files or the skills directory reveals prompt instructions, capabilities, and secrets that should be invisible to peer skills.
## 6、执行流程
1. **洗干净输入**:去掉滤镜、文字贴纸([remove-watermark](https://github.com/dlazy-ai/ecommerce-skills/blob/main/skills/remove-watermark/skill.md))。
2. **逐件列穿搭**:上装 / 下装 / 鞋 / 包 / 配饰——一件一句,这段整组复用。
3. **定内容主题**:通勤 / 约会 / 旅行 / 居家 / 运动,每个主题对应一组场景 + 动作 + 光线(第三节配方)。
4. **补相机语言**:50mm、浅景深、轻微颗粒——这是「像随手拍」的关键。
npx commands without a version suffix (e.g. @1.0.0) create a rug-pull risk if the upstream server is compromised and publishes a malicious update.
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
model: () => env.GEN_MODEL_OPENAI || 'gpt-image-1',
describe(req) {
const ep = req.images?.length ? 'images/edits' : 'images/generations'
return `POST https://api.openai.com/v1/${ep} model=${openai.model()} size=${mapSize(req.size)} n=${req.batch}`
},
async run(req) {
const key = env.OPENAI_API_KEY
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
: await readFile(p)
fd.append('image[]', new Blob([buf], { type: mimeOf(p) }), path.basename(p))
}
r = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/images/edits', {
method: 'POST', headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${key}` }, body: fd,
})
} else {
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
: await readFile(p)
fd.append('image[]', new Blob([buf], { type: mimeOf(p) }), path.basename(p))
}
r = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/images/edits', {
method: 'POST', headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${key}` }, body: fd,
})
} else {
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
method: 'POST', headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${key}` }, body: fd,
})
} else {
r = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/images/generations', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${key}`, 'content-type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
method: 'POST', headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${key}` }, body: fd,
})
} else {
r = await fetch('https://api.openai.com/v1/images/generations', {
method: 'POST',
headers: { authorization: `Bearer ${key}`, 'content-type': 'application/json' },
body: JSON.stringify({
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
model: (req) =>
env.GEN_MODEL_REPLICATE ||
(req?.images?.length ? 'black-forest-labs/flux-kontext-pro' : 'black-forest-labs/flux-dev'),
describe(req) { return `POST https://api.replicate.com/v1/models/${replicate.model(req)}/predictions` },
async run(req) {
const input = { prompt: req.prompt, num_outputs: req.batch }
if (req.images?.length) input.input_image = await asDataUri(req.images[0])
Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
const input = { prompt: req.prompt, num_outputs: req.batch }
if (req.images?.length) input.input_image = await asDataUri(req.images[0])
const j = await postJson(
`https://api.replicate.com/v1/models/${replicate.model(req)}/predictions`,
{ input },
{ authorization: `Bearer ${env.REPLICATE_API_TOKEN}`, prefer: 'wait' },
req.timeoutMs,