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Security audit

Macos Spm App Packaging

Security checks across malware telemetry and agentic risk

Overview

The skill matches its macOS packaging purpose, but its helper scripts handle signing credentials and modify the user keychain in ways that deserve review before use.

Install only if you are comfortable reviewing and editing shell release scripts before running them. Use setup_dev_signing.sh only when you intentionally want a persistent signing identity added to your login keychain, and update the scripts to use mktemp/private temp directories, restrictive permissions, safe parsing of version.env, and clear cleanup/removal steps before providing Apple or Sparkle signing keys.

SkillSpector

By NVIDIA
Vulnerability Patterns
  • Data ExfiltrationExternal Transmission, Env Variable Harvesting, File System Enumeration
  • Privilege EscalationExcessive Permissions, Sudo/Root Execution, Credential Access
  • Tool MisuseTool Parameter Abuse, Chaining Abuse, Unsafe Defaults
  • Prompt InjectionInstruction Override, Hidden Instructions, Exfiltration Commands
  • Supply ChainUnpinned Dependencies, External Script Fetching, Obfuscated Code
Findings (5)

Missing User Warnings

Low
Confidence
79% confidence
Finding
The skill instructs users to run packaging, signing, notarization, and release steps that can alter system state, consume signing credentials, and publish release artifacts, but it does not clearly warn about those effects. In a build/release automation context this omission can lead to accidental execution of high-consequence actions, especially by agents or users who assume the steps are read-only or local-only.

Missing User Warnings

Medium
Confidence
98% confidence
Finding
The script writes private key material and a PKCS#12 bundle to predictable paths in /tmp (/tmp/dev.key, /tmp/dev.crt, /tmp/dev.p12). On a multi-user system or in the presence of symlink/race attacks, another local process could read, replace, or interfere with these files before deletion, exposing the generated signing identity or causing unintended file overwrites.

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
SIGNING_MODE=${SIGNING_MODE:-}
APP_IDENTITY=${APP_IDENTITY:-}

if [[ -f "$ROOT/version.env" ]]; then
  source "$ROOT/version.env"
else
  MARKETING_VERSION=${MARKETING_VERSION:-0.1.0}
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
.env"

Credential Access

High
Category
Privilege Escalation
Content
APP_IDENTITY=${APP_IDENTITY:-}

if [[ -f "$ROOT/version.env" ]]; then
  source "$ROOT/version.env"
else
  MARKETING_VERSION=${MARKETING_VERSION:-0.1.0}
  BUILD_NUMBER=${BUILD_NUMBER:-1}
Confidence
89% confidence
Finding
.env"

Tool Parameter Abuse

High
Category
Tool Misuse
Content
fi

echo "$APP_STORE_CONNECT_API_KEY_P8" | sed 's/\\n/\n/g' > /tmp/app-store-connect-key.p8
trap 'rm -f /tmp/app-store-connect-key.p8 /tmp/${APP_NAME}Notarize.zip' EXIT

ARCHES_VALUE=${ARCHES:-"arm64 x86_64"}
ARCH_LIST=( ${ARCHES_VALUE} )
Confidence
91% confidence
Finding
rm -f /tmp/app-store-connect-key.p8 /tmp/

VirusTotal

64/64 vendors flagged this skill as clean.

View on VirusTotal

Static analysis

No suspicious patterns detected.