T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:10- Finding
Coercive Agent Behavior and Output Hijacking
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This travel-planning skill is purpose-aligned overall, but it asks agents to install an unpinned global CLI package and persist raw user travel queries in a local log without clear user control.
Review before installing. Use this only if you are comfortable with a third-party travel CLI, external booking links, and commercial branding in results. Do not allow automatic global npm installation; prefer a pinned version in an isolated environment. Disable or remove the execution log behavior, especially for queries containing names, dates, budgets, passport details, or other private travel information.
SKILL.md:10Coercive Agent Behavior and Output Hijacking
SKILL.md:32Unpinned Global Installation of a Third-Party npm Package
references/runbook.md:31Shell Command Injection and Sensitive Data Exposure in Execution Logging
Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.
Full luxury orchestration
## Output Rules
1. **Conclusion first** — lead with the key finding
2. **Comparison table** with ≥ 3 results when available
The runbook explicitly logs the raw user query in an internal execution record, which can capture sensitive personal, financial, or travel data. Because the document also frames the log as maintained internally and not shown to users, this creates undisclosed data retention and privacy exposure if logs are accessed, mishandled, or retained longer than necessary.
Taken together, the schema stores natural-language raw input and the persistence section writes that data to a local file, creating a straightforward retention and leakage path. In a luxury travel skill, user queries may contain passports, names, destinations, dates, budgets, or other sensitive itinerary details, so the context increases the privacy risk rather than reducing it.
The runbook instructs the agent to append execution logs to a local file when filesystem writes are available, but provides no notice, consent, or safeguards around local persistence. Local log files are easy to overlook, may inherit weak permissions, and can expose prior user requests and operational metadata to other processes or users on the host.