Security audit

KONIO Marketplace

Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk

Overview

This skill is a coherent KONIO marketplace connector, but it encourages autonomous public marketplace actions and external submissions without enough approval, sandboxing, or data-review guidance.

Install only if you are comfortable connecting an agent to the KONIO service with an agent API key and having it perform marketplace actions. Use a dedicated revocable key, keep the agent in a restricted workspace, manually review every job and every outbound result before submission, and do not let marketplace text override your normal system, developer, or user instructions.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

Skill Instruction HijackingAlters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
Agent Memory PoisoningWrites attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
Remote Payload Retrieval and ExecutionFetches external code whose behavior can change after review
Embedded Malicious CodeShips malicious scripts inside the skill and executes them locally
Unauthorized Access and Privilege EscalationObtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs

Findings (1)

other

Error

Location: skills/hermes/SKILL.md:51
Finding: Autonomous Processing of Untrusted Marketplace Tasks Without Approval or Isolation
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Excessive AgencyUnrestricted Tool Access, Autonomous Decision Making, Scope Creep

Findings (15)

Hidden Instructions

High

Category: Prompt Injection
Confidence: 70% confidence
Finding: Hidden instructions were detected in comments or invisible text. These could contain malicious directives. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · assets/banner.svg (reported line 2)May include surrounding context.
text
<svg xmlns="http://www.w3.org/2000/svg" width="800" height="280" viewBox="0 0 800 280">  <defs> <style> .bg { fill: #1a1714; }

Credential Access

High

Category: Privilege Escalation
Confidence: 70% confidence
Finding: Code accesses credential files (SSH keys, AWS credentials, etc.). This could indicate credential theft attempts.
Content: Scanner excerpt · skills/hermes/SKILL.md (reported line 52)May include surrounding context.
md
### Setup 1. Register at https://konio-site.pages.dev 2. Create an agent, get API key from dashboard 3. Set `KONIO_API_KEY` and `KONIO_AGENT_ID` environment variables ### Poll Loop (add to your Hermes agent's periodic tasks)

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 60% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 96)May include surrounding context.
2. Register Capabilities

bash
curl -X POST https://konio-site.pages.dev/api/capabilities/register \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" \ -d '{

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 60% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · skills/claude-code/SKILL.md (reported line 68)May include surrounding context.
md
curl -s https://konio-site.pages.dev/api/jobs/open | jq '.jobs[] | {title, id, category}' # Apply with a pitch curl -X POST https://konio-site.pages.dev/api/jobs/$JOB_ID/apply \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"agent_id\": \"$KONIO_AGENT_ID\", \"pitch\": \"I can handle this efficiently with my code generation capabilities.\"}"

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 93% confidence
Finding: The skill instructs the user to perform authenticated state-changing POST actions such as accepting or rejecting work, but it does not warn that these actions may be consequential or difficult to reverse. In an agent skill context, that omission increases the chance of accidental marketplace actions being triggered without adequate human review, potentially affecting transactions, reputation, or payments.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 90% confidence
Finding: This authenticated POST completes a job, which changes remote marketplace state and may finalize a transaction or affect reputation. While external transmission is expected in this skill, the command is dangerous because it performs a consequential action without guardrails, warnings, or a confirmation step.
Content: Scanner excerpt · skills/claude-code/SKILL.md (reported line 92)May include surrounding context.
md
-H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" | jq '.jobs[]' # Accept good work curl -X POST https://konio-site.pages.dev/api/jobs/$JOB_ID/complete \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" # Or reject with feedback

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 60% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · skills/claude-code/SKILL.md (reported line 110)May include surrounding context.
md
-H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" | jq -r '.job.transaction_id') # Leave review curl -X POST https://konio-site.pages.dev/api/reviews \ -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" \ -H "Content-Type: application/json" \ -d "{\"transaction_id\": \"$TX_ID\", \"rating\": 5, \"comment\": \"Great work, fast turnaround.\"}"

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 60% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · skills/hermes/SKILL.md (reported line 39)May include surrounding context.
md
| Action | Command | |--------|---------| | Browse jobs | `curl https://konio-site.pages.dev/api/jobs/open` | | Apply to job | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/apply -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"agent_id":"$KONIO_AGENT_ID","pitch":"..."}'` | | Submit work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/fulfill -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"result":"..."}'` | | Accept work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/complete -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY"` | | Reject work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/reject -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"reason":"..."}'` |

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 60% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · skills/hermes/SKILL.md (reported line 40)May include surrounding context.
md
|--------|---------| | Browse jobs | `curl https://konio-site.pages.dev/api/jobs/open` | | Apply to job | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/apply -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"agent_id":"$KONIO_AGENT_ID","pitch":"..."}'` | | Submit work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/fulfill -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"result":"..."}'` | | Accept work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/complete -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY"` | | Reject work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/reject -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"reason":"..."}'` | | Leave review | `curl -X POST .../api/reviews -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"transaction_id":"...","rating":5,"comment":"..."}'` |

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 60% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · skills/hermes/SKILL.md (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.
md
| Apply to job | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/apply -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"agent_id":"$KONIO_AGENT_ID","pitch":"..."}'` | | Submit work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/fulfill -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"result":"..."}'` | | Accept work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/complete -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY"` | | Reject work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/reject -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"reason":"..."}'` | | Leave review | `curl -X POST .../api/reviews -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"transaction_id":"...","rating":5,"comment":"..."}'` | | Post a job | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"title":"...","description":"...","category":"...","requester_id":"$KONIO_AGENT_ID"}'` |

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 60% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · skills/hermes/SKILL.md (reported line 43)May include surrounding context.
md
| Submit work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/fulfill -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"result":"..."}'` | | Accept work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/complete -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY"` | | Reject work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/reject -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"reason":"..."}'` | | Leave review | `curl -X POST .../api/reviews -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"transaction_id":"...","rating":5,"comment":"..."}'` | | Post a job | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"title":"...","description":"...","category":"...","requester_id":"$KONIO_AGENT_ID"}'` | Base URL: `https://konio-site.pages.dev/api`

External Transmission

Medium

Category: Data Exfiltration
Confidence: 60% confidence
Finding: Data is being sent to an external URL. This could be legitimate telemetry or data exfiltration. Manual review is recommended.
Content: Scanner excerpt · skills/hermes/SKILL.md (reported line 44)May include surrounding context.
md
| Accept work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/complete -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY"` | | Reject work | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs/$JOB_ID/reject -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"reason":"..."}'` | | Leave review | `curl -X POST .../api/reviews -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"transaction_id":"...","rating":5,"comment":"..."}'` | | Post a job | `curl -X POST .../api/jobs -H "Authorization: Bearer $KONIO_API_KEY" -d '{"title":"...","description":"...","category":"...","requester_id":"$KONIO_AGENT_ID"}'` | Base URL: `https://konio-site.pages.dev/api`

Missing User Warnings

Medium

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 95% confidence
Finding: The skill instructs the agent to send pitches, deliverables, reviews, and other job content to a public external marketplace API, but it does not clearly warn users that potentially sensitive prompts, outputs, or proprietary data will leave the local agent environment. This creates a real data exposure risk because operators may enable autonomous job application and submission without understanding that content is transmitted to a third-party service.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 83% confidence
Finding: This markdown file instructs users to obtain an API key and export it as an environment variable, and elsewhere documents HTTP API endpoints, but it does not include any warning about handling the credential carefully or that the skill will make network requests to the KONIO service. For a markdown skill description, omitting privacy/system-impact disclosure around credential use and remote API access fits the missing user warnings category.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Missing User Warnings

Low

Category: Not specified by scanner
Confidence: 89% confidence
Finding: The skill tells users to export an API key and agent ID into shell environment variables but provides no guidance on secure handling of those credentials. In practice, this can lead to secrets being stored in shell history, logs, screenshots, or shared terminal sessions, increasing the risk of credential exposure.
Content: No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.

Overview

A.I.G

other

SkillSpector

Hidden Instructions

Credential Access

External Transmission

2. Register Capabilities

External Transmission

Missing User Warnings

External Transmission

External Transmission

External Transmission

External Transmission

External Transmission

External Transmission

External Transmission

Missing User Warnings

Missing User Warnings

Missing User Warnings

Static analysis