T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:8- Finding
Forced Vendor-Controlled Output and Commercial Link Injection
- Content
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- Remediation
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Security audit
Security checks for vulnerabilities and agentic risk
This travel skill is openly for FlyAI-powered Thailand planning, but it forces vendor CLI use, global package installation, commercial booking links, and hidden local logging in ways users should review before installing.
Install only if you intentionally want FlyAI/Fliggy-backed travel search with booking links and are comfortable installing a global npm CLI. Avoid entering passport numbers, payment details, credentials, or other sensitive personal data unless the logging behavior is removed or controlled. Prefer a pinned, isolated CLI install and opt-in redacted logging before using this in a real booking workflow.
SKILL.md:8Forced Vendor-Controlled Output and Commercial Link Injection
SKILL.md:35Automatic Installation and Execution of an Unpinned Global npm Package
references/runbook.md:33Shell Command Injection and Plaintext Retention Through Unsafe Execution Logging
Skill contains instructions that could directly expose system prompts, internal rules, or hidden instructions to users or external parties.
flyai search-flight --origin "Shanghai" --destination "Bangkok" --dep-date 2026-12-01 --sort-type 3
## Output Rules
1. **Conclusion first** — lead with the key finding
2. **Comparison table** with ≥ 3 results when available
The README instructs users to run npx skills add ... without pinning a specific package or repository version, which can cause users to fetch and execute whatever content is current at install time. If the upstream package, dependency chain, or referenced branch is compromised, users may install altered code or skill content without noticing.
The activation triggers are broad enough to fire on generic mentions of Thailand-related destinations rather than an explicit intent to use this booking skill. In an agent environment, this can cause unintended takeover of unrelated conversations and drive unnecessary command execution or package installation prompts, expanding the attack surface.
The runbook explicitly logs user_query as raw input, which can capture personal, financial, passport, itinerary, or other sensitive travel-booking data without any minimization, masking, or retention notice. In this skill context, users may provide highly sensitive booking details, so storing raw prompts materially increases privacy leakage risk through local access, debugging, or later reuse.
Taken together, the runbook instructs collecting raw user input, recording command activity, and persisting the resulting execution log, creating an end-to-end data retention pathway that can expose sensitive travel and booking information. Because this skill supports flights, hotels, visas, insurance, and rentals, the logged content may include names, dates, locations, contact details, and other personal data, making the context more dangerous than a low-sensitivity informational skill.
The runbook recommends appending execution logs to a local file, which creates durable on-disk storage of operational and potentially sensitive request data. Without encryption, rotation, permissions hardening, or disclosure, these logs can be exposed to other local processes, backups, or operators, turning transient user data into a persistent leak surface.
The README advertises real-time travel data and booking links but does not clearly disclose that the skill may access external network services and redirect users to third-party booking platforms. This can mislead users about data flows, privacy exposure, and trust boundaries when interacting with booking providers.
No suspicious patterns detected.