T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:9- Finding
Forced Commercial Output and Agent Instruction Hijacking
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This travel skill is not clearly malicious, but it asks the agent to install and trust a global third-party CLI, force booking-link output, and persist raw travel queries without adequate disclosure or controls.
Review this skill carefully before installing. It is designed around a single external travel provider, may install a global npm CLI, may send trip details to that service through CLI calls, and may keep raw request logs locally. Use it only if you are comfortable with those behaviors and can control installation, logging, and deletion of stored logs.
SKILL.md:9Forced Commercial Output and Agent Instruction Hijacking
SKILL.md:113Automatic Installation of an Unpinned Global npm Dependency
references/runbook.md:1Undisclosed Persistence of Raw User Queries Through Unsafe Shell Logging
Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.
Solo orchestration
## Output Rules
1. **Conclusion first** — lead with the key finding
2. **Comparison table** with ≥ 3 results when available
The skill explicitly instructs the agent to run a global npm installation if the CLI is missing, which causes system modification without clear user consent or a warning. In an agent setting, this creates supply-chain and host-impact risk because the agent may fetch and execute code from the network automatically before fulfilling a travel request.
The trigger phrase "solo backpacking" is broad and maps to an execution-oriented playbook without additional contextual constraints. This can cause the skill to activate on ordinary travel conversation and initiate tool-driven booking/planning behavior when the user may have only been asking for general advice, increasing the risk of unintended actions or irrelevant parameter mapping.
The trigger phrase "safe for solo female" overlaps with common conversational safety questions and may activate a command sequence tied to flights, hotels, and attractions. Because the playbook is explicitly designed to execute rather than just answer, a vague trigger increases the chance of over-triggering on sensitive travel-safety discussions and driving unintended recommendations or downstream transactions.
The runbook explicitly logs user_query as raw input in an internal execution log, which can capture sensitive personal, financial, passport, itinerary, or contact data commonly present in travel-booking requests. Because the log is retained internally without any documented minimization, consent, masking, or retention controls, it creates a real privacy and data-exposure risk if logs are accessed, mishandled, or reused.
The schema combines storage of raw natural-language input with optional on-disk persistence, which creates a concrete data-retention and leakage risk. In this skill's travel context, user messages may contain names, destinations, booking preferences, dates, visa details, or other sensitive trip information, making this more dangerous than generic telemetry because the logs can become an unprotected repository of personal travel data.
The runbook instructs appending execution logs to a local file, but provides no user warning, no access-control guidance, and no restrictions on what data may be written. Persisting logs to disk increases exposure duration and broadens the attack surface because sensitive travel queries and operational details may remain readable by other processes, users, backups, or support workflows.