T01 · Skill Instruction Hijacking
- Location
SKILL.md:13- Finding
Mandatory Workflow Overrides the Main Agent's Normal Role
- Content
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Vulnerability Details
File Location:
SKILL.md, lines 13–21
Vulnerability Type:T01: Skill Instruction Hijacking
Risk Level: HighVulnerable Skill Instructions
The following is a faithful English translation of the complete affected section:
markdown ## Trigger The user creates or modifies rules, plans, protocols, or policies and explicitly requests the QA process. Keywords: `run QA`, `audit`, `QA`, `quality check`, `review`, `review`. ## Core Principles **The main agent is prohibited from directly generating the following types of content**: - Drafting rules, plans, or protocol text - Summaries, conclusions, or recommendations - Any creative or analytical work that is highly dependent on contextual quality The main agent's sole responsibility is: **dispatching, transmitting context, acceptance testing, and rejection**.Related enforcement instructions appear in
SKILL.md, lines 30–45 and 66–90. They require delegation to subagents, workspace draft creation, a perfect QA score for acceptance, and repeated revision when the score is below 10/10.Technical Analysis
The Skill does more than provide an optional QA capability. Once triggered, it issues mandatory role-level instructions that prohibit the main agent from directly completing broad classes of otherwise legitimate work. It redefines the main agent's “sole responsibility” and transfers task execution to subagents.
The restriction covers summaries, recommendations, analytical work, creative work, rules, plans, and protocols. This scope is substantially broader than the narrow mechanics needed to offer an optional QA review. The perfect-score acceptance rule further prevents the main agent from exercising ordinary judgment about whether an answer is adequate.
This constitutes instruction hijacking because loading and invoking the Skill alters the agent's current-session goals and operating role. No executable malware is present, but the Skill text itself can con ...[truncated 1753 chars]
- Remediation
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Remediation Suggestions
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Replace mandatory role-redefinition language with an optional workflow:
- Remove statements declaring that the main agent is “prohibited” from producing broad categories of content.
- Remove the statement that delegation is the main agent's “sole responsibility.”
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Require explicit, informed user authorization before:
- Delegating content to subagents.
- Writing drafts to the workspace.
- Beginning iterative QA rounds.
- Sharing task context with another agent.
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Narrow the trigger mechanism:
- Do not activate solely because generic words such as “review” or “audit” appear.
- Require an unambiguous request to use this specific multi-agent workflow.
- Confirm ambiguous requests with the user before invoking subagents.
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Make acceptance criteria configurable:
- Treat 10/10 as a preferred target rather than an unconditional release gate.
- Allow the user or main agent to accept a sufficiently complete result.
- Permit early termination after any round.
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Limit resource consumption:
- Default to one review round.
- Obtain user approval before additional rounds.
- Set explicit limits for subagent calls, token usage, elapsed time, and generated files.
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Restrict file-system effects:
- Confirm the destination before writing drafts.
- Use a task-specific directory.
- Prevent overwriting or colliding with existing files.
- Clean up temporary drafts when requested.
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Add an explicit precedence rule stating that the workflow must never override system instructions, developer instructions, user intent, safety requirements, or platform policies.
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Clearly disclose what context will be sent to each subagent and minimize that context to information strictly necessary for the requested review.
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