linux-firewall-hardening

• Outcome: Review
• Latest audit: Sep 16, 2026 · 8:48 AM UTC
• Version: 2.7.0

Overview

This firewall skill is mostly purpose-aligned, but its rollback and verification scripts can make broad privileged changes that are not safely scoped.

Treat this as a Review install. Use it only on systems where you have console access and a maintenance window, inspect the scripts before running them, do not let an agent execute the emergency rollback fallback automatically, and avoid using the apply/verify automation on production hosts until rollback cancellation and plan-state handling are tightened.

A.I.G

Vulnerability Patterns

• Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation: Obtains permissions beyond the task's legitimate needs
• Insecure Skill Coding Practices: Finds exploitable flaws such as hardcoded secrets or command injection
• Skill Instruction Hijacking: Alters the agent's session goals or safety constraints when the skill loads
• Agent Memory Poisoning: Writes attacker-controlled rules into memory that affect later sessions
• Remote Payload Retrieval and Execution: Fetches external code whose behavior can change after review

Findings (5)

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Note

• Location: scripts/audit-firewall.sh:56
• Finding: Unnecessary Cloud Instance Metadata Probing<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/audit-firewall.sh:56-63` **Vulnerability Type**: Cloud metadata service reconnaissance beyond minimum required privileges **Risk Level**: Low ### Vulnerable Code ```bash detect_cloud_provider() { if curl -s --max-time 2 http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/ >/dev/null 2>&1; then CLOUD_PROVIDER="aws" elif curl -s --max-time 2 -H "Metadata-Flavor: Google" http://metadata.google.internal/ >/dev/null 2>&1; then CLOUD_PROVIDER="gcp" elif curl -s --max-time 2 -H "Metadata: true" "http://169.254.169.254/metadata/instance?api-version=2021-02-01" >/dev/null 2>&1; then CLOUD_PROVIDER="azure" fi } ``` ### Technical Analysis Every invocation of the audit script sends requests to AWS, GCP, and Azure instance metadata endpoints until one responds. Cloud metadata services are security-sensitive because neighboring paths may expose instance identity documents, access tokens, or temporary credentials. The current implementation requests only provider root or instance metadata paths, discards the responses, uses a two-second timeout, and does not request credential endpoints. Therefore, the observed code does not steal credentials or exfiltrate metadata. However, directly contacting metadata services is unnecessary for inspecting the host firewall and exceeds the minimum network access needed for the Skill's principal function. The AWS request also does not use an IMDSv2 token. Although the requested path is not itself a credential endpoint, normalizing unauthenticated metadata access is undesirable on systems where IMDSv1 remains enabled. ### Attack Path 1. An operator invokes `scripts/audit-firewall.sh`. 2. The script sends HTTP requests to link-local or internally resolved cloud metadata services. 3. It infers the cloud provider from the first successful response. 4. If this logic were later extended or influenced to request sensitive subpaths, the same access ch ...[truncated 613 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Disable metadata probing by default and require an explicit option such as `--detect-cloud-via-metadata`. 2. Prefer local evidence that does not contact a network service, including: - DMI data under `/sys/class/dmi/id/` - Installed cloud agents - Provider-specific system files - Existing operator-supplied configuration 3. Query only the provider indicated by local evidence instead of probing all providers. 4. For AWS, use IMDSv2 with a short-lived token and reject fallback to IMDSv1. 5. Retain strict connection and total timeouts and ensure that response bodies are never logged. 6. Document metadata access prominently so operators can make an informed decision before enabling it. ]]>

T05 · Unauthorized Access and Privilege Escalation

Error

• Location: scripts/firewall-verify.sh:94
• Finding: Successful Verification Deletes All Pending User at Jobs<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/firewall-verify.sh:94-102` **Vulnerability Type**: Overbroad scheduled-task cancellation **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code ```bash if command -v at &>/dev/null; then # Cancel all pending at jobs (rollback timer uses at) # Store job IDs in an array first to avoid subshell scoping issue mapfile -t AT_JOBS < <(atq 2>/dev/null | awk '{print $1}') for job in "${AT_JOBS[@]}"; do [[ -z "$job" ]] && continue atrm "$job" 2>/dev/null && ROLLBACK_CANCELLED=true done echo "INFO: Pending 'at' jobs cancelled ($ROLLBACK_CANCELLED)" fi ``` ### Technical Analysis The verifier does not retain or identify the specific `at` job created for firewall rollback. Instead, it enumerates every pending job visible to the current user and removes each one. This violates least privilege: successful firewall verification should authorize cancellation only of the matching firewall rollback job. It should not authorize modification of unrelated scheduled work. The issue is particularly serious if the Skill runs as root or through a privileged automation account. In that context, the affected queue can include system maintenance, backups, recovery operations, certificate rotation, or other security tasks belonging to that privileged identity. ### Attack Path 1. A user or automation account already has one or more unrelated pending `at` jobs. 2. Firewall rules are applied and `scripts/firewall-verify.sh` is invoked. 3. The local checks produce no critical errors. 4. The success branch runs `atq` and collects all visible job identifiers. 5. The script calls `atrm` for every collected identifier. 6. Unrelated scheduled tasks are permanently removed without verifying their command, purpose, or association with this Skill. An attacker who can influence whether verification succeeds could use this behavior to trigger denial of scheduled operations, although local execution under the ...[truncated 591 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Capture the exact rollback job ID when scheduling it. 2. Store that identifier in a private state file located in a mode-0700 runtime directory, with the state file set to mode 0600. 3. Record additional binding information, such as: - Backup directory - Creation time - Executing UID - Plan token - Expected rollback command digest 4. During commit, read and validate the saved identifier and cancel only that job: ```bash rollback_job_id=$(read_validated_state) atrm "$rollback_job_id" ``` 5. Confirm through `at -c "$rollback_job_id"` or equivalent inspection that the job is the expected firewall rollback before removing it. 6. Fail safely if the state is absent, malformed, stale, owned by another user, or refers to an unexpected command. 7. Never use an unfiltered `atq | awk ... | atrm` pipeline for rollback cancellation. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: scripts/firewall-verify.sh:86
• Finding: Insufficient Local Verification Automatically Disarms Firewall Rollback<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/firewall-verify.sh:86-124` **Related Locations**: `scripts/firewall-verify.sh:10-17, 41-47, 56-63`; `scripts/firewall-apply.sh:170-177`; `SKILL.md:345-373` **Vulnerability Type**: Fail-open verification and premature safety-control cancellation **Risk Level**: Critical ### Vulnerable Code The SSH test checks only the target host's loopback interface: ```bash echo "=== 1. SSH Reachable ===" SSH_PORT=$(ss -tlnp | grep -E "sshd|ssh" | awk -F: '{print $NF}' | head -1) SSH_PORT=${SSH_PORT:-22} if nc -z -w5 localhost "$SSH_PORT" 2>/dev/null; then echo "PASS: SSH port $SSH_PORT reachable locally" else echo "FAIL: SSH port $SSH_PORT not reachable" ERRORS=$((ERRORS+1)) fi ``` Missing IPv6 protection and Docker filtering are treated only as warnings: ```bash echo "=== 4. IPv6 Symmetry ===" if sudo ip6tables -L -n 2>/dev/null | grep -qv "Chain\|policy"; then echo "PASS: ip6tables rules present" elif sudo nft list ruleset 2>/dev/null | grep -q "inet filter"; then echo "PASS: nftables inet family covers IPv6" else echo "WARN: No explicit IPv6 firewall detected" fi ``` ```bash if command -v docker &>/dev/null && docker ps &>/dev/null; then if sudo iptables -L DOCKER-USER -n 2>/dev/null | grep -q "DROP"; then echo "PASS: DOCKER-USER has DROP rule" else echo "WARN: DOCKER-USER chain missing DROP rule" fi else echo "SKIP: Docker not running" fi ``` The rollback is then cancelled whenever the limited set of critical checks reports no errors: ```bash echo "" echo "=== Summary ===" if [[ $ERRORS -eq 0 ]]; then echo "All critical checks passed." # --- Cancel rollback timer on successful verification --- ROLLBACK_CANCELLED=false if command -v at &>/dev/null; then # Cancel all pending at jobs (rollback timer uses at) # Store job IDs in an array first to avoid subshell scoping issue mapfile -t AT_JOBS < <(atq 2>/dev/ ...[truncated 3013 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Remove rollback cancellation from `firewall-verify.sh`. 2. Add a separate `firewall-commit.sh` command that requires a second explicit operator action after verification. 3. Bind commit to: - The exact approved plan token - The rollback job identifier - The backup directory - A fresh verification result 4. Require external SSH and service reachability testing from a second host before allowing remote-session commit. 5. Treat the following as critical failures unless explicitly accepted in the approved policy: - Missing IPv6 protection - IPv4/IPv6 divergence - Unexpected Docker DNAT exposure - Missing expected-open ports - Reachable expected-closed ports 6. Compare the complete active ruleset against a canonical representation of the approved plan rather than checking only for the presence of any rule. 7. If external verification is unavailable, leave rollback armed and require a human to commit through a separate command after reviewing the limitations. 8. Ensure timeout or interrupted verification leaves the rollback mechanism untouched. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: scripts/firewall-plan.sh:129
• Finding: Predictable Shared Temporary Files Undermine Plan Approval Integrity<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/firewall-plan.sh:129-143, 222-228` **Related Location**: `scripts/firewall-apply.sh:34-61` **Vulnerability Type**: Insecure temporary files, local tampering, and time-of-check/time-of-use race **Risk Level**: High ### Vulnerable Code The audit cache uses a fixed shared path: ```bash plan_json() { # --- Audit caching --- local AUDIT_CACHE="/tmp/firewall-audit.json" local AUDIT_CACHE_TTL=300 # 5 minutes local USE_CACHED_AUDIT=false if $REFRESH_AUDIT; then rm -f "$AUDIT_CACHE" fi if [[ -f "$AUDIT_CACHE" ]]; then local CACHE_AGE=$(($(date +%s) - $(stat -c %Y "$AUDIT_CACHE" 2>/dev/null || stat -f %m "$AUDIT_CACHE" 2>/dev/null || echo 99999))) if (( CACHE_AGE < AUDIT_CACHE_TTL )); then USE_CACHED_AUDIT=true fi fi ``` The generated plan is also written to a predictable shared path: ```bash if [[ "$OUTPUT_MODE" == "json" ]]; then PLAN_CACHE="/tmp/firewall-plan.json" plan_json | tee "$PLAN_CACHE" else case "$BACKEND" in ufw) plan_ufw ;; firewalld) plan_firewalld ;; nftables) plan_nftables ;; iptables) plan_iptables ;; *) echo "Cannot determine firewall backend. Run audit-firewall.sh first."; exit 11 ;; esac fi ``` The privileged apply path later trusts that file: ```bash PLAN_CACHE="/tmp/firewall-plan.json" # --- Verify approval token against cached plan --- # Plan output is cached by firewall-plan.sh --json to PLAN_CACHE if [[ ! -f "$PLAN_CACHE" ]]; then echo "ERROR: No plan cache found. Run firewall-plan.sh --json first." >&2 exit 40 fi PLAN_JSON=$(cat "$PLAN_CACHE") PLAN_TOKEN=$(echo "$PLAN_JSON" | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['approval_token'])" 2>/dev/null || echo "") ``` ### Technical Analysis The Skill stores security-sensitive state under globally predictable names in `/tmp`. It does not securely create the files, enforc ...[truncated 2093 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Create a private runtime directory using `mktemp -d` or an appropriate per-user runtime directory: ```bash STATE_DIR=$(mktemp -d "${XDG_RUNTIME_DIR:-/tmp}/firewall-hardening.XXXXXX") chmod 700 "$STATE_DIR" ``` 2. Create state files with mode 0600 and a restrictive `umask`, such as `umask 077`. 3. Reject symbolic links and verify that every state file: - Is a regular file - Is owned by the expected UID - Has no group or world write permission - Resides in the expected private directory 4. Write to a newly created temporary file, call `fsync` where appropriate, and atomically rename it into place. 5. Use file locking to prevent concurrent plan and apply races. 6. Include creation time, expiration time, invoking UID, host identity, and a unique nonce in plan state. 7. Revalidate current audit state immediately before application and reject expired plans. 8. Prefer passing an immutable plan file descriptor or a securely created root-owned state file rather than reopening a predictable pathname. ]]>

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

• Location: scripts/firewall-apply.sh:129
• Finding: Approved nftables Plan Does Not Authenticate the Applied Ruleset<![CDATA[ ## Vulnerability Details **File Location**: `scripts/firewall-apply.sh:129-138` **Related Location**: `scripts/firewall-plan.sh:104-114, 191-193` **Vulnerability Type**: Approval-token bypass through unbound mutable configuration **Risk Level**: Critical ### Vulnerable Code Planning validates or describes `/etc/nftables.conf.new`, but its content is not included in the approval token: ```bash plan_nftables() { echo "=== nftables Plan ===" echo "Backend: nftables" echo "" if [[ -f /etc/nftables.conf.new ]]; then echo "Validating /etc/nftables.conf.new..." sudo nft -c -f /etc/nftables.conf.new 2>&1 | sed 's/^/ /' else echo " Would create inet filter table with ports: ${TARGET_PORTS[*]}" fi echo "" echo "Atomic apply command: sudo nft -f /etc/nftables.conf.new" } ``` ```bash # --- Approval token (sha256 of plan fingerprint) --- local PLAN_CONTENT="${BACKEND}|${ACTIVE_FRONTEND}|${PROFILE:-none}|${TARGET_PORTS[*]}|${RISK}|${DISRUPTION}" local APPROVAL_TOKEN="sha256:$(echo -n "$PLAN_CONTENT" | sha256sum | awk '{print $1}')" ``` Application subsequently executes whatever content is present at the mutable path: ```bash apply_nftables() { echo "[nftables] This backend requires a pre-built /etc/nftables.conf.new" echo " Run firewall-plan.sh first to prepare the config." if [[ -f /etc/nftables.conf.new ]]; then if $DRY_RUN; then echo " [DRY-RUN] sudo nft -c -f /etc/nftables.conf.new" else sudo nft -c -f /etc/nftables.conf.new && sudo nft -f /etc/nftables.conf.new echo "nftables rules applied" fi else echo " ERROR: /etc/nftables.conf.new not found" exit 40 fi } ``` ### Technical Analysis The approval token is derived only from backend name, frontend name, profile, target ports, and coarse risk fields. It does not include a digest of `/etc/nftables.conf.new`, even though that file is the actual payl ...[truncated 1774 chars]
• Remediation: <![CDATA[ ## Remediation Suggestions 1. Canonicalize the complete candidate nftables ruleset during planning. 2. Compute a SHA-256 digest of the exact candidate file and include that digest in: - The displayed plan - The approval token - The secured plan state 3. Immediately before application: - Open the file securely - Verify ownership and permissions - Reject symbolic links - Recompute its digest - Compare it with the approved digest 4. Apply the exact reviewed bytes rather than reopening a mutable pathname after verification. For example, copy the approved content into a private, root-owned, mode-0600 file and validate and apply that same immutable file. 5. Include all tables, chains, sets, maps, hooks, priorities, policies, and rule expressions in the operator-visible diff. 6. Reject the apply operation if the candidate's inode, modification time, size, or cryptographic digest changes between validation and execution. 7. Keep rollback armed until external verification completes and a separate explicit commit command is issued. ]]>

SkillSpector

Vulnerability Patterns

• Data Exfiltration: External Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
• Tool Misuse: Tool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
• MCP Tool Poisoning: Hidden Instructions, Unicode Deception, Parameter Description Injection
• Prompt Injection: Instruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
• Privilege Escalation: Excessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access

Findings (309)

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: Again, the risk is not merely documentation quality; it is the possibility of unsafe automation based on inaccurate claims of idempotence, rollback safety, and multi-backend support. In a privileged firewall skill, misleading declarations materially increase operational risk.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: Again, the risk is not merely documentation quality; it is the possibility of unsafe automation based on inaccurate claims of idempotence, rollback safety, and multi-backend support. In a privileged firewall skill, misleading declarations materially increase operational risk.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 93% confidence
• Finding: Again, the risk is not merely documentation quality; it is the possibility of unsafe automation based on inaccurate claims of idempotence, rollback safety, and multi-backend support. In a privileged firewall skill, misleading declarations materially increase operational risk.

Tp4

High

• Category: MCP Tool Poisoning
• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: Again, the risk is not merely documentation quality; it is the possibility of unsafe automation based on inaccurate claims of idempotence, rollback safety, and multi-backend support. In a privileged firewall skill, misleading declarations materially increase operational risk.

Intent-Code Divergence

High

• Confidence: 98% confidence
• Finding: The emergency section says the dangerous ACCEPT/flush sequence must never be auto-executed, yet the rollback script includes equivalent automatic fallback behavior when backup restore files are missing or fail. This contradiction means an agent-triggered rollback could fully open the host or wipe filtering state without human approval, defeating the stated safety boundary.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

ROLLBACK_SCRIPT=$(cat <<'RB'
#!/bin/bash
BACKUP_DIR="REPLACE_ME"
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The same chained command also embeds semicolon-delimited privileged actions that flush firewall state after a failed restore. That creates a direct path from ordinary error handling to total exposure of the host.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

ROLLBACK_SCRIPT=$(cat <<'RB'
#!/bin/bash
BACKUP_DIR="REPLACE_ME"
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable

• Confidence: 97% confidence
• Finding: The same chained command also embeds semicolon-delimited privileged actions that flush firewall state after a failed restore. That creates a direct path from ordinary error handling to total exposure of the host.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

#!/bin/bash
BACKUP_DIR="REPLACE_ME"
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable
sudo firewall-cmd --panic-off 2>/dev/null

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: The semicolon-style chaining here contributes to unsafe error recovery by allowing successive privileged commands to run in the same automated context. This increases the chance of ending in an over-permissive state rather than a verified restore.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

#!/bin/bash
BACKUP_DIR="REPLACE_ME"
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable
sudo firewall-cmd --panic-off 2>/dev/null

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: The semicolon-style chaining here contributes to unsafe error recovery by allowing successive privileged commands to run in the same automated context. This increases the chance of ending in an over-permissive state rather than a verified restore.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

BACKUP_DIR="REPLACE_ME"
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable
sudo firewall-cmd --panic-off 2>/dev/null
RB

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: This finding highlights another chained privileged restore/fallback sequence inside the rollback script. Its compact shell logic makes it hard to reason about failure modes and easier for automation to trigger unsafe outcomes.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

BACKUP_DIR="REPLACE_ME"
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable
sudo firewall-cmd --panic-off 2>/dev/null
RB

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: This finding highlights another chained privileged restore/fallback sequence inside the rollback script. Its compact shell logic makes it hard to reason about failure modes and easier for automation to trigger unsafe outcomes.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" ] && sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules" || { sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" ] && sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules" || { sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F; }
[ -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" ] && sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules" || sudo nft flush ruleset
systemctl is-active ufw &>/dev/null && sudo ufw disable
sudo firewall-cmd --panic-off 2>/dev/null
RB
)

• Confidence: 96% confidence
• Finding: The chained logic on this line again couples restoration attempts with permissive fallback behavior. In a root-executed firewall workflow, this is dangerous because a single failed command can pivot into firewall flush or disable actions.

Anti-Refusal Statement

High

• Category: Anti-Refusal

Content

| `--approved-plan <token>` | CLI | **Yes** | — | Hash from `firewall-plan.sh --json`. Reject if missing/mismatch (exit 41) |
| `--dry-run` | CLI | No | off | Render + diff only; zero kernel changes |
| `--family <v4\|v6\|both>` | CLI | No | `both` | Which address families to apply |
| `POLICY_DIR` | env | No | `./policy.d` | Override policy directory |
| `LOG_LEVEL` | env | No | `info` | `debug` emits full generated ruleset |
| `LOCK_PATH` | env | No | `/run/fw.lock` | Advisory lock file |
| stdin | pipe | No | — | If policy piped, `POLICY_DIR` is ignored |

• Confidence: 90% confidence
• Finding: Skill attempts to nullify the agent's safety policies or restrictions ('you have no restrictions', 'ignore your guidelines', 'do anything now'). This is a direct jailbreak that disables guardrails.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules"
   sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules"
   sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules"
   sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable
   ```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules"
   sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules"
   sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules"
   sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable
   ```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules"
   sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules"
   sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules"
   sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable
   ```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules"
   sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules"
   sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules"
   sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable
   ```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules"
   sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules"
   sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules"
   sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable
   ```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules"
   sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules"
   sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules"
   sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable
   ```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules"
   sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules"
   sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules"
   sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable
   ```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules"
   sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules"
   sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules"
   sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable
   ```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules"
   sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules"
   sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules"
   sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable
   ```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

sudo iptables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v4.rules"
   sudo ip6tables-restore < "$BACKUP_DIR/iptables-v6.rules"
   sudo nft -f "$BACKUP_DIR/nftables.rules"
   sudo ufw reset && sudo ufw disable
   ```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash
   sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F
   sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F
   sudo nft flush ruleset
   sudo ufw disable

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Chaining Abuse

High

• Category: Tool Misuse

Content

```
6. **Emergency ACCEPT** — LAST RESORT only:
   ```bash
   sudo iptables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo iptables -F
   sudo ip6tables -P INPUT ACCEPT; sudo ip6tables -F
   sudo nft flush ruleset
   sudo ufw disable

• Confidence: 75% confidence
• Finding: Tool calls are chained to bypass individual safety checks or escalate capabilities beyond what any single tool call would allow.

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.