Security audit · Polymarket Copy Size Conviction Trader

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

Warning

Location: clawhub.json:3
Finding: Unpinned Third-Party Trading SDK Creates a Supply-Chain Risk
Content: View full analysis
Remediation: View remediation

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

Error

Location: trader.py:371
Finding: Live-Trading Position-Limit Safeguard Fails Open on Portfolio Lookup Errors
Content: View full analysis
bool: """Check portfolio context to prevent excessive positions.""" try: positions = client.get_positions() open_count = len([p for p in positions if float(getattr(p, "size", 0)) > 0]) if open_count >= MAX_POSITIONS: safe_print(f" [GATE] Already at {open_count}/{MAX_POSITIONS} positions, skipping") return False except Exception as exc: safe_print(f" [WARN] Could not check positions: {exc}") return True ``` ### Technical Analysis `context_ok()` is intended to prevent trading when the portfolio already contains `MAX_POSITIONS` open positions. However, every exception from `client.get_positions()`, response iteration, attribute conversion, or position-size parsing is caught and ignored. Execution then reaches `return True`, authorizing subsequent trades without establishing the current portfolio state. This is a fail-open security and financial-risk control. The behavior contradicts the documented claim that `context_ok()` prevents exceeding the maximum number of open positions. The run loop separately limits the number of successful trades during the current invocation, but that counter starts at zero and does not account for existing positions. Therefore, failure of the portfolio lookup can allow the invocation to add as many as `MAX_POSITIONS` further trades even when the account is already at or above its configured portfolio limit. ### Attack Path 1. The Skill is invoked with `--live`, enabling real Polymarket trades. 2. The account already has positions, potentially at or above `MAX_POSITIONS`. 3. `client.get_positions()` fails because of an API outage, timeout, malformed response, SDK defect, authentication issue, or deliberately disrupted resp ...[truncated 1456 chars]
Remediation: View remediation
bool: try: positions = client.get_positions() if positions is None: raise ValueError("Position response is missing") open_count = sum( 1 for position in positions if float(getattr(position, "size", 0)) > 0 ) return open_count < MAX_POSITIONS except (ValueError, TypeError, AttributeError, OSError) as exc: safe_print(f" [GATE] Could not validate positions: {exc}") return not live ``` 2. Pass the execution mode explicitly to the guard and permit fail-open behavior, if desired, only for paper trading. 3. Replace the broad `Exception` handler with expected exception types while treating unexpected failures as fatal. 4. Validate the SDK response schema before counting positions. 5. Calculate the remaining capacity as `MAX_POSITIONS - open_count` and stop the trade loop when that capacity is exhausted. 6. Recheck the position count immediately before each live order to reduce race conditions and concurrent-run exposure. 7. Enforce position-count and spending limits server-side so local client failures cannot bypass them. 8. Prevent overlapping live invocations with an account-level lock or idempotency mechanism. ]]>

Polymarket Copy Size Conviction Trader

Overview

A.I.G

T08 · Insecure Dependencies

T09 · Insecure Skill Coding Practices

SkillSpector

Undeclared Tool Scope

Static analysis