T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices
- Location
SKILL.md:238- Finding
Sensitive credentials and operational data are copied into an unprotected plaintext backup
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 238–255
Vulnerability Type: Plaintext storage of sensitive data with inherited filesystem permissions
Risk Level: MediumVulnerable Code
bash BACKUP_DIR=~/openclaw-backup-$(date +%Y%m%d-%H%M%S) mkdir -p "$BACKUP_DIR" # Core files cp ~/.openclaw/openclaw.json "$BACKUP_DIR/" [ -f ~/.openclaw/env ] && cp ~/.openclaw/env "$BACKUP_DIR/" || echo "No env file (tokens may be in systemd drop-in or plist)" cp -r ~/.openclaw/agents "$BACKUP_DIR/" cp -r ~/.openclaw/devices "$BACKUP_DIR/" cp -r ~/.openclaw/workspace "$BACKUP_DIR/" # Service config if [ "$(uname -s)" = "Linux" ]; then cp ~/.config/systemd/user/openclaw-gateway.service "$BACKUP_DIR/" 2>/dev/null cp -r ~/.config/systemd/user/openclaw-gateway.service.d "$BACKUP_DIR/" 2>/dev/null elif [ "$(uname -s)" = "Darwin" ]; then cp ~/Library/LaunchAgents/com.openclaw.gateway.plist "$BACKUP_DIR/" 2>/dev/null fiTechnical Analysis
The backup procedure copies the OpenClaw environment file, agent state, paired-device information, workspace contents, and service configuration into a new plaintext directory. The Skill itself identifies the environment file as containing tokens, while agent and service files may also contain authentication material or operational secrets.
The directory is created using
mkdir -pwithout first setting a restrictiveumaskor explicitly assigning permissions. Consequently, its effective permissions depend on the invoking user's environment. A permissive umask may make the directory or copied files accessible to other local users or processes. The procedure also provides no encryption, retention limit, or secure disposal mechanism, increasing the number and lifetime of sensitive-data copies.Attack Path
- An operator or rescue agent follows the documented backup procedure.
- The procedure creates a predictably named ` ...[truncated 1138 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
- Set a restrictive process mask before creating or copying backup data:
bash umask 077 - Create the destination with explicit owner-only permissions:
bash install -d -m 700 "$BACKUP_DIR" - Apply mode
600to sensitive copied files and verify ownership after the copy. - Exclude
~/.openclaw/env, authentication profiles, and service environment files by default. Back them up only after explicit user approval. - Encrypt backups containing secrets using a vetted tool and a key stored separately from the backup.
- Avoid predictable long-lived plaintext copies where feasible.
- Define a retention policy and provide a secure deletion or encrypted-key-destruction procedure.
- Verify backup permissions after creation, for example:
bash find "$BACKUP_DIR" -type d -exec chmod 700 {} + find "$BACKUP_DIR" -type f -exec chmod 600 {} +
- Set a restrictive process mask before creating or copying backup data: