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Security audit

Notify Tool

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

This desktop notification skill appears purpose-aligned, but crafted notification text can trigger unintended local shell command execution.

Review before installing or using this in automation. It should be fixed to call notify-send with a subprocess argument list instead of a shell string. Until then, only pass trusted notification text and avoid using logs, filenames, user input, or process output as titles or messages.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Behavioral ASTexec() Call, eval() Call, Dynamic Import
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (1)

os.system() or os exec-family call

High
Category
Dangerous Code Execution
Content
try:
        # Try notify-send (Linux)
        urgency_map = {'low': 'low', 'normal': 'normal', 'critical': 'critical'}
        os.system(f'notify-send -u {urgency_map.get(urgency, "normal")} "{title}" "{message}"')
    except:
        print(f"[NOTIFICATION] {title}: {message}")
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
This is a true command-injection vulnerability because untrusted CLI inputs (`title` and `message`) are interpolated directly into a shell command passed to `os.system()`. Quoting with double quotes is not sufficient to prevent shell expansion, so crafted input containing shell metacharacters or command substitution can execute arbitrary commands under the privileges of the script.

VirusTotal

66/66 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.