linux-firewall-hardening

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 8:48 AM UTC
• Version: 2.7.0

Overview

This firewall skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but its rollback and verification scripts can make broad privileged changes that are not safely scoped.

Treat this as a Review install. Use it only on systems where you have console access and a maintenance window, inspect the scripts before running them, do not let an agent execute the emergency rollback fallback automatically, and avoid using the apply/verify automation on production hosts until rollback cancellation and plan-state handling are tightened.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review

Findings (5)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Note

• Location: scripts/audit-firewall.sh:56

Finding

Unnecessary Cloud Instance Metadata Probing

Content

View full analysis

/dev/null 2>&1; then CLOUD_PROVIDER="aws" elif curl -s --max-time 2 -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata.google.internal/ >/dev/null 2>&1; then CLOUD_PROVIDER="gcp" elif curl -s --max-time 2 -H "Metadata: true" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01" >/dev/null 2>&1; then CLOUD_PROVIDER="azure" fi } ``` ### Technical Analysis Every invocation of the audit script sends requests to AWS, GCP, and Azure instance metadata endpoints until one responds. Cloud metadata services are security-sensitive because neighboring paths may expose instance identity documents, access tokens, or temporary credentials. The current implementation requests only provider root or instance metadata paths, discards the responses, uses a two-second timeout, and does not request credential endpoints. Therefore, the observed code does not steal credentials or exfiltrate metadata. However, directly contacting metadata services is unnecessary for inspecting the host firewall and exceeds the minimum network access needed for the Skill's principal function. The AWS request also does not use an IMDSv2 token. Although the requested path is not itself a credential endpoint, normalizing unauthenticated metadata access is undesirable on systems where IMDSv1 remains enabled. ### Attack Path 1. An operator invokes `scripts/audit-firewall.sh`. 2. The script sends HTTP requests to link-local or internally resolved cloud metadata services. 3. It infers the cloud provider from the first successful response. 4. If this logic were later extended or influenced to request sensitive subpaths, the same access ch ...[truncated 613 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error

• Location: scripts/firewall-verify.sh:94

Finding

Successful Verification Deletes All Pending User at Jobs

Content

View full analysis

/dev/null; then # Cancel all pending at jobs (rollback timer uses at) # Store job IDs in an array first to avoid subshell scoping issue mapfile -t AT_JOBS < <(atq 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}') for job in "${AT_JOBS[@]}"; do [[ -z "$job" ]] && continue atrm "$job" 2>/dev/null && ROLLBACK_CANCELLED=true done echo "INFO: Pending 'at' jobs cancelled ($ROLLBACK_CANCELLED)" fi ``` ### Technical Analysis The verifier does not retain or identify the specific `at` job created for firewall rollback. Instead, it enumerates every pending job visible to the current user and removes each one. This violates least privilege: successful firewall verification should authorize cancellation only of the matching firewall rollback job. It should not authorize modification of unrelated scheduled work. The issue is particularly serious if the Skill runs as root or through a privileged automation account. In that context, the affected queue can include system maintenance, backups, recovery operations, certificate rotation, or other security tasks belonging to that privileged identity. ### Attack Path 1. A user or automation account already has one or more unrelated pending `at` jobs. 2. Firewall rules are applied and `scripts/firewall-verify.sh` is invoked. 3. The local checks produce no critical errors. 4. The success branch runs `atq` and collects all visible job identifiers. 5. The script calls `atrm` for every collected identifier. 6. Unrelated scheduled tasks are permanently removed without verifying their command, purpose, or association with this Skill. An attacker who can influence whether verification succeeds could use this behavior to trigger denial of scheduled operations, although local execution under the ...[truncated 591 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: scripts/firewall-verify.sh:86

Finding

Insufficient Local Verification Automatically Disarms Firewall Rollback

Content

View full analysis

/dev/null; then echo "PASS: SSH port $SSH_PORT reachable locally" else echo "FAIL: SSH port $SSH_PORT not reachable" ERRORS=$((ERRORS+1)) fi ``` Missing IPv6 protection and Docker filtering are treated only as warnings: ```bash echo "=== 4. IPv6 Symmetry ===" if sudo ip6tables -L -n 2>/dev/null | grep -qv "Chain\|policy"; then echo "PASS: ip6tables rules present" elif sudo nft list ruleset 2>/dev/null | grep -q "inet filter"; then echo "PASS: nftables inet family covers IPv6" else echo "WARN: No explicit IPv6 firewall detected" fi ``` ```bash if command -v docker &>/dev/null && docker ps &>/dev/null; then if sudo iptables -L DOCKER-USER -n 2>/dev/null | grep -q "DROP"; then echo "PASS: DOCKER-USER has DROP rule" else echo "WARN: DOCKER-USER chain missing DROP rule" fi else echo "SKIP: Docker not running" fi ``` The rollback is then cancelled whenever the limited set of critical checks reports no errors: ```bash echo "" echo "=== Summary ===" if [[ $ERRORS -eq 0 ]]; then echo "All critical checks passed." # --- Cancel rollback timer on successful verification --- ROLLBACK_CANCELLED=false if command -v at &>/dev/null; then # Cancel all pending at jobs (rollback timer uses at) # Store job IDs in an array first to avoid subshell scoping issue mapfile -t AT_JOBS < <(atq 2>/dev/ ...[truncated 3013 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: scripts/firewall-plan.sh:129

Finding

Predictable Shared Temporary Files Undermine Plan Approval Integrity

Content

View full analysis

/dev/null || stat -f %m "$AUDIT_CACHE" 2>/dev/null || echo 99999))) if (( CACHE_AGE < AUDIT_CACHE_TTL )); then USE_CACHED_AUDIT=true fi fi ``` The generated plan is also written to a predictable shared path: ```bash if [[ "$OUTPUT_MODE" == "json" ]]; then PLAN_CACHE="/tmp/firewall-plan.json" plan_json | tee "$PLAN_CACHE" else case "$BACKEND" in ufw) plan_ufw ;; firewalld) plan_firewalld ;; nftables) plan_nftables ;; iptables) plan_iptables ;; *) echo "Cannot determine firewall backend. Run audit-firewall.sh first."; exit 11 ;; esac fi ``` The privileged apply path later trusts that file: ```bash PLAN_CACHE="/tmp/firewall-plan.json" # --- Verify approval token against cached plan --- # Plan output is cached by firewall-plan.sh --json to PLAN_CACHE if [[ ! -f "$PLAN_CACHE" ]]; then echo "ERROR: No plan cache found. Run firewall-plan.sh --json first." >&2 exit 40 fi PLAN_JSON=$(cat "$PLAN_CACHE") PLAN_TOKEN=$(echo "$PLAN_JSON" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['approval_token'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "") ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill stores security-sensitive state under globally predictable names in `/tmp`. It does not securely create the files, enforc ...[truncated 2093 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: scripts/firewall-apply.sh:129

Finding

Approved nftables Plan Does Not Authenticate the Applied Ruleset

Content

View full analysis

&1 | sed 's/^/ /' else echo " Would create inet filter table with ports: ${TARGET_PORTS[*]}" fi echo "" echo "Atomic apply command: sudo nft -f /etc/nftables.conf.new" } ``` ```bash # --- Approval token (sha256 of plan fingerprint) --- local PLAN_CONTENT="${BACKEND}|${ACTIVE_FRONTEND}|${PROFILE:-none}|${TARGET_PORTS[*]}|${RISK}|${DISRUPTION}" local APPROVAL_TOKEN="sha256:$(echo -n "$PLAN_CONTENT" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}')" ``` Application subsequently executes whatever content is present at the mutable path: ```bash apply_nftables() { echo "[nftables] This backend requires a pre-built /etc/nftables.conf.new" echo " Run firewall-plan.sh first to prepare the config." if [[ -f /etc/nftables.conf.new ]]; then if $DRY_RUN; then echo " [DRY-RUN] sudo nft -c -f /etc/nftables.conf.new" else sudo nft -c -f /etc/nftables.conf.new && sudo nft -f /etc/nftables.conf.new echo "nftables rules applied" fi else echo " ERROR: /etc/nftables.conf.new not found" exit 40 fi } ``` ### Technical Analysis The approval token is derived only from backend name, frontend name, profile, target ports, and coarse risk fields. It does not include a digest of `/etc/nftables.conf.new`, even though that file is the actual payl ...[truncated 1774 chars]

Remediation

View remediation

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Tool Misuse: Tool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (309)

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

Again, the risk is not merely documentation quality; it is the possibility of unsafe automation based on inaccurate claims of idempotence, rollback safety, and multi-backend support. In a privileged firewall skill, misleading declarations materially increase operational risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

Again, the risk is not merely documentation quality; it is the possibility of unsafe automation based on inaccurate claims of idempotence, rollback safety, and multi-backend support. In a privileged firewall skill, misleading declarations materially increase operational risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 93% confidence

Finding

Again, the risk is not merely documentation quality; it is the possibility of unsafe automation based on inaccurate claims of idempotence, rollback safety, and multi-backend support. In a privileged firewall skill, misleading declarations materially increase operational risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

Again, the risk is not merely documentation quality; it is the possibility of unsafe automation based on inaccurate claims of idempotence, rollback safety, and multi-backend support. In a privileged firewall skill, misleading declarations materially increase operational risk.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Intent-Code Divergence

High

• Category: Not specified by scanner
• Confidence: 98% confidence

Finding

The emergency section says the dangerous ACCEPT/flush sequence must never be auto-executed, yet the rollback script includes equivalent automatic fallback behavior when backup restore files are missing or fail. This contradiction means an agent-triggered rollback could fully open the host or wipe filtering state without human approval, defeating the stated safety boundary.

Content

No source excerpt is available for this finding.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The same chained command also embeds semicolon-delimited privileged actions that flush firewall state after a failed restore. That creates a direct path from ordinary error handling to total exposure of the host.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 245)May include surrounding context.

md

ROLLBACK_SCRIPT=$(cat <<'RB'
#!/bin/bash
BACKUP_DIR="REPLACE_ME"
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 97% confidence

Finding

The same chained command also embeds semicolon-delimited privileged actions that flush firewall state after a failed restore. That creates a direct path from ordinary error handling to total exposure of the host.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 245)May include surrounding context.

md

ROLLBACK_SCRIPT=$(cat <<'RB'
#!/bin/bash
BACKUP_DIR="REPLACE_ME"
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

The semicolon-style chaining here contributes to unsafe error recovery by allowing successive privileged commands to run in the same automated context. This increases the chance of ending in an over-permissive state rather than a verified restore.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 246)May include surrounding context.

md

#!/bin/bash
BACKUP_DIR="REPLACE_ME"
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable
sudo firewall-cmd --panic-off 2>/dev/null

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

The semicolon-style chaining here contributes to unsafe error recovery by allowing successive privileged commands to run in the same automated context. This increases the chance of ending in an over-permissive state rather than a verified restore.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 246)May include surrounding context.

md

#!/bin/bash
BACKUP_DIR="REPLACE_ME"
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable
sudo firewall-cmd --panic-off 2>/dev/null

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

This finding highlights another chained privileged restore/fallback sequence inside the rollback script. Its compact shell logic makes it hard to reason about failure modes and easier for automation to trigger unsafe outcomes.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 247)May include surrounding context.

md

BACKUP_DIR="REPLACE_ME"
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable
sudo firewall-cmd --panic-off 2>/dev/null
RB

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

This finding highlights another chained privileged restore/fallback sequence inside the rollback script. Its compact shell logic makes it hard to reason about failure modes and easier for automation to trigger unsafe outcomes.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 247)May include surrounding context.

md

BACKUP_DIR="REPLACE_ME"
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable
sudo firewall-cmd --panic-off 2>/dev/null
RB

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 96% confidence

Finding

The chained logic on this line again couples restoration attempts with permissive fallback behavior. In a root-executed firewall workflow, this is dangerous because a single failed command can pivot into firewall flush or disable actions.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 248)May include surrounding context.

md

[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable
sudo firewall-cmd --panic-off 2>/dev/null
RB
)

Anti-Refusal Statement

High

• Category: Anti-Refusal
• Confidence: 90% confidence

Finding

Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/firewall-apply.md (reported line 15)May include surrounding context.

md

| `--approved-plan <token>` | CLI | **Yes** | — | Hash from `firewall-plan.sh --json`. Reject if missing/mismatch (exit 41) |
| `--dry-run` | CLI | No | off | Render + diff only; zero kernel changes |
| `--family <v4\|v6\|both>` | CLI | No | `both` | Which address families to apply |
| `POLICY_DIR` | env | No | `./policy.d` | Override policy directory |
| `LOG_LEVEL` | env | No | `info` | `debug` emits full generated ruleset |
| `LOCK_PATH` | env | No | `/run/fw.lock` | Advisory lock file |
| stdin | pipe | No | — | If policy piped, `POLICY_DIR` is ignored |

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 382)May include surrounding context.

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable

text

6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
```bash

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 420)May include surrounding context.

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable

text

6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
```bash

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/declarative-policy.md (reported line 264)May include surrounding context.

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable

text

6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
```bash

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/declarative-policy.md (reported line 265)May include surrounding context.

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable

text

6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
```bash

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/recovery.md (reported line 14)May include surrounding context.

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable

text

6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
```bash

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/security-profiles.md (reported line 99)May include surrounding context.

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable

text

6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
```bash

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/security-profiles.md (reported line 136)May include surrounding context.

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable

text

6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
```bash

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/security-profiles.md (reported line 137)May include surrounding context.

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable

text

6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
```bash

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/firewall-apply.sh (reported line 131)May include surrounding context.

sh

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules"
   sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules"
   sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules"
   sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable
   ```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · scripts/firewall-plan.sh (reported line 162)May include surrounding context.

sh

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules"
   sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules"
   sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules"
   sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable
   ```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · SKILL.md (reported line 42)May include surrounding context.

text

6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash
   sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F
   sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F
   sudo nft flush ruleset
   sudo ufw disable

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse
• Confidence: 75% confidence

Finding

Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Content

Scanner excerpt · references/recovery.md (reported line 18)May include surrounding context.

text

6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash
   sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F
   sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F
   sudo nft flush ruleset
   sudo ufw disable